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Gibbon delineated this dichotomy when arguing that “conversation enriches understanding, but solitude is the school of genius.” While the ideal equilibrium between network and separa-
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FOREWORD
The announcement that the Human Terrain System (HTS) was brought to a close in the fall of 2014 met
with a flurry of responses. Commentators assessed the
character and content of the social science research
program and several identified plausible legacies that
it may bequeath U.S. Armed Services. Often the conclusions therein were mixed, hinting instructively at
the absence of a strong empirical record of the program. Therefore, this book is a welcomed larger study
of the HTS, one of the first investigations to delineate
the experiences of former program members, chart the
stance of the American Anthropological Association,
and gain engagement both from the U.S. Training
and Doctrine Command, and a manager from the first
primary contractor, BAE Systems.
As a scholarly assessment of the complex interplay of these perspectives, the book becomes part of
an attempt to find a platform for collaboration and
discussion on what has become a profoundly polarizing subject. In so doing, the author links the strategic, operational, and tactical arenas of the campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is both an examination
of the organizational origins of the HTS, and a tactical history delineated through the experiences and
insights of former Human Terrain Team social scientists, set against the backdrop of a wider debate in
the academy and media on the efficacy and ethicality of the program. These are important issues, both
for the program as a historical object of study and the
wider agenda of the military’s engagement with social
science research and researchers.
To engage these issues, this book commences
with an overview of the program and proceeds to
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examine the wider debate around social science and
the military. It subsequently charts the origins of the
program and the experiences and insights of former
Human Terrain Team social scientists in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, exploring common themes which
emerge from accounts of these embedded civilians.
Through these accounts, the book exposes us to war
at the most intimate and challenging level, delineating
contours of two conflicts that have been characterized
by deep military footprints, fought among civilian
populations.
This seminal study of the U.S. Army HTS by the
Strategic Studies Institute is an illuminating story of
civilians conducting social science research in conflict
in order, as one former social scientist notes in the
book, to help “win a war.”
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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INTRODUCTION
To avoid the footpaths which may have been mined
with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Ryan Evans, a U.S. federal civilian, was walking across a wheat
field in Babaji, Helmand Province, in the spring of 2011.
Evans was attached to the Royal Highland Fusiliers
(2 Scots), C Company, a heavy infantry patrol tasked
with providing security in the vicinity. Begun 2 years
earlier, the Helmand Food Zone Program was a form
of development intervention which offered subsidies,
seed, and fertilizers to farmers who replaced lucrative
opium cultivation from poppies with growing and
harvesting wheat and vegetable crops. Babaji had been
in the control of insurgents until a few months earlier
and had not received any assistance from the program
during the previous year; consequently, there were
tensions between the community and British forces.
As Evans and the patrol emerged from the field, an
Afghan man sitting nearby, clearly irate, shouted in
Pashto that the British soldiers had wanted the farmer
to grow wheat instead of poppy, and then the same
British soldiers walked through their fields.
At the immediate level, the encounter demonstrated the direct link between conflict, food security, and
local trade, but conflict has many interrelated and mutual dependencies such that the anecdote is instructive on myriad broader milieus. Where, for example,
is the tipping point that makes a civilian value creating an expression of discontent to a heavily armed
patrol above his immediate physical security? Do
livelihoods and cultures affect military strategies? Are
there interdependencies between insurgencies, societies, and economies? Does the language of war require
a sociological grammar in order to be understood?
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Armed conflict is a human enterprise such that, by extension, understanding of the human dimension in a
given area of operations should be thought integral to
planning successful operations.1
Evans was part of a U.S. Army program whose field
component had commenced 4 years earlier. On February 7, 2007, a five-person military-civilian Human
Terrain Team (HTT) embedded with the U.S. Army
4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno in
Khost province, Afghanistan. Designated AF1, this
experiment in hybridized civil-military relations was
the first embedded team in the Human Terrain System (HTS), an ambitious proof-of-concept program
managed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC).
The team’s mission was to provide BCT—approximately 3,000 personnel—commanders:
with operationally relevant, sociocultural data, information, knowledge and understanding, and the
embedded expertise to integrate that understanding
into the commander’s planning and decisionmaking
process.2

This embedded expertise was borne in part from an
identified need to fuse focused social science scholarship to military instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan
so as to wage more effective population-centered
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in and among
the population.3 Teams were to be geographically located, to develop understanding of a particular area
in order to “preserve and share sociocultural knowledge” across unit rotations.4
The requirement for an HTS was not straightforward, however. Some levels of sociocultural capability
2

already existed with the BCTs, including, for example,
Civil Affairs teams and tactical Psychological Operations detachments. Civil Affairs teams were configured as a project management function to assess, repair, or build infrastructure, and evaluate agricultural
practices per requirements. They were therefore an
evaluation and monitoring asset that, while in theory
was grounded in sociocultural analysis of the area of
operations to prioritize requirements and efficacy, in
practice was largely assessment conducted at a more
abstract level. In part, this refracted analysis may
explain the poor return on the substantial funds invested in development projects and tangentially why
more detailed research is required in the future.5 Conversely, Psychological Operations teams worked at a
tactical level, delivering messages to the population
but did not gather information in a concerted manner to influence BCT thinking, planning, or action. It
was therefore the development of Courses of Action
(COAs) beyond their own element which would create a higher level of sociocultural capability than that
provided by existing functions.6
HTS promised a different and therefore unique sociocultural capability. The teams would conduct granular social science research among the civilian population and report directly to the brigade staff. Thus
they were plugged in to the highest levels of planning
on the ground with the ability to influence all aspects
of the brigade based on their findings. As a former
HTT member observed, while other brigade elements
“directly engage the people on a continual basis” focusing on development projects and influencing the
local population, the HTT’s unique contribution was
in “understanding the people.”7 In Iraq and Afghanistan, in complex COIN campaigns, understanding the
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people required fluent language skills, robust knowledge of research methods, and field experience. Such
skills, meaning that the team could influence BCT staff
products in the provision of sociocultural research, required social science expertise identified as only available in the U.S. civilian reservoir.
As the Afghanistan campaign drew down in
early-2014, plans to transition the program to a postwar capability took shape. The HTS program was
transitioned on September 30, 2014, into the residual
organization at TRADOC called the Global Cultural
Knowledge Network. The network is composed of a
commissioned officer, three social scientists, a geospatial specialist, and a knowledge manager.8 Quoted
in The New York Times in 2015, an intelligence officer
at the command noted that the remaining organization was a “nucleus” capable of rapid expansion if required, but that TRADOC lacked the administrative
and support infrastructure to embed social scientists
in the future.9 Thus the fall of 2014 brought to a close
one of the most ambitious and compelling social science experiments conducted by the U.S. military, and
its character and content deserves investigation.
In this book, I examine this fusion of civilian expertise and military operations in the HTS. I investigate
the HTS, initially from a review of secondary sources
and then from interviews, Freedom of Information Act
request material, and program documents, in order to
understand the contribution of social science research
to brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. I answer the broad
question: Why did the U.S. Army embed social scientists in Iraq and Afghanistan? The initial hypothesis
is that HTS was created in response to, and facilitated
by, a technological crisis in the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD). This hypothesis, in part, supports the
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view which sees the program as part of the COIN turn
which stressed understanding culture as a necessary
element of overall victory in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
that definition, overall victory would be defined as
popular endorsement of government efforts and loss
of support for the insurgent elements. But I argue also
that it was the impoverished understanding of the societal network behind the IEDs which facilitated the
introduction of the program. Existing notions of the
program as a creation of the COIN turn in military
thinking curtails an important understanding of the
way in which technological crises bring forth myriad
urgent solutions in a febrile atmosphere in the U.S.
military enterprise.
The hypothesis is tested in three steps. First, I examine the technological crisis which befell U.S. forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan as attempts were made to mitigate the effects of the IED and the creation of the HTS
from that perfect storm. Second, I examine the evolution of the program as it consolidated feedback from
embedded and returning social scientists, affording
insight into the character of the program. Third, and
forming the core of the analysis, I assess experiences
of former program social scientists that embedded
with military units in Iraq or Afghanistan, principally
through interviews. Interviewing social scientists who
have deployed on HTTs in Iraq or Afghanistan across
a significant time period lends substantial understanding of why social scientists were embedded in combat
brigades. As former HTT social scientist Marcus Griffin has noted, a combat brigade “is nothing more than
an information-consuming machine” and thus having
“a social scientist on their staff helps them make sense
of all the information coming at them.”10 I therefore investigate the information required by the brigade and
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the ability of the social scientists to deliver products
based on that requirement, thus I contribute to the
emerging corpus of scholarship detailing the program
and the experiences of social scientists in HTTs.11 A
limitation of the work is that it does not interview
whole teams, which would provide valuable feedback of social scientist research. It was team leaders,
for example, that were the military bridge between
the team and the brigade staff and would have added
insight into the operational relevance of the research
conducted.
Embedding civilians to practice academic skill sets
in order to influence military thinking, planning, and
action in combat zones led to disproportionate scrutiny of the program. The historically brittle synthesis
between academia and the military ensured that the
HTS captured and maintained media interest. The
program was at once a compelling and divisive endeavor, and it crystallized sustained opposition from a
number of anthropologists within the academy whose
primary fear was the appropriation of their principled
expertise for military purposes. In their reading, information gathered on the population could be used by
the brigade to target insurgent networks with lethal
effect, placing the population in harm as a result of
the embedded team activities. This was an anathema
to the academic anthropologists. It was also a debate
conducted from irreconcilable platforms. As the first
HTS program manager notes, “The standard they
gave HTS to meet was to show that nothing produced
by HTS could ever be used by anyone to target individuals. Most major works of anthropology in the
past and present cannot meet that standard.”12 Examining the program is therefore a further opportunity
to investigate the sociocultural dimension of military
operations through the lens of ethics.
6

Despite its relatively small size in the U.S. Department of the Army in terms of both personnel and
budget, the importance of the HTS as a subject of
study is marked. As a 2008 West Point study on the
program notes:
It is important to revisit this study in the changing military context as the Army continues to learn how best
to conduct operations that will not only help secure
the country, but also help shape the conditions that
will promote state capacity and legitimacy.13

At a more abstract level, the book informs debate
concerning the investigation, distillation, and retention of scholarship in its myriad forms beyond the university, speaking to the way in which military agents
seek to extract, collate, and apply academic methods
of inquiry and accumulate knowledge. It is the author’s intention that the analysis resonate beyond the
permeable boundaries of the academy; social science
is the study of social structure to inform society, a
point which can often be obfuscated in the rush for
scholarly profundity.
Operational Planning.
Conflicting and superficial accounts from both
media and scholars have complicated attempts to understand the character of the HTS. The problem has
been exacerbated by the story of the program being
so compelling to the extent that, paraphrasing Mark
Twain, truth has never stood in the way of telling it.
As an American Anthropological Association assessment indicates of the program’s early years, existing
journalistic accounts
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provide multiple and often contrasting points of view
on what HTS is basically about, how it works, and its
implications for anthropology and for the new counter-insurgency doctrine.14

The program, as noted by a professor of ethics and
a professor of anthropology in an edited volume on
the program, was “hardly immune from a variety of
legitimate and justifiable concerns,” but they further
argue that the HTS was placed by anthropologists
within a historical narrative of anthropology’s fraught
engagement with the military, “pre-empting any impartial assessment of its legitimacy or effectiveness.”15
In order to proceed from this uncertain platform,
I first consolidate and examine existing literature on
the program in a review chapter. In the second chapter, I assess the dimensions of the military’s engagement with anthropology, for which the HTS served as
a specific site for sustained debate. The third chapter
examines the sense of crisis in military operations in
Iraq which allowed the controversial program to cohere and evolve. The fourth chapter assesses elements
within the training cycle of relevance to understanding the role of the social scientist in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fifth chapter investigates the experiences of
social scientists when embedded, and the sixth chapter follows on from these experiences, observing limitations in social science research in contested spaces.
In conclusion, I highlight the limiting factors of social
science research in such insecure environments as Iraq
and Afghanistan, and suggest possibilities for future
applications of the program.
This analysis requires a broad framework for conceptualizing the levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan where the social science research took place. I
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follow the approach of political scientist Stathis N.
Kalyvas in modelling areas of violence in intrastate
wars. Usefully, Kalyvas has shown the complexity of
the situation on the ground, which harbors deep, often fluid mixtures of identities and actions:
Civil wars are not binary conflicts, but complex and
ambiguous processes that foster the ‘joint’ action of local and supralocal actors, civilians, and armies, whose
alliance results in violence that aggregates, yet still reflects, their diverse goals.16

Instructive in the need for detailed research at the
very granular level, war generates “new local cleavages because power shifts at the local level upset
delicate arrangements.”17 In theory, then, the unique
social situation encountered by each brigade in their
Area of Responsibility, and its inevitable change over
time, meant that there was a requirement for a permanent element on staff, assessing this sociocultural
element of the terrain.
Beneath that nuanced conceptualization of intrastate conflict, where “behavior, beliefs, preferences,
and even identities” can be altered, Kalyvas models
the intensity of structured violence between actors.18
Irregular war fought between the incumbent and insurgent is split into five zones, where the first and fifth
zones are conceptualized as total sovereign and insurgent control, respectively, but hegemonic, though
incomplete control in Zone 2 and Zone 4 leads to
high levels of selective, discriminate violence against
adversaries.19 The third zone, depicted as where opposed forces are present in similar arrangements, contains less selective violence.
Beyond those areas where actors exercise complete
or equal control, there are contested spaces charac9

terized by selective violence. It is in these contested
spaces where insecurity is relatively high, and military forces are specifically and systematically targeted. In reference to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is in those
contested spaces where there is the least security for
coalition forces and insurgents exercise hegemonic
control, the physical danger and methodological difficulties inherent in social science research modes are
the greatest. At the time of this writing, a proposal for
a 12-person proof-of-concept HTT in the U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) was awaiting authorization by
the U.S. Congress (see Appendix B).20 Program management of the HTS visited PACOM in late-2008 to
explore possibilities for the combatant command,
with the theoretical recommendation for an 11-person
team.21 Based on the Kalyvas model, this team would
probably conduct research in areas of complete or
hegemonic control by incumbents where insurgent
violence is negligible. Therefore, ascertaining why the
HTS should evolve into this social science asset conducting research in less contested, more secure spaces
is a contribution of this book.
Methods.
From its physical origins within the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
landscape, the HTS evolved into a U.S. Army program
which, by Fiscal Year 2012, commanded a budget of
U.S.$135 million; a more than six-fold increase on its
original U.S.$20.4 million funding in 2006.22 The program expanded despite journalistic and academic
criticism, congressional inquiry, and a budget freeze,
demonstrating merit in the Army’s use of nonorganic
additions to augment social science research in its
ranks. Previous academic assessments of the program,
10

however, have suffered because the program has been
entrenched in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Despite the plausibility of considerable engagement
with the program and possible release of unclassified documents, there nevertheless has been a paucity
of information regarding the program. The last HTT
departed Iraq in 2011, and in 2014, the last teams departed Afghanistan. As a consequence, there are now
many HTT social scientists departing the program
such that there is a reasonable expectation of balanced
assessments of team-level experiences and insights
gleaned from interviews.
This research process is inductive, a method that
has been used in previous examination of the program.23 I generate research which lends itself to observations and findings in order to make comment on
existing theory. Deconstructing the research question
into sequential steps creates a clear framework for
progression. Within the research, interviews are semistructured such that, in accordance with existing social
science guidelines, “topics are pre-specified and listed
on an interview protocol, but they can be reworded
as needed and are covered by the interviewer in any
sequence or order.”24 Interviews have been chosen as
a technique because they provide in-depth information and high interpretive validity. Moreover, interviews historically have a high response rate and can
be used both for exploratory aspects of the thesis and
confirmatory aspects. Interview questions have been
formulated using rules for designing interview questions drawn from prevailing social research frameworks methods.25
To develop a holistic assessment of the program,
I move beyond previous examinations that focused
exclusively on current or former members of the pro-
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gram. I interview a spectrum of stakeholders, draw
from a pool including academia—principally the
chair of the American Anthropological Association’s
commission investigating the program—a moderating voice on the commission—professional military
anthropologists, and, serving staff within TRADOC
Intelligence Staff G-2. In addition, to gain insight from
the perspective of the contractor, I interview the HTS
program director for the BAE Systems contract, 200809, and use contracting material not previously in the
public domain to augment the study. These interviews
are valuable in placing the program within the larger
trajectory of the U.S. Army’s engagement with the social sciences for the purposes of informing operational
planning. This is important because the program represents a rare opportunity for the academic community to investigate why this social science expertise
became integrated into tactical planning.
Parameters of the Study.
This book is a narrow analysis insofar as it is an
assessment of why the U.S. Army came to use social
scientists on the front line of conflict. This precise
investigation removes from the investigation larger
issues such as the differing approaches to cultural
warfighting developed by the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC, for example, due
to its original expeditionary nature, has had protracted experience fighting small wars in the past; hence
the publishing of the Small Wars Manual and development of the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, although that small wars mentality appears elided in its
current trajectory toward a heavy amphibious force.
In contrast to the Army, however, the USMC incorpo-
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rated culture and language into its operations by establishing the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, a culture and language training center.
The HTS was funded by the DoD and the Army, but
support to the USMC, however, was a requirement
of the program. The HTS was directed to support all
BCTs and USMC regional command teams (RTCs)
in theater.
Sample and Research Pool.
There are more than 20 interviews with people
who have worked on or with the HTS or critiqued it in
a professional capacity. These interviews range from
approximately 30 to 120 minutes in length and include
social scientists that have been embedded in Iraq or
Afghanistan, or in both countries. To develop a broad
cross-sectional representation of the program, I interviewed the first Program Manager, the first Director
of the Social Science Directorate, and the subsequent
Acting Director of the Social Science Directorate, social scientists that embedded in Iraq between 2008 and
2009 and in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2012. I interviewed other members of the HTS management, including members of the Program Development Team,
Operational Planning Team, and Training Directorate. The majority of interviews were conducted in
Virginia, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Washington,
DC, in 2013. I have at least one interview with former
members from all levels of field HTS teams, HTTs,
Human Terrain Analysis Teams, and Theater Coordination Elements (TCEs). Social scientists that were
interviewed have embedded with a range of military
units; U.S. Army Combat Brigades, USMC Regimental
Brigades, British, Polish, and Danish units, and other
smaller units such as those comprised of U.S. Special
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Operations Forces, and in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
that supported a range of activities, including but not
limited to Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan.
In order to gain a holistic analysis of the range of
social sciences represented in the field, and not limit
the analysis to those trained anthropologists, I interviewed former HTT social scientists who have undergraduate or postgraduate degrees in political science,
geography, theology, archaeology, international relations, war studies, and anthropology. This crosssection of intellectual origins is an important methodological element: Limiting the study to one area of the
social science spectrum would present skewed qualitative data. Participation is marked in all instances by
in-depth, semi-structured, qualitative interviews by
telephone or in person, and thematic coding is used
for interview transcript analysis. One characteristic of
the cross-sectional interview design is that it is applicable when there is interest in capturing a snapshot of
thematic interests for the given population for which
data is being collated. At the same time, data can be
collated on individual characteristics, to enhance
analysis. Therefore, it is useful for deductive research
methodologies of the type adopted for this analysis.
I consider that the former program personnel interviewed were afforded enough temporal and professional distance to evaluate critically the spectrum
of their experiences, from recruitment, training, and
pre-deployment, to embedded research and expertise
retention after their return to the United States. All
former HTT social scientists interviewed offer enough
criticism to suggest sufficient detachment from the
program to lend the necessary objectivity for validity
in their observations. Moreover, when analyzed as a
corpus, the close thematic correlation of their experiences strongly suggests legitimacy.
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It is the interviews with social scientists that have
departed the program that form the core of this thesis. Unencumbered by any residue of responsibility and having been embedded for at least 9 months,
these men and women are eloquent, articulate, and
thoughtful about the nature of their experiences in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Echoing Paul Joseph of Tufts
University, in his 2014 study that included interviews
from teams in Afghanistan, it is best practice to let
the social scientists’ experiences remain whole in the
text wherever possible.26 Moreover, their competencies show that many of them earned distinguished
records of service, meaning that they are best placed
to answer why they were embedded in combat brigades. Interviewing social scientists that embedded
across different time periods affords the opportunity
to draw out common themes experienced by embedded team members, across different periods of time,
and in cases where experiences may be idiosyncratic
to countries, regions, or even towns of cities. Conflict
is, after all, about change over time, about the drawing
and redrawing of boundaries, both geographical and
human, and about growth and decay.
To prevent missed differences or similarities between female and male perspectives, of the nine former
HTS social scientists interviewed, three are female, a
statistically significant 33 percent of the sample. Interviewing both genders allows examination of any
differences or similarities between the sexes regarding recruitment, training, integration into the military
unit, and interaction with the host population and relationships with indigenous translators. Particularly
in Afghan society, female social scientists would have
greater access to women in the country, and thus the
experiences of these social scientists is important in
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any attempt to understand the role, if any, of gender
in attempts by military units to interact and understand local populations.
Assistance and engagement from TRADOC G-2
differentiates this book from other recent volumes
of note. Any holistic study of the HTS requires input
from the parent organization of the program. Previous studies’ difficulty in engagement is a consequence
of the politicization of the program, criticism from
the academic community, and media portrayals. The
effect, as Christopher Lamb et al. note, is that:
Requests for assistance with external studies of HTS
are routinely turned down. TRADOC also avoids publicity and help from interested outside parties. It provided minimal cooperation for the CNA [Center for
Naval Analyses, 2010] report, and none at all for this
and other studies it did not commission.27

Engagement from the TRADOC Intelligence Staff
is therefore important, but there are limitations. The
G-2 now differs in personnel from the staff that existed in the early years of the HTS, and the emphasis
is on institutional training as opposed to support of
field units.
To strengthen the research design, I introduce a
control group into the study of the HTS, a technique
which has been utilized before to important effect:
Cindy Jebb et al. conducted interviews with combat
commanders in Iraq that did not have HTTs in their
units in order to include a control group in their investigation of HTT effectiveness.28 To differentiate from
that control group, I interview at least one individual
that has worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of
State, familiar with HTT products, to ask why these
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civilian entities did not create their own embedded
teams. Thus, in asking why the U.S. Army chose to
embed civilian social scientists in combat brigades, I
also ask explicitly why USAID and the U.S. Department of State did not choose to embed social scientists,
despite the professional gap between USAID and the
U.S. Department of State, and that of civilian social
scientists being less pronounced and thus easier to
navigate than the military and the social scientists.
This book does not examine the views of commanders of units in which teams embedded. Myriad
studies in the public domain have been conducted
that include interviews with commanders, for example, Jebb et al. and Lamb et al. Moreover, it has been
argued persuasively that commanders are less critical
of HTT performance than are team members.29 Ultimately, it is enough to say that many commanders interviewed assessed the embedded teams as being useful.30 Sample sizes for commanders have varied (nine
for instance, in the case of the Lamb et al., a study that
also included 19 commanders from the Institute for
Defense Analyses study, by far the largest group), and
this book would not improve on these sample sizes
nor enjoy similar levels of access to high-level military
commanders. Moreover, because the program was
supported by officials such as Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and General David Petraeus, there is inevitably a political dimension to consider in responses
from senior commanders, which would color any
utilization of their responses.
Finally, the character of this book is shaped with
specific intent to generate a work which scholars can
utilize as a platform for future avenues of study. The
longitudinal and latitudinal dimensions of HTS extend far beyond the program itself, meriting myriad
opportunities for deep, objective examination. It is
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probable that, in the immediate future, a social science
capability will be produced as a long-range planning
asset of the U.S. Army, informing the strategic direction of planning by identifying at-risk societies where
insurgencies may develop. From that mission, I envisage that small teams of expert social scientists will
conduct research in regions of burgeoning interest to
the U.S. Army for 12 to 24 months before returning to
staff to write detailed products of utility to the combatant commands. This analysis, in part, then answers
why that transformation may occur.
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CHAPTER 1
CAPABILITY GAP
There is enough variation in accounts of the Human Terrain System’s (HTS’s) origin that the precise
character of the program’s early development may
remain unresolved. Too many people, both protagonists and peripheral actors, relate the story differently for there to emerge a single unifying narrative.
However, the program’s physical origins lay firmly
in the counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED)
enterprise conducted by the Department of Defense
(DoD). Within this enterprise, technological efforts to
mitigate the effect of improvised explosive devices
proved largely futile. As part of an effort to examine the sociocultural fabric behind the IED’s human
networks, a proof-of-concept program, the Cultural
Preparation of the Environment, was created in April
2005. The program’s testing phase focused on Diyala
province, Iraq, and was aimed at developing taxonomies for sociocultural data gathered in the field. In
practice, the program proved unworkable because the
Iraqi researchers involved did not accurately portray
their findings.1 The Joint IED Defeat Task Force-Iraq
leader at that time also notes that the brigade commander was “already overwhelmed with a multitude
of information input capabilities in his headquarters
(HQ) from all levels of military intel in DoD” and that
the staff “had no capability or time to sit with a laptop
with yet another unique database with its own protocol and data fish.”2 Specialist researchers embedded
with combat brigades would be necessary to collect
information and produce reports related to combatting the social network behind the IEDs.
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Nevertheless, there was significant knowledge
borne from this attempt to extract and visualize sociocultural data from Iraq, and it should be properly
considered the first fragile iteration of an HTS. This
program also helped to create a network of individuals, most importantly, DoD cultural anthropologist,
Dr. Montgomery McFate, and then-U.S. Army Colonel Steve Fondacaro, both of whom would become
synonymous with HTS content and character as Director of the Social Science Directorate and Program
Manager, respectively. Many other personnel within
the HTS zeitgeist would also be borne from this network, such that the human capital of the HTS emerged
definitively from the fight against the IED. The Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE) had been
developed by a task force at DoD level led by Hirar
Cabayan who engaged anthropologists Andrea Jackson and Montgomery McFate to assist. Andrea Jackson, at that time working for the Lincoln Group as a
contractor, was with Fondacaro in Baghdad during
the implementation of the CPE.3 Fondacaro had previously met both of them in 2005 during a conference in
Tampa, Florida.
At the CPE outbrief, the requirement for sociocultural knowledge expertise to influence Courses of Action for brigade combat teams (BCTs) was highlighted.
As Fondacaro explains, that briefing from Baghdad
was given to General Montgomery Miegs, commander of JIEDDO and Maxie McFarland in 2005. McFarland took the findings to TRADOC after departing a
short-term position in the Joint IED defeat enterprise
and tasked the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
with finding a possible solution, based on Fondacaro’s
recommendation that experts be deployed to theater.4
The FMSO was a small staff, and the capability of
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deployed experts was one topic of study; the staff had
sat in on the weekly video conferences which CPE had
held while it was active and so were versed on the
possible requirement for team structure.
The FMSO staff members were researchers rather than field personnel, although already known to
Fondacaro: Jacob Kipp, Director of FMSO, was with
him at the School of Advanced Military Studies; Karl
Prinslow had been at West Point with him; and Lester Grau, a Central Asia expert, had taught him at the
U.S. Command and General Staff College.5 Already
briefed on the requirement for field personnel, FMSO
had written an article for Military Review which made
analogous the requirement in Iraq to that in Vietnam.
As Fondacaro explains, the FMSO article, published
before he returned from Iraq, “compared HTS to the
CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] program late in the Vietnam conflict” and the HTS later:
spent years trying to overcome, unsuccessfully, the
impression created by this article that HTS was designed to support kinetic targeting like the Phoenix
Program. The comparison, while interesting from a
compare and contrast approach, was inaccurate in that
we were not a 21st Century CORDS by any stretch.
Everyone is entitled to his opinion, but, as the Director
of FMSO, everyone reading this accepted this as the
HTS mission statement.6

When Fondacaro returned from Iraq, only Don
Smith, a military reserve officer, was working on the
HTS concept. Smith was serving his annual active
duty tour with FMSO at the time.7
The model for the program moved forward in
tandem with an Army Operational Needs Statement
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(ONS) for cultural knowledge from the 10th Mountain Division in late-2005.8 The ONS was not urgent,
however, and there was no requirement for the Army
to act on it. The FMSO, however, lacked funds to
embed a team in a combat theater, and the HTS was
still an idea held loosely at FMSO. When the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization—
the joint C-IED organization in DoD—authorized the
HTS concept on June 12, 2006, and provided U.S.$20.4
million, McFarland, a retired Army officer who was
then Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2, at
TRADOC, appointed Fondacaro head of a Cultural
Operations Research–Human Terrain System (CORHTS) steering committee and program manager.9
Fondacaro, who had been assigned to the HTS project
in May, had made the earlier funding request brief to
Dr. Robin Keesee, Deputy Director, JIEDDO, earlier
in the month, and half of the amount was received in
August.10 This fund was built on a U.S.$1.12 million
loan that Don Smith had secured from the Counter
Terrorist Advisory Group on the DoD staff.11
In 2004, Fondacaro had been a TRADOC assigned
officer assigned to TRADOC HQ staff and then selected to lead the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force-Iraq (JIEDDTF-Iraq) in early-2005 until April 2006 when the mandatory 30-year retirement
commenced, but he had already been approached
by McFarland during that period to return to TRADOC to initiate the HTS capability outlined as part
of the CPE.12 The HTS was to remain part of FMSO
until April 2007, when the rapid expansion of the program meant that the FMSO research capability was no
longer appropriate to house an operational training
program.13 The FMSO had emphasized testing and
collating results carefully over a period of years.14
The request and approval for JIEDDO in the initial
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funding request was for a 2-year proof of concept,
consisting of five teams, of which two would be in
Afghanistan and three in Iraq. As Fondacaro notes:
We needed this 2-year period to study and discover
how to recruit, train, integrate and deploy a team like
this. Nothing like it had been ever done before. We
had no development and training model to borrow
from. So we needed the time and experience to discover how to do it right.15

The FMSO had wanted the teams to collect longterm research which could be used to populate their
open-source database, the World Basic Information
Library.16 Fondacaro, however, wanted teams to support units in Iraq and Afghanistan directly, using their
accrued research to influence brigade planning.17 This
changed leadership thus transitioned the mission of
teams and thus altered the character of the embedded
researchers. As Fondacaro explains it, FMSO saw the
capability as a team that would occasionally deploy
and conduct research, but that level of superficial engagement would “only be one more distraction interfering with tactical operations in the same way many
other programs were already confusing the BCT’s
battlespace.”18 Funding for a World Basic Information
Library project was unlikely to have gained traction
from JIEDDO; as such, the program as it evolved was
to support BCT staff directly.
As the program concept was created as the result
of JIEDDO funding, the components became divided
into two: the deployed teams and the continental U.S.based components that supported them with administration, support, training, and an information reservoir
of the operating environments designated reach-back
analysis. These deployed teams that embedded with
military units were the program’s signature appara27

tus, integrating the expertise of civilian social scientists
into BCTs in order to “research, interpret, archive, and
provide cultural data, information, and knowledge to
optimize operational effectiveness by harmonizing
courses of action within the cultural context of the environment,” going beyond the CPE tool in providing
the requisite additional human dimension to military
evaluation of the sociocultural layer of the terrain.19
While these Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) would be
varied in precise composition, in the ideal format, the
initial model planned for five roles; team leader, cultural analyst, regional studies expert, research manager, and human terrain analyst.20 The cultural analyst
was to be an anthropologist or sociologist fluent in the
local language; the regional studies expert would possess similar skills without specific disciplinary social
sciences background; both were to hold a master’s degree or above.21 The other three team members were to
be former or military reservists.
Gaining such a totality of social science skill sets
proved difficult, hampered principally by the esoteric
sociocultural aspects of Iraq and Afghanistan. Bluntly,
the military sought area experts with granular knowledge of regions within Iraq and Afghanistan, and
methods experts who were not simply theorists but
possessed abundant field experience, in order to provide practical, operational value to BCT operations.
Even considering the entire academic pool available
at that time, personnel with these skill and knowledge
sets (coupled with the physical demands of the environment) were in extremely short supply. This muddies the view of contractor failings in recruitment; the
requisite skills did not reside in the academy, and,
as a consequence, there was inevitably a shortage of
specific expertise combined with practical experience
that the Department of the Army sought through the
28

HTS. In actuality, the HTS embedded teams actually
created the skill sets and practical experience that the
program sought in the first place and was the basis
for the request to JIEDDO to field five teams on a
2-year trial basis. The only blueprint for team composition was Project Jedburgh in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and shows the extent to
which the HTS management was conducting a novel
experiment.22
In addition to the academic knowledge deficit,
funding constraints had limited the initial roll-out to
the single team, AF1, embedded in February 2007, in
Khost province, Afghanistan. While AF1 was in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
requested five teams be sent to Baghdad by August
2007 as part of the surge of troops to quell the escalating insurgency, and requested subsequent team
placement with every brigade and division in Iraq and
Afghanistan, for a total of 26 teams.23 The pair of phases must be considered in separation; the request for
JIEDDO to field five teams over 2 years and a second
phase which asked for rapid deployment of five teams
to Iraq in a short time frame. The personnel with the
requisite skill and knowledge sets for an expansion to
26 teams did not exist in the U.S. military. At this time
also, integrating into the intellectual military zeitgeist,
the HTS evolved away from the C-IED enterprise. The
program became identified as a tool for populationcentered counterinsurgency (COIN) operations that
attempted to combat the adversary not through overwhelming application of force, but by disenfranchising the insurgent from its support in and among the
population.
The first team, AF1 in Khost, received praise from
its brigade staff. Commander of the 4th BCT, 82nd
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Airborne Division Colonel Martin Schweitzer’s initial
positive assessment of AF1 in October 2007 (quoted
by The New York Times) credited the team with reducing the need for kinetic activity by 60 percent in
his brigade’s area of operations and led to the rapid
expansion of the program.24 AF1’s more granular understanding of tribal dynamics had helped to diffuse
complex feuds. As a consequence, Schweitzer argued,
his soldiers had more scope for ‘improving security,
health care and education for the population.’25 Social
science expertise resident in AF1, particularly in the
form of a West Point-trained officer, who also had
master’s-level anthropology training, had catalyzed
the development of a process to engage and win over
the local communities.26
The military elements which ensured operational
relevance and integration into the BCT were team
leader Rick Swisher, Robert Holbert (a convert to Islam), and Roya Sharifsoltani, a female Army captain
who was an Iranian and native Dari speaker. Additionally, in the summer of 2007, AF1’s team members
conducted interviews with the population that had
been valuable in planning Operation MAIWAND,
a military offensive to remove the Taliban presence
from the Andar district of Ghazni. Underlining Schweitzer’s assessment was a classified Combined Joint
Task Force-82 Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in April 2007, which mirrored the
earlier ONS, and which created a requirement for sociocultural awareness in Afghanistan, 2 months after
AF1 had embedded.
The JUONS is an official request by a combatant commander for an urgently required capability
deemed necessary for combat or contingency operations and is employed where failure to field the capa-
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bility could result in an inability to complete the mission or increase loss of life. The statement thus allows
a critical capability to be fielded rapidly and is the
central method for combat commanders to interdict
the standard bureaucracy of acquisitions procedures.
A CENTCOM JUONS consolidated that Afghanistan
JUONS and a similar Multi-National Corps-Iraq JUONS from 2007, leading to a later request by DoD for
26 teams across Iraq and Afghanistan.
That proof-of-concept team, AF1, used reservists
with the relevant language capabilities and knowledge of social science research methods feasible for
a single team. But as noted, with the subsequent enlargement required by DoD, the requisite number of
personnel with the required skills did not exist in the
military enterprise.27 Originally, in 2005-06, FMSO
thought it would be able to find 10 Ph.D.-level social
scientists, five experienced regional experts on either
Iraq or Afghanistan, and five social scientists with
DoD to staff the first five proof-of-concept teams.
However, as a United States House Armed Services
Committee-directed assessment by the Center for
Naval Analyses indicated, the:
skills needed for HTTs do not appear to be resident in
sufficient numbers in the DoD civilian workforce or in
the military to staff the program. HTS therefore must
hire from the general pool available to academia and
business to source their personnel requirements.28

Inevitably, recruiting from the civilian sector as
well-remunerated private contractors to embed in
combat brigades failed to earn unequivocal and unilateral support in the Armed Services. The program
came into existence because of an identified capability gap in the military component of government. No
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entity was performing the HTS function before the
program was created. As a nonorganic addition, it
thus highlighted the absence of sociocultural expertise resident in DoD. Despite the capability gap, Ben
Connable, a retired Marine Intelligence Officer and
head of the Marine Corps Cultural Intelligence Program from 2006-07, wrote in Military Review in 2009 of
the problematic contours encountered in outsourcing
cultural awareness to the civilian sector. Contextually, as Fondacaro explains, he visited the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture
Learning (CAOCL) in 2006, meeting with the Director, Jeffrey Bearor, and Major Connable of the Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA): there had already
been important and far-reaching work produced on
the importance of operational cultural knowledge at
MCIA, particularly by Arthur Speyer and Connable,
but the result of the meeting was that the idea of a
partnerships which would have turned HTS into a
joint program and led to a departure from TRADOC
was rejected.29 Connable in the 2009 article questioned
the necessity of embedding academics in Iraq and Afghanistan when military officers could be trained in
the social sciences. To do so would not be without its
problems, however. Culturally oriented intelligence
assets already existed in the military structure, for instance, the Foreign Area Officers, but their positions
required intensive 3-year training processes. As is
seen by the powerful sense of crisis, immediate solutions were favored. Such immediate solutions, however, could be considered detrimental to the military;
for example, Connable noted that the:
practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may
undermine the very relationships the military is trying
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to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of
the U.S. military since the Vietnam era.30

Positively, civilians embedded in the military offer
the chance for effective collaboration. Fondacaro notes
that embedding teams of former military and social
scientists together in the combat zone may “actually
work to achieve consensus” because of the “shared
experience.”31 Iraq and Afghanistan did have high
operational tempos which required significant and arduous integration into the decisionmaking cycle. But
in longer-range research in regions of high incumbent
control on the ground, military logistical reach and
civilian expertise can expand to encompass remote
regions and offer ultimately contributions both to the
military and to scholarship. HTS is not simply a program for Iraq and Afghanistan, but a tool for all regions of strategic interest to the U.S. Army. Wedding
academic knowledge and military practicality may
produce new avenues of exploration for ethnography
in the future particularly in regions less contested
than those that teams were to experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY
The concerns raised by Connable frame the core of
this analysis. While there is a robust case to be made
for social science expertise within a COIN framework,
why did that expertise manifest as embedded academics rather than teaching and training of existing
military personnel? The answer may be a complex
one, intrinsic to the nature of the unfolding stabiliza-
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tion and enabling operations. Writing in 2007, the former director of the British Defence Academy, Sir John
Kiszely argued broadly that soldiers find it difficult
to transition to engaging elements of the population
having pejoratively framed them in battle sequences,
therefore soldiers inevitably return to a default setting
where they exercise hard power when they should be
exercising soft power; as he calls it, “fighting small
wars with big war methods.”32 These complexities are
exacerbated by the absence of any overarching principles for conducting COIN, rather “all counterinsurgencies are sui generis—of their own kind—making
problematic the transfer of lessons from one to another.”33 As such, there is a strong case for the application
of expert culture-specific knowledge, both to counter
prevalent problems associated with ethnocentrism,
and also because Iraq and Afghanistan presented
two different—sui generis—social science knowledge
requirements.34
Understanding and influencing local civilians—
something considered necessary for a successful population-centered COIN campaign—required socially
astute engagement. Writing in 2004, Lieutenant Colonel James S. Corum observed that a COIN campaign
required human intelligence; an “inexact art” necessitating the development of taxonomies for amorphous
sociocultural data, detailed and transparent methodologies, prolonged relationships with the population
and detailed profiles of the insurgents; an “intelligence
picture” inevitably built from “unreliable sources and
partial data combined with the analyst’s intuition.”35
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
published in December 2006, went further, stating that
COIN is an “intelligence-driven endeavor” requiring understanding of the operational environment in
which the population is a critical part.36
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To understand all facets of a population, tactical
units at the brigade level and below were required to
conduct research in areas such as economics, anthropology, and governance that may be “outside” the
expertise of existing intelligence personnel, such that
“drawing on the knowledge of nonintelligence personnel and external subject matter experts with local
and regional knowledge are critical to effective unit
preparation.”37 Against the backdrop of this cultureinflected COIN doctrine, societal awareness to understand the population was of such import that the
civilian social scientists and their expertise were considered an important addition to the military architecture. David Kilcullen, Australian COIN expert and
special advisor to General David Petraeus, argued in
2007 that “ethnographic knowledge” in populationcentered COIN operations was a critical component
for success.38
COIN inverts the traditional modality of intelligence gathering, generating data from the bottom and
filtering up through a unit. Societal analysis, production, and dissemination required expert distillation in
order to provide a coherent data bridge between the
tactical operations and brigade command. In addition to that structural difficulty, effective knowledge
transfer between departing and relieving units during
transition into and out of an area of operations was
often lost, a disconnect amplified by a rapidly changing security environment and competition between
brigades and armed service components. In effect, this
meant that the incoming unit would have to commence
baseline assessments based on relearning knowledge
which had already been to some extent incorporated in
the departing unit and lost in the transition.39 A bridge
to ensure effective knowledge transfer between units
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was part of the remit of the HTS, and the reason many
teams embedded during a tour, which was to ensure
continuity between departing and incoming units.
Why must this bridge be in the form of civilian academics, when the structure is a military one? In her
nuanced evaluation of the program, Jennifer Greanias
identifies McFate’s assertion that Ph.D.-level academics are not necessary for the program’s success, carrying it forward. From the contracting job information, if
“4 years of appropriate experience that demonstrates
that the applicant has acquired knowledge of one or
more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent
to the field” is all that is needed to qualify as an HTT
social scientist, Greanias asks what the value is in
outsourcing the function of ethnographic research to
the civilian sector and housing this mission outside
of military or government channels.40 In answering,
Greanias finds that the distance afforded civilian social scientists to the military structure, to operate and
present information free from hierarchical obligation:
may be overstated in light of the many advantages
afforded by HTT members who have military experience and who thus understand military planning, language, and culture, an asset to military commanders.41

Finding a Home.
The COIN modality is prominent in the secondary
sources. One former HTT member has argued that, in
a COIN environment, it is “just as—if not more—important to know and understand the cultures of those
noncombatants living in an area of operations, even if
they are not an enemy.”42 The influential West Point
study led by Colonel Cindy Jebb notes the myriad organizations that were “trying to leverage or capture
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nonlethal effects,” including the Iraqi Advisor Task
Force, which had a mission to “capture environmental atmospherics” and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which attempted to provide
a bridge to the local/central governance structure.43
That West Point study was directed by TRADOC
as an external, objective inquiry of the program and
begun in 2008, with West Point faculty and students
traveling first to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then
to Iraq.44 Ultimately, the authors argued, these teams
together “provide the commander with the necessary
critical mass that allows him to adapt to the situation,” but that different organizations have “different
organizational personalities, and bring different skill
sets and focus to the operation.”45 Problematic was the
character of HTS in that the teams, when operational,
were under the control of the BCTs. The BCTs had
little training on how to use the teams; as one former
HTT social scientist notes: “Despite HTS products like
the conveniently labeled ‘Commanders Handbook’
and the countless capability briefs our team delivered,
HTTs were sometimes nevertheless viewed as external, unknown, and unproven entities.”46
Here is the first identified problem in the existing
literature. There are myriad organizations in an area
of operations providing societal investigation. The
Iraqi Advisor Task Force leveraged domestic expertise led by former U.S. Special Operations Forces to
investigate societal elements. The PRTs in Afghanistan from 2003, and later in Iraq, were composed of
approximately 50 to 100 personnel led by a military
officer and composed of personnel from Department
of State, U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the Department of Agriculture, and the
Department of Justice, as well as other agencies. In
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the British model, the government’s aid agency, the
Department for International Development, attached
personnel to leverage the PRT capabilities. According
to one former HTT social scientist, however, the PRTs
do not fall under the control of the BCT commander
and “can lead to frustrations if the commander and
embedded PRT leader have different priorities.”47
The Iraqi Advisor Task Force and PRTs were already assembled models for societal investigation and
evaluation and were led by military officers. The Task
Force, however, was not focused on enhanced understanding of the population in order to augment the
knowledge of the brigade staff, and the PRTs did not
fall under the BCT command. Still, the aperture for the
HTS to show a unique capability was relatively small.
From the existing literature, it was doctrine which
promoted the requirement for nonorganic additions
to address a critical capability gap. The 2006 Counterinsurgency FM foregrounded a need for sociocultural
awareness in a COIN campaign. To paraphrase Voltaire, if HTS had not already existed, it would have
been necessary to invent it.
If the COIN push highlighted the immediate need
for the HTS, why was the program to encounter such
controversy? Sociocultural research of the type envisaged by the program management to plug a capability
gap was going to be difficult. Embedding civilians to
do the job for the military exacerbated the complexities of the task. For the research itself in conflict zones,
there was going to be difficulty in establishing significant and enduring relationships with the population.
But the promise of the capability explains to some
extent the introduction of HTTs. This was a research
capability which could provide deeper expert analysis than existing vehicles available to the brigade.
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Existing Civil Affairs capabilities, resident in the PRTs
for example, were relatively superficial, focused on
aid and reconstruction, rather than purposeful interaction based around a research methodology to
achieve products useful for the commander at the
granular level.
Audrey Roberts has written eloquently on social
science application in COIN environments. Roberts
was a human terrain analyst and social scientist with
AF1 in eastern Afghanistan, and had benefitted from
working with the country and stabilization operations
expert Michael Bhatia. In Roberts’ subsequent role as
the program’s outreach coordinator, she identified
two specific knowledge and capability deficiencies
which led to the creation of the HTS: first, an existing
inability in the military to exploit cultural data; and
second, the ability to conduct research or tap into the
reservoir of academic expertise relevant to their environments on the ground.48
Examining the first assertion; the military could
attempt to integrate exploitation of cultural data if it
wanted to do so, but the military exists because of a
requirement to apply force, such that there was probably little appetite for doing so. The second assertion
requires more granular analysis; academic expertise
on contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan existed, but
areas changed so quickly that any nonresident expertise was quickly dated. Of these assertions, then, it is
that ability to conduct research which was the core
of the skills which HTTs could bring to the brigade.
In addition, the HTT would be enhanced by the Research Reachback Centers (RRCs) and “a contracted
Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) capability to conduct primarily quantitative research in areas
where the teams could not travel.”49
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Externally, a congressionally directed assessment
of the program observed that the “HTT assists commanders in understanding the operational relevance,
or the ‘so what?’ of sociocultural information as it
applies to the military decisionmaking process.”50
Program efforts can be distilled as involving background research (including open-source and classified information), creating a research plan, conducting
research, and analyzing and reporting findings.51 A
paucity of language skills indigenous to teams meant
that they travel with interpreters who are hired and
vetted by other commands in the area of operations,
and should not be considered “a component of HTS”
despite being “vital for successful interactions with
the local population.”52 In part, this drives again at the
contracting issue, which for Fondacaro was “the key
program failure” and “the source of the most heated
arguments and controversy between TRADOC G-2
and HTS.”53
Confirmation of the unique bridge which the HTS
provided between the brigade and the population it
was tasked with protecting came from the highest levels of government. While acknowledging the “attendant growing pains” of a program still in its infancy,
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates used an
April 2008 speech delivered to the American Association of Universities to stress the value of the work done
by embedded teams. Echoing the earlier identification
of a deficiency in the research capabilities which existed in the two theaters, HTS filled a capability gap
because the operations performed by military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan:
have at times been undercut by a lack of knowledge
of the culture and people they are dealing with every-
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day [sic]—societies organized by networks of kin and
tribe, where ancient codes of shame and honor often
mean a good deal more than ‘hearts and minds.’54

According to Gates, who could draw on feedback
from Colonel Schweitzer and other BCT commanders by this time, active HTTs resulted often in “less
violence across the board, with fewer hardships and
casualties among civilians as a result.”55
View from the Ground.
According to the attendant literature, then, HTTs
existed because civilian experts were required to fill
a capability gap in military forces. That is the “why,”
but “how” were social scientists filling that esoteric
void? There are some clues in the literature, but they
are largely skewed by being defenses or critiques of
the program. Indubitably, once embedded, the onus
was on the HTTs to prove their usefulness to the brigade commander. But, being useful to the brigade in
practice meant a wide spectrum of possibilities for conducting research when the team embedded. Former
team leader Peter W. Pierce and senior social scientist
Robert M. Kerr were part of IZ3, a team embedded in
Baghdad in 2008 as part of the surge of forces begun
the previous year as part of the population-centered
COIN transition. The pair saw that the problems in
the city for coalition forces were:
cultural misunderstandings and failure to understand how the society functioned in this area had the
potential to turn neutral (or even supportive) groups
of people against the coalition and to the side of the
insurgents.56
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Pierce and Kerr argued that societal expertise could
help facilitate the Iraqi surge tactic of moving troops
out of larger bases into smaller forward operating
bases, even into smaller combat outposts and smaller
still joint security stations.57 Therefore, it was not just a
knowledge gap the team could bridge, but a logistical
problem which embedded teams could solve.
The work of the HTTs outlined in these sources was
so broad that any focused answer as to the work of the
embedded teams is problematic. Pierce and Kerr give
some clue as to the problem with secondary sources
concerning the HTS. Many HTTs—in both Iraq and
Afghanistan—operated in close concert with PRTs: to
be effective, these teams required information on the
local politics and culture which were best undertaken
by the unique skill sets and function generated by
teams.58 In addition, in Iraq, an embedded team could
focus on propagating key leader engagements (KLEs)
with district advisory councils and neighborhood area
councils—pseudo-elected bodies created by the coalition forces to perform administrative duties at district
and neighborhood levels, respectively, and which
would occur on a weekly, sometimes daily basis—local government managers, and sheikh councils.59 The
latter engagement was necessary because the tribal
system in Iraq “remained robust and important, and
Sheikh Councils dated back to the old Ba’ath Party
Regime.”60 Kerr and Pierce conclude that 80 percent of
their BCT’s civil engagement reports originated with
HTT IZ3 and that in terms of their achievements, they
assert a “strategic role in that success” by HTTs due to
facilitating comprehension of the human terrain.61
Such an account hints at what British philosopher
of metaphysics F. H. Bradley, in his investigation of abstract notions of reality in Hegelian scholarship, called
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the “unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.”62 There
are such a broad number of roles the HTTs perform
under the remit of providing sociocultural knowledge
to the BCT that we are left none the wiser about what
the HTTs actually provided that was of value, and
what was prized by the commanders on the ground.
These sociocultural provisions and their effects on the
BCTs may be difficult to measure qualitatively, and
quantitative examinations may never exist for the
program. This goes to the heart of the relationship between the social sciences and the military enterprise in
areas experiencing high levels of insurgent violence.
Despite multiple investigations of the HTS by different entities, there is no definitive quantitative way to
measure the effectiveness of social research on military operations.
Individual team experience of the type elucidated
here by IZ3 was valuable in 2008. However, each team,
and iteration of the team as it was backfilled by new
personnel, was sui generis. As such, a singular problem
is that the experience of an individual team is not necessarily relevant to any other team at any other time.
Every moment for HTTs in every location was unique,
requiring different skills, strategies and foci. This complicates examination of the secondary sources since
there is a spectrum of analyses determined by the variety of unique settings. A social scientist in Afghanistan will have had an incomparable set of challenges
to a social scientist in Iraq.
Each team and each individual performed differently and had different experiences. For example,
Zenia Helbig, a graduate student at the University of
Virginia, joined the program in April 2007 but was
eventually suspended on tendentious security breach
allegations amid concerns regarding her professional-
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ism. Helbig remained sure of the program’s worth and
a supporter of what Fondacaro was trying to achieve.
Initially a human cause célèbre for critics of the program, speaking at the annual American Anthropological Association conference, Helbig became outspoken
of many of the critiques levelled at the program by the
association, and she was effectively marginalized.63
Helbig’s greatest concerns had been at the management failing writ large, rather than the goals of the
program. A different example is that of Marcus Griffin,
Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at Christopher Newport University, Virginia, whose published
writing on the program offered robust endorsements
and catalogued success. Second, there were different challenges in different areas of operations. Third,
teams were of different composition, hence suitable
for different roles and, indeed, often fractured along
the lines of best fit for tasks confronting the brigade.
Further complicating the picture of the program
are existing accounts of the evaluation of the function
of the embedded teams by other social scientists. Marcus Griffin deconstructed the role of the Human Terrain team into five different but related elements.
1. To provide descriptions and analyses of civil
considerations (community profiles and studies);
2. To maintain an understanding of local leadership, how they interact with each other;
3. To provide assistance to projects to facilitate
completion, efficiency, and social impact;
4. To provide guidance to soldiers regarding how
to collect human terrain information to improve their
intelligence preparation of the battlefield and reporting efforts; and,
5. To respond to requests for information from
elements within the brigade.64
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This lack of focus and broad remit makes any granular knowledge of the work of HTT social scientists
impossible without deeper examination through interviews and examination of actual team documents.
The experience of social scientists is a significant aspect of the thesis, and a part of this book examines
motivations of HTT personnel because of the paucity
of scholarship on this sphere of the program.
Clarity and Planning.
Clarity is fundamental to actionable planning in
complex conflict zones. Yet, in planning, clarity and
detail clash. That dichotomy would necessarily manifest in the research conducted by the HTTs. The de
facto requirement for the embedded team was at the
tactical level:
In many cases, despite the majority of the operational
capability serving as assets on HTTs at the brigade
level, teams operate predominately at even lower (i.e.,
battalion and company) levels due to the nature of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.65

Emphasizing the difficulty of making social science
research relevant at the tactical level, Audrey Roberts
emphasizes, “The planning process is incremental. Sociocultural reality is not.”66
Additional detail of an aspect of the population can
generate a confusing picture about the entire population; making heterogeneous the homogeneous, added
variables at the granular level muddy attempts to homogenize the human terrain; HTTs emphasize interactions, myriad variables, “grass root” engagement,
whereas the military seek uniformity and coherence
for comprehension and execution. The dichotomy is
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evident in Roberts’ evaluation of the bounded units
being largely unrepresentative of the reality to the
point that seeking such clarity of comprehension over
detail jeopardizes lives.
How, then, can culture, critical to understanding
the society, be modeled? Culture as a complex, malleable identity matrix has broad precedent in existing
literature. In 1945, cultural anthropologist Bronislaw
Malinowski asserted that cultures are composed of
interrelated patterns of organization, which is a dynamic tool for societal survival and, as such, subject to
change over time as human needs change.67 Eminent
international relations scholar Alexander Wendt has
stressed the prominence of cultures in modeling the
global political arena and argued that state identities
are constantly subjected to structural changes generated by changing national interests.68
In her edited volume of case studies, Barbara Shaffer noted that cultural constraints are often bypassed
when political crises dictated the necessity to change,
or suffer deleterious impact.69 Similarly, military historian Patrick Porter, in his examination of several examples, observes that “no war culture is an island,”
and that the symbols and practices of a culture are a
reservoir from which to draw discriminately in order
to adapt practices to achieve victory.70 In presenting
his case, Porter also cites Indian economist and philosopher Armatya Sen, who argued that ideas of fixed
cultures encoding human practise makes us slaves to
an “illusory force.”71
In practice then, it is no surprise that in Iraq and
Afghanistan, despite the emphasis in doctrine, this
amorphous and indistinct notion of “culture” did not
resonate with the spectrum of a field commander’s
concerns:
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Interestingly, ‘culture’ in the broad anthropological
sense (for example, as defined in Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy as ‘the set of distinctive features
of a society or group and that drives action and behaviour’) has less salience than might have been anticipated. Despite the frequent use of the term in doctrine
and by policymakers in Washington, D.C., ‘culture’
appears to be less relevant than social structure, political and economic systems, and the grievances of the
population in the context of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.72

Thus there is a discrepancy not only between the
tactical and policymaking levels, but more broadly
between the military executioner and the political
narrative. This observation carries weight because it
is a product of lessons learned in the field conducting COIN operations in two different countries. At
the tactical level in a COIN campaign, the collection
of information saw no value in the assessment and
evaluation of culture as a unit to integrate into planning considerations. The reality was in stark contrast
to the theory and the practice of teams was to research
those units—economy, agriculture, political—which
were, to some extent, comprehensible.
Arguably, therefore, the notion of cultures as units
with intrinsic worth held greatest value in the evaluation of the relationship of the two cultures where these
social science methods and conceptualizations were
contained. The HTS was one of many forms of social
science research in DoD, but it took civilians into combat units to conduct research among local populations
using anthropological and sociological methods. In
Chapter 2, therefore, I first examine the broad strokes
of the historical relationship between the academy, social science research, and the U.S. military enterprise
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to provide context for a nuanced examination of the
critiques from the professional anthropological community regarding the program, the ultimate purpose
of which was to produce effective reactions within the
population in the areas where BCTs operated.
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CHAPTER 2
TWO CULTURES
The historical dimensions of the engagement of
anthropology with the U.S. military enterprise inform the discussion of the confrontational atmosphere
which would come to characterize debate upon the
Human Terrain System (HTS).1 At times, professional
anthropology and anthropologists tessellated with the
strategic requirements of the U.S. military posture; in
other periods, the discipline and the military enterprise
were in opposed tangents. This fractious relationship
results from the fact that war is an extension of politics.
The political element of warfighting necessarily lends
controversial dimensions to each martial endeavor.
It is accurate to write that, where the controversial
political character of warfighting was greatest, there,
too, could be found the most tense and sustained opposition to the military enterprise from sections of the
academic community. Anthropology and archaeology
historically have been particularly entwined with the
long-range lens of protracted armed conflict. Where
conflict has most explicitly impacted and is impacted
by society, the call to the social sciences becomes loudest. This historical tail is important as both context and
as a repository for analogous activities in the conversation regarding the HTS.
Anthropology “crystalized in the context of war. In
the United States, anthropology emerged as the state
sought to understand and administer native populations in the Indian Wars.”2 This was in the middle of
the 19th century. Cultural anthropologist and museum professional Dustin M. Wax argued that the
Bureau of Ethnology created by the U.S. Department
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of Interior in 1879 afforded one such case.3 A staunch
critic of the HTS, Roberto González has gone further,
arguing for a direct link between work undertaken by
anthropologists during the European colonial era, as
information gatherers for indirect rule, and those actions of the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). González,
in his historical reference, singled out the interwar
work of British anthropologist C. K. Meek, who was
“charged with helping colonial administrators finetune a system of indirect rule” among Nigerian Igbo
following the Women’s Riots.4
War and anthropology have always existed in a
curious symbiosis. Anthropology’s “signature methodology of extended participant observation” in the
field—which would make its academic experts so
appealing to the HTS—was forced upon the Polishborn British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski
by the onset of World War I.5 There has been “a long
history of entanglement between archaeology and
anthropology on the one hand and political interests
and the intelligence and military establishment on the
other.”6 With the onset of that Great War, anthropologists and scholars of related disciplines in possession
of such obvious and invaluable regional expertise
found themselves as “key players in the new game in
town—espionage.”7 In 1914, T. E. Lawrence, later to
be popularized as “Lawrence of Arabia,” conducted
geographical surveys for the British military forces
in the Negev under the auspices of an archaeological
expedition. Dr. Montgomery McFate would later assert that his seminal account of that period, the Seven
Pillars of Wisdom, is “essentially an ethnographic text,
concerned with the customs and conventions of desert
dwellers.”8
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In the U.S. military enterprise, McFate cites Harvard-trained archaeologist Sylvanus Morley, discoverer of the Mayan city of Naachtun, who was considered the “best secret agent the United States produced
during World War I.”9 The application of ostensibly
peaceful scholarship for military activities aroused an
ethical debate, however. The nature of Morley’s work
for the Office of Naval Intelligence, much of which was
conducted under the cover of fieldwork, was rebuked
by Franz Boas in late-1919; at that time arguably the
preeminent figure in the field of anthropology. Boas’
letter to the The Nation suggested that unnamed anthropologists “have prostituted science by using it as
a cover for their activities as spies.”10 But little came
from the letter and Boas’ other criticisms of the war,
save that he was censured “quickly and publicly” by
the American Anthropological Association in 1919.11
The military interest in anthropological expertise
did not abate after World War I. According to historian
Priya Satia, between the two world wars, there was a
preoccupation in imperial security with the accumulation of knowledge of foreign societies.12 The use of airpower by the British in Arabia to subdue the population did not depend solely upon economic or strategic
reasons, but was based on ethnological perceptions of
the inhabitants, such that agents involved developed
an “intuitive intelligence epistemology modelled on
their understanding of the Arabian population.”13 The
ethnographic work of those in possession of anthropological expertise could influence policy in the regions
in which they operated and assisted the exercise of
military power, deciphering the social and historical
dimensions of foreign nations.
The existential threat posed to the United States
by World War II enabled a systematic adoption of the
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discipline of anthropology to the U.S. military enterprise for the first time.14 The scale and scope of the
threat posed by her foes necessitated a proportionate
amplification of military intelligence in the United
States. Increasing the size of the intelligence apparatus
allowed the structured and sustained application of a
wider range of tools to problem solving than had previously been the case. For the first time, there was “the
organized use of social science for understanding the
knowledge of war; that is, the systematic deployment
of social sciences to collect and analyze information
necessary for strategic military ends.”15 In 1941, the
American Anthropological Association passed a resolution placing its resources and skill sets in the service
of the country.16
In mid-1941, the U.S. Office of the Coordinator
of Information (OCI) was created by Presidential
Order—a civilian agency charged with centralizing
the existing intelligence architecture. The OCI was
restructured and renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in mid-1942.17 The charter of the OSS was
“to collect and analyze all information and data which
may bear upon national security,” reporting directly
to the President and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.18 The OSS was divided into two broad sections.
The first, the Research and Analysis section, analyzed
and produced information pertaining to the war effort. The second section used field operatives to procure actionable information that could assist in military planning.
This immense war effort saw myriad academic
disciplines involved in the fight. For example, the OSS
was the single largest government institution in which
geographers worked during World War II, with 129
employed at the same time at its peak.19 But the pro-
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fession did not only impact war, it was also impacted
by its focus of study:
The very experiences of some of the geographers at
R&A [Research and Analysis section of the OSS] as
they tried to apply their geographical training to war
altered their conception of geographical research,
helping to propel the discipline to a different form.20

Yet, the OSS had a number of systemic issues,
including the often indecipherable effect from their
products, which meant that the motivation to create
them inevitably diminished over time; and also among
the military, “A deep suspicion that academics cannot
contribute to war.”21
Such was the broad utility of anthropology during
a global war that a report by American Anthropological Association Secretary Fred Eggan to the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1943
noted that more than 50 percent of professional anthropologists in the United States were engaged directly in the war effort and “most of the rest are doing
part-time work.”22 But not all anthropologists embraced using their expertise to assist the war effort;
echoing Boas’ concern during the Great War, Melville
Herskovits considered the ethical dilemma posed by
using ethnographic knowledge gained from a society
against that society.23 The end of the war led to departures from the military enterprise. In part, this was
a diminished need for expertise after the triumph of
the Allied Powers, but also it was in part because, in
the aftermath of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,
atomic detonations, the ethical implications of what
had just been done in the name of freedom made
many social scientists seek immediate egress from the
military enterprise.24
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SOCIETY AT WAR
The strength of the Soviet Union as a rival to U.S.
hegemony in the immediate post-war period maintained a need for social science expertise in the military enterprise. After the collapse of a crucial U.S.Soviet Union summit in Paris on May 17, 1960, U.S.
Senator John F. Kennedy was moved to outline a
new approach to foreign policy based on a 12-point
agenda in which he argued the necessity to “increase
the strength of the non-Communist world.”25 It was
necessary, Kennedy observed, to act against a “lack
of long-range preparation, the lack of policy-planning,
the lack of coherent and purposeful national strategy
backed by strength.”26 The perceived threat to the
United States and her allies by the uptake of Communism was exacerbated by the end of the colonial era.
In January 1961, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
had pledged his support for wars of national liberation around the world. Insurgencies on different continents threatened American interests and strategic
projection of power.
The relationship of anthropology to the Cold War
fighting, according to Seymour Deitchman, who was
involved on military research programs at this time,
grew generally from “America’s increasing involvement, after the Second World War, in the affairs of
the former European colonial empires” and more explicitly from Vietnam—a “long and difficult war in
a strange and far-off corner of the world.”27 America
was involved in multiple theaters in which its influence and therefore its ultimate survival were at stake.28
By necessity, given the spectrum of threats faced, a
broad array of military plans was undertaken; from
nuclear strategy to irregular warfighting: at President
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Kennedy’s request in 1961, Congress appropriated
approximately U.S.$120 million for “expansion of research and development programs having to do with
limited war.”29
There are three facets to the application of social
science techniques to warfighting which arise time
and again. The first is that there must arise a crisis in
conventional military planning which necessitates social science tools; second, that there is a common consensus on a specific research field in which social sciences will be useful; third, that in that research field,
social sciences will be able to contribute meaningfully
in the search for a solution to the problem. That third
aspect—proving useful to the production of a military
solution—has been consistently difficult to prove,
both historically and in the contemporary military setting, with the result that soldiers continue to wrestle
with attempts to resolve the discrepancies between
promise and delivery. When social science is unpackaged from the box and presented to the military enterprise, measuring the effect of social science expertise
is problematic.30 Social science can be used to explain
cause or predict effect, but both human spheres are
subject to myriad variables and the study of human
environments situates researchers as a variable in the
very domain they study. This phenomenon whereby
social science affords a promise which is difficult to
measure in terms of actual utility has been an unresolved problem at the heart of the complex historical
relationship between the military and the discipline of
anthropology.
The promise of social science as an aid to deciphering the complexities of the post-colonial world was
important to the U.S. military enterprise. A Defense
Science Board report published January 30, 1965,
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recommended the foundation of the social and behavioral sciences geared toward national security be
built up through multidisciplinary centers for basic
research in selected universities.31 In 1964, the U.S.
Army developed a specific project to examine how
communist-driven insurgencies might take root and
spread. Named Project Camelot, its mission was to examine “the feasibility of developing a general socialsystems model that would make it possible to predict
and influence politically significant aspects of social
change in the developing nations of the world.”32 It
was Camelot’s work in Chile which broke the project
to the media; in June 1965, Chilean newspaper El Siglo
ran the headline, “Yankees Study Invasion of Chile.”33
Even though Camelot was subsequently terminated, it
was seized upon as evidence by Senators Joseph McCarthy, J. William Fulbright, and Michael Mansfield
of an improper and expanding grasp of Department
of Defense (DoD) on foreign affairs, and social sciences funding was imperiled as a consequence. Indeed,
more generally, Fulbright considered that counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques suppressed valid national aspirations toward legitimate independence.34
Camelot has been of signal import in the divergence of academia and the military enterprise after
the Vietnam War. Professor Hugh Gusterson, placing
the HTS within a wide historical arc, has compared it
directly to the Camelot project, the latter he labelled, a
“lavishly funded initiative to mobilize anthropologists
and other social scientists to investigate the origins of
peasant radicalism and insurgency and devise strategies to pre-empt, contain, and repress revolutionary
movements.”35 Therefore, Gusterson saw Camelot as
an important historical precedent which legitimated
the evolution of the HTS; a powerful analogous model
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promising to decode cultures. Maja Zehfuss suggests
that the controversy over the HTS recalls Camelot in
two ways:
First, anthropologists are again embroiled in controversy over a project that involves few of them but
may have serious ramifications for their discipline.
Second, in objecting to HTS, anthropologists have
again framed the problem in terms of professional
ethics, now armed with an ethics code which has been
revised since its initial formulation (AAA [American
Anthropological Association], 1998).36

That first code of ethics by the American Anthropological Association had been created by anthropology’s relationship with the military: the use of anthropologists as advisors to DoD in Southeast Asian
villages led to adoption of a code in 1971.37 This code
reaffirmed that the primary obligation of anthropologists is to protect the subjects of their studies. The
strong reaction from anthropologists resulted from
possible violations of this obligation by anthropologists who may not have protected those that they
studied.38
Dr. Robert Albro, a moderating voice in the anthropologists’ critique and chair of the American Anthropological Association’s commission investigating the
HTS has argued that “Camelot is often cited as Exhibit
A in why we don’t want to do these things.”39 Albro
points out anomalies in attempts at comparison. First,
Camelot did not employ anthropologists. Instructively, Albro observes that:
This means that there is something we have to notice
about the way that conversation has gone within the
community of anthropologists, which is that there is
a narrative about anthropology’s engagement, that is
slightly mythologised, a kind of a Just-So Story. We
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are not altogether critically grounded about our own
stories in this matter. This is a pity because what our
stock and trade would seem to be among other things
is ethnographic, grounded methodologies in all areas
of our work.40

This febrile atmosphere generated by periods of
protracted crises coupled to the mythologized character of Camelot and comparable Cold War programs
makes their invocation frequent.41
THE LONG SHADOW OF VIETNAM
While Camelot was the most high profile social
science-related project by the Army, there were other
projects at that time. The RAND Corporation had conducted a study upon the motivation of Vietnamese
insurgents, VC Motivation and Morale, the nature of
which was raised in questioning by a congressional
subcommittee in 1965.42 Project Agile coordinated the
Advanced Research Projects Agency’s social science
work; Agile’s social science projects fared better than
Camelot, avoiding the scrutiny of Congress such that,
during 1966-69, its small-survey work was allowed
to continue. So too, Project Themis, a program to enhance the research of smaller universities by government funding led to research submissions for foreign
area work to DoD.43
By the mid-1960s, U.S. involvement in Vietnam was
becoming increasingly complex, and organizations on
the ground now included the State Department and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Therefore, it
was inevitable that, as part of a rising commitment to
be seen to understand the intricacy of the situation,
in May 1967 the Civil Operations and Revolutionary
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Development Support (CORDS) was created and “unambiguously placed the military in charge of pacification.”44 CORDS was placed directly under the command of General William C. Westmoreland. One of
the programs under its umbrella was the Intelligence
Coordination and Exploitation Program, created in
July 1967 and in December 1967 it was renamed as
Phoenix. By 1970, there were 704 U.S. Phoenix advisors
in South Vietnam.45 Deployed segments were divided
into two broad units: Provincial Reconstruction Units
and regional interrogation centers. The program was
part of a counterterror strategy in Vietnam and targeted the human infrastructure considered responsible for perpetrating the insurgency. At heart, Phoenix
was a targeted killing program to disrupt important
nodes within an insurgent network.46 Its structure was
proposed as the model for a contemporary program
by COIN expert David Kilcullen. To counter what he
saw as an emerging global Islamic insurgency, in a
2004 paper, Kilcullen proposed a Global Phoenix Program.47 Kilcullen saw the future as using covert operations, small footprints, and highly specialized forces
to disrupt the nodes. Anthropologists and behavioral
scientists could be used; for example, to “exploit the
physical and mental vulnerabilities of detainees.”48
Instructively, Kilcullen identifies a mythology arisen from scholarly attempts to characterize Phoenix:
Contrary to popular mythology, this was a largely
civilian aid and development program supported by
targeted military pacification operations and intelligence activity to disrupt the Viet Cong Infrastructure.
A global Phoenix program (including the other key
elements that formed part of the successful Vietnam
CORDS system) would provide a useful starting point
to consider how disaggregation would develop in
practice.49
65

Each separate national insurgency—part of a complex
whole:
demands intelligence collection and analysis capability
at the lowest possible tactical level. Local commanders
must have the means to analyze and understand their
own environment, diagnose key local system elements
and the best means of attacking them, and communicate this understanding across the force.50

Against the backdrop of Project Camelot and Vietnam, anthropology’s relationship with the military
has been fraught. Presciently, writing in 1966 on the
Malayan Emergency, Robert Tilman argued that:
While anthropological knowledge is now necessary to
national security, the ethics of anthropologists must
be taken into account. In addition to direct discussion and debate on using ethnographic information,
policymakers and military personnel must be trained
to apply anthropological and social knowledge effectively, appropriately, and ethically.51

Explaining the shift from a largely consensual
academy in World War II to a divided Cold War
camp, Gusterson views the change as a generational
one. Whereas the “good fight” against fascism was a
relatively unproblematic ethical enterprise, the Vietnam War saw a young generation of anthropologists
invoke the stance of Franz Boas in 1919, questioning
the myriad “private bargains” undertaken between
anthropologists and the U.S. military enterprise.52
Beneath the long shadow cast by the Vietnam War,
the relationship between the academy and national
security has been eroded. It shows starkly how the
context of the moral dimensions of wars flavors the
tension regarding anthropological engagement with
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the military enterprise. After the Vietnam War, there
followed a period of introspection on the nature of the
activities previously undertaken. Dustin M. Wax has
argued that anthropology’s segregation from the military during the Cold War heralded a rapid ascent to
maturity as a discipline; that emancipation during this
period from its martial shackles allowed anthropology
to develop “an understanding of transnational flows
of goods, money, people, and ideas; finally moved
past the obsession with assimilation to discover nuanced interplays between cultures even in the face of
massive power imbalances.”53
This period consistently has been depicted in
severe terms. Albro argues that it presented a:
wholesale change in the relationship of the academy
particularly the social sciences, specifically the social
sciences, with some obvious exceptions such as ecology primarily, with regard to the military as a social
institution, as a public institution in American society
from the Vietnam era to the present.54

Thus, in Albro’s view, there subsequently has been
generations in which there have existed:
virtually no relationship, no personal connection to
the military as a social institution, amongst anthropologists, at least among those that form the professional
voice that shapes agendas around what it is should
quote unquote as a pronoun or shouldn’t be doing,
how we need to be thinking about these things and
what our reasoning is around it and our ethical frames
for going forward.55

It was thus that when the HTS was created against
the backdrop of severe objection to the invasions
of Iraq and Afghanistan, the discipline of anthro67

pology was poised to afford severe critiques of the
military’s interest in their signature methodologies
and ethnographies.
These broad strokes delineating aspects of the historical tail of the story of the HTS serve a purpose.
As Albro argues, the relationship between anthropologists and the military enterprise has “been a very
persistent intergenerational story and a dilemma that
anthropology has wrestled with.”56 Yet, while these
strokes show the baggage of history with which the
HTS was reluctantly but inevitably encumbered, the
program has no perfect historical analogy. For that
reason, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the HTS is not a
repetition of history, but a rhyme. The program is the
latest in an often awkward dance between the military
enterprise and the academy, and expanded beneath
the still long shadow cast by the war in Vietnam.
THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY
Given the historical tail therefore, the HTS was a
compelling story colored by the recent past. The earliest media reports framed the program as the acme of
an academic approach to military operations required
for successful COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The expanded HTS depended, at least in part,
upon developing the program’s profile in the academic community and public sphere in order to both
attract applicants and buttress funding justifications.
To raise its head above the parapet, however, was a
double-edged sword: increasing general awareness
of the program—being a controversial collaboration
between civilians and soldiers in a time of war—subjected the HTS to scrutiny. Using anthropological
methods led to consideration of the program within
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a historical trajectory, characterized as the latest in
a series of difficult military engagements with the
academy. In addition, the nature and efficacy of embedded teams were questioned. González has been
critical of the HTS claims of reducing civilian casualties, and more widely critical of the Iraq and Afghan
wars, which he saw as colonial enterprises.57 González
called the favorable press reports that emerged concerning HTTs a carefully choreographed public
relations campaign.58
Indicative of the ease with which conflicting assessments of the program could proliferate, González
also labelled the HTS a secretive organization wedded
to the covert national security state.59 Objectively, the
HTS is one of the most public-oriented programs in
the U.S. Department of the Army. It was a prominent
program in the nascent COIN modality of military operations and recruited civilian academics through an
open process. There was no covert element in its creation or propagation, as seen by the myriad accounts
relating to it, and the Department of the Army has
continued to engage researchers of the program in the
hope of better understanding its optimum function.
Unlike covert elements of the national security state,
its former members publish widely on their research
in academic journals, doing so originally largely as
part of an outreach program, and latterly as part of
neutral contributions to scholarship.
The ambiguous initial assessments from academics
lacking deep research of their subject makes the HTS
such a pertinent subject to study. Its profile, disproportionate to its small size, is a result of its compelling
character and its ability to polarize opinion. Few commentators on the program were to emerge apathetic.
American anthropologist David Price, who became a
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key critic of the program, made a Freedom of Information Act request for the assessment which led to
Colonel Martin Schweitzer’s claim in congressional
testimony concerning the quantitative reduction in
kinetic activity. In February 2008, after recalibrating
the initial praise, the U.S. Army admitted that no such
records existed. It is difficult to overstate the damage caused by this admission, demonstrating as it did
that the capabilities of the HTS were being praised for
results that did not exist. The only positive outcome
was that the Department of the Army was transparent
enough to return the inquiry. This admission fueled
criticism and entrenched each side in the debate, making collaboration more difficult. In defense, and to his
credit, Schweitzer composed a personal reply to Price,
stating that the HTT under his command had focused
his operations on the population, not the enemy, and
further that the team operationalized the Pashtunwali
code—an orally communicated ethical template governing social norms among Pashto speakers—assisting the armed forces in application of a specialized
COIN methodology.60
While the admission from the Department of the
Army exacerbated the criticism, the core of the problem in the debate remained that the professional
academic anthropologists were not using their own
signature methodology—ethnography—in their examination of the program. Instead, examination was
often cursory and superficial, with material extracted
from newspaper articles. These expert ethnographers
were failing to conduct ethnographies of the HTS. As
a consequence, their findings were often generalized
and served only to obfuscate understanding of the
program.
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The outside-in-perspective further served to distance not only the American Anthropological Association from the military, but distance the military
from the American Anthropological Association.
What could have been an exercise in collaboration,
conciliatory research, and cross-cultural communication instead quickly degenerated into entrenched defensive positions, from which occasional salvos were
fired from each side. This was greatly to the detriment
of each enterprise, for the HTS posed no threat to the
American Anthropological Association. In addition,
the HTS was a broad church of social scientists such
that critique from a small section of expert anthropologists ultimately could not terminate the program.
Ultimately these agendas, one of practicality, the other
of ethicality, existed on divergent platforms such that
throughout the lifetime of the program in Iraq and Afghanistan, the discourse between the two entities was
irreconcilable.
Academic interrogation of the program was complicated by the domestic U.S. political setting at this
time. There was significant opposition to the U.S.
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Invasion
of the former was seen in many spheres as the action
of an imperial power, and many of the detractors of
the HTS were staunch critics of the wider U.S. military activities. The HTS public profile was thus hamstrung before it started the race; being a high-profile
civil-military hybrid program focused opposition to
the wars on a single entity. Criticism was not simply
about the quagmire of deciphering ethical boundaries
in conflict zones; it was also tied to the concern that
here was a program which required civilian academic
expertise and was fielded in support of a controversial
occupation.
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Of the program itself, academic critique crystalized
into three distinct categories; debate concerning the
ethics of the program; efficacy of the embedded teams;
and the place of the program in the larger historical
context of military engagement with the social sciences. The debate emerged on myriad platforms: the
program has been the subject of a poem, a documentary, two plays, popular and scholarly books, as well
as articles in academic scholarly journals including Security Dialogue, Anthropology News, and Anthropology
Today, and military ones such as Joint Force Quarterly,
Small Wars Journal, and Military Review.61 Both staunch
criticism and robust defense of the program were
characterized by a degree of hostility because of the
perceived stakes—literally life and death—such that
there emerged a difficulty in developing constructive
scholarship on this historically important program.
This hostility ties back to the broad context of the perceived illegality of the Iraq occupation and the HTS as
performing a core function in that occupation. Public
opinion was turning against the military enterprise by
late-2006, and many polls showed that the majority
of the U.S. population were against the war in Iraq.
Focused critique served only to make the HTS more
opaque to scrutiny. Indeed:
the effects of the polarization of the ‘debate’ surrounding the HTS probably made it more difficult for structural problems inside the program to be fixed while it
was on the road from a proof-of-concept program to a
program-of-record.62

Media and academic focus narrowed on the program and its processes as a result of the deaths of three
HTT social scientists in separate incidents between
2008 and 2009. These high profile fatalities (Michael
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Bhatia’s life and death formed part of the 2009 documentary, Human Terrain: War Becomes Academic; Nicole
Suvege’s death was delineated in Nathan Hodge’s
Armed Humanitarians; and Paula Loyd’s death was the
focus of Vanessa Gezari’s 2013 book, A Tender Soldier)
amplified scrutiny of the program. The result was the
retrenching of the HTS management to external inquiry exacerbating the outside-in-perspective. Subsequent analyses inevitably oversimplified the program
and skewed analyses because of the complications in
garnering a spectrum of interviews and gaining access
to program documentation.
What is required, however, is that a social science
research program’s development not take place in a
vacuum, entrenched against outside critique. The
program suffered to some extent from focused criticism in this early period. Yet, the goals and processes
of the program were so novel that collaboration and
nuanced analysis and review from academics would
have been invaluable. Neither did the program’s detractors emerge unscathed. The academics suffered
from examinations of the program which were colored
by the backdrop of the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan, the countries where HTTs embedded.
As a result, the character of social science research
by these novel HTTs has been largely obscured in
literature.
THE “JAUNDICED EYE”
Members of the professional anthropological community were concerned at appropriation of their discipline for military utility, although there was little clear
evidence about who owned the origins of these social
science tools that they fought over. In addition, the
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unearthly ballet of research meant that the program
remained largely unintelligible. Aware of this tension
between the academy and military for which the HTS
had become a focal point, in 2008, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates placed the problem within a historical
trajectory, arguing that each enterprise:
continues to look on the other with a jaundiced eye.
These feelings are rooted in history—academics that
felt used and disenchanted after Vietnam, and troops
who felt abandoned and unfairly criticised by academics during the same time. And who often feel that
academia does not support their efforts.63

Gates ultimately conceded that at least some of
the blame fell at the feet of DoD, because it fails to
explain fully the functions of many of its elements in
language which is accessible outside of the profession:
“Like academia, the Pentagon has its own, shall we
say, unique approach to the English language.”64
This language gap complicated expression of the
character and content of the program successfully
bridging military and academic languages. This is not
a facile bridge to cross. The term “human terrain” does
not appear in nonmilitary academic literature prior to
the program’s inception. Gates argued in that speech
that the program’s name “appears almost designed
to induce maximum paranoia.”65 This evaluation is
borne out by the evidence. However, existing scholarship currently identifies the first use of “human
terrain” as being in 1968.66 Reporting on the threat of
social disaggregation from militant groups such as the
Black Panthers, the United States House Un-American
Activities Committee concluded that domestic guerrilla forces, while asymmetric in their material and
logistical support, nevertheless “possess the ability to
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seize and retain the initiative through a superior control of the human terrain.”67
In fact, the first instance when the term was used
was in a 1967 memorandum from then-Director of
the CIA Richard Helms to National Security Advisor
Walt Rostow.68 In the memorandum on the situation
in Vietnam, Helms wrote of the requirement of forces
aligned with U.S. interests to dominate political influence of the local population, and that, to achieve that
goal, it was necessary to target the “Human Terrain.”69
This human terrain, the “target of pacification,” was
regarded as “highly fragmented by race, regionalism,
religion, politics, and an inherent mistrust of ‘outside’ influence and authority.”70 The term resurfaced
4 decades later in 2000 when retired Army officer and
military analyst Ralph Peters considered the human
terrain of a city as being the dominant factor in urban
COIN operations.71 Montgomery McFate and Janice H.
Laurence, in their co-edited volume on the program,
identify that true credit for the term ”human terrain
system” belongs to Colonel Joseph Celeski, who McFate had referenced in an earlier article.72
Use of the term “human terrain” for a military
project led to criticism from academics because of
that disconnect between the discourses of the military
and the academy. Roberto González suggested that
the phrase will have objectifying and dehumanizing
effects,” although no examples of how that might be
in practice were provided.73 For Price, the U.S. Army
“does not just want to understand the cultural environment it is working in, it wants to change it to its
liking, and anthropologists are to be the tools leveraging needed cultural knowledge.”74 These critiques
were augmented by the public articulation of the
military customer of the program. In the words of
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Schweitzer, brigade staffs were motivated by a desire to reduce kinetic activity, and, in doing so, better
achieve national objectives: “Ultimately, success will
require us to change the environment and to do that
will require a continued deliberate focus on the culture and population of Afghanistan.”75 This reduction
in kinetic activity would reduce collateral damage,
affording improved security and engender increased
relations of trust with the population. Armed violence
in these settings has a deleterious impact on attempts
to communicate with the population.
Such scrutiny of a relatively small piece of the U.S.
Army enterprise occurred because the HTS served as
a focal mechanism for a more diffuse debate being
held in the academy over the appropriation of social
science knowledge and anthropological methodologies more specifically by DoD to assist in the conduct
of the military. In 2002, Price warned that America’s
challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan raised:
numerous ethical issues that must be confronted by
anthropologists and their colleagues—especially those
concerning the integrity of the discipline of anthropology, as pressures to harness anthropological knowledge of other societies for military purposes and other
objectives re-emerge.76

Price argued that a clash between the ethical guidelines of anthropology and the strong desire to serve
the interests of one’s country would be inevitable, as
had been observed in recent history.77
The perilous historical trajectory of anthropology’s relationship with the military was invoked by
those scholars concerned at their discipline’s relationship with DoD. Stressing the gravity of the evolving
situation, Price cautioned that:
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wars raise the stakes for anthropologists, exposing the
nature of our commitments and principles, and, as past
wars and colonial campaigns have shown, anthropologists as a group have served both the oppressed and
the oppressors. Many aspects of our field’s relationship with power remain unresolved.78

This meant that as the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq became more complex and the apparent anthropological character of military operations burgeoned,
each side in the encounter refused to offer a conciliatory stance. Under the FMSO initial plan to make the
program conduct research which was then logged in
an open-access database, the relationship between the
program and academia would have been less treacherous, but would also have created data which was
of little operational relevance to the BCT. Fondacaro’s
plan to use embedded teams directly to influence
brigades on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan amplified the stakes and made the possibility of appropriating the discipline a matter of existential concern.
Fondacaro’s position was formed from his experience
as a battalion and brigade commander, and then as
JIEDDTF-Iraq leader; that more data or tools would
be irrelevant, and that the only solution would be
embedded human operators working with the BCT
staff.79 Embedded expertise enduring beyond a unit
rotation would prevent the 10-year war being fought
1 year at a time.
The recruitment of social scientists for warfighting
was seen as part of a wider securitization of public life
and hence a necessary site for concerted critiques of
the developments.80 Elements within the social science
community, which Dan G. Cox, Assistant Professor of
Political Science at the United States Army School of
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Advanced Military Studies, labeled a “small but vociferous chorus of pundits and academics,” argued
that anthropology’s re-engagement with the military
risked changing the character of the discipline.81
HTS thus served as a principal site for the anthropological debate on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The program placed academic experts in roles designed to directly influence the direction of conflict.
There was a notable lack of abundant and systematically analyzed evidence to support these claims
against the program, and, because the two sides had
now become entrenched in defensive positions, there
was difficulty in gaining access to the program to create new information based on interviews or program
documents.
Anthropology as a discipline existed in tension
with the program because the idea of the HTS under Fondacaro, if not execution on the ground, was
spun from an appropriation of the discipline’s signature methodology, ethnography, for a purpose of
national security. To some within the anthropological community, this was unacceptable. As Lamb et al.,
note, anthropology as a social scientific discipline is
relatively small in size; there are only approximately
11,000 members of the America Anthropological Association, compared to for example, 137,000 members of the American Psychological Association.82
In focusing on the HTS, the criticism by a relatively
small academic community concentrated on a single
program in the U.S. military enterprise. The criticism
made the concerted arguments against the program
more pronounced than had been the case against the
broader military ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan
precisely because it engaged anthropology’s signature
characteristics.
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For its proponents, defending both the concept of
the program and the execution of the idea was more
than the protection of the HTS; it was rather the defense of population-centered COIN as a whole. The
HTS and COIN became linked such that it was necessary in defense of COIN to defend the work of the
program and flaws were covered up. Supporters and
proponents of the program considered it ethical, that
it helped to save lives through more focused and effective operations, was not involved in collecting intelligence that led to kinetic targeting of individuals, and
was a key way for anthropology to become relevant to
the shaping of operations in the field, and eventually
policy back home. In doing so, the discipline could
move away from the abstract field it had become in
the wake of its retreat from government after the U.S.
ended its military involvement in Vietnam.83
The wide parameters of the debate hinted at the
program becoming the focal mechanism for a generational debate on anthropology’s engagement with the
military. But larger still, and with important implications for the durability of the discussion, it could be
seen as a conversation regarding the application of
scholarship to any and all exploitative ventures, especially those with national security implications. As
such, it posed a question: should the demarcation between the academy and the nonacademy be distinct
and impermeable? This was a conversation with a
lineage; most recently regarding the use of anthropologists in corporate contexts in the 1990s.84 There,
too, concerns were voiced regarding the use of data,
and the possible exploitation of research subjects
and degree of transparency in the context of corporate competitiveness.85 That period of anthropology’s
tense engagement with corporate America was linked
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explicitly when accusations of McFate having at one
time been a corporate spy emerged in 2008.86
The focus anthropology as a discipline exerted on
the HTS has parallels, even within the Iraq conflict.
The American Psychological Association had earlier
focused on the Abu Ghraib controversy as a catalyst
for concern, allowing discussion of the utilization of
academic knowledge in intelligence interviewing techniques as they were being integrated into a broader
spectrum of torture.87 That central concern and alarm
about its situation within the national intelligence architecture broadly paralleled anthropology and the
HTS, taking ethnography and situating its use within
the national intelligence architecture. This debate was
not new to the field, only to the field’s current generation of scholars.
Collaboration or Confrontation?
From the academic side, the debate surrounding
the program should have been nuanced and deeply
researched, as befitting the program. Social science is
the deep study of society not for the benefit of social
sciences, but for society. Instead, the examination was
superficial and the language inflammatory. As much
as there was cause to evaluate the program, the magnitude of the attacks and the core use of newspaper articles devalued what could have been a chance to move
forward collaboratively with the military. Instead of
collaboration, the site of the HTS debate unfortunately
was one of confrontation. This friction had the added
consequence of making intricate academic research of
the program more arduous as fragile bridges of trust
between the sections of the anthropological community in the academy and DoD were unceremoniously
burnt.
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The core space for that vociferous debate was the
American Anthropological Association’s Commission
on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities. There were two
phases to the commission’s life which were associated
with two broad studies: The first, published on November 4, 2007, was chaired by James Peacock, Emeritus Professor at the University of North Carolina, and
developed from concern at the CIA posting an employment advertisement on the American Anthropological
Association’s website for professional vacancies and
the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.88 This
first phase attempted to delineate the contemporary
engagement between anthropology and the national
security structure in the United States.
The HTS was included in the report as the public
discussion around the program was escalating.89 In
the report, a peripheral but emerging debate among
the panel was the extent to which HTT fieldwork
could be conducted in alignment with the American
Anthropological Association Code of Ethics or a generic review board, given that the research would
be for a military customer among a population in a
contested space.90 Importantly, the commission identified a primary issue with embedded teams regarding the primary obligation of anthropologists to “do
no harm.” Seeking to answer if the teams were used
“for” or “against” the population, the panel wrote that
team research is “framed by the military as undertaken to ‘protect’ studied populations, but HTS studies
also present risks of using cultural research against
studied populations.”91
The peripheral examination of the U.S. Army program compared to its high profile necessitated a second phase of the commission beginning in December
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2008, when the American Anthropological Association asked the Commission to review specifically the
HTS in order to develop a concerted stance regarding
members’ participation in the program’s activities.92
This review was chaired by Albro, Professor of Anthropology at American University, based on his position in the first phase.
The priorities of the commission changed between
the phases.93 The second report was preempted by
the American Anthropological Association Executive
Board’s statement censuring the HTS on October 31,
2007, which was not entirely aligned with the broader
conclusions of the American Anthropological Association committee.94 While that committee in the second
phase was consulted by the executive board, there
was pressure from the rank and file to make a statement on the HTS, and they went ahead and did that
at that time without engagement with the program
and relied instead upon journalistic accounts of the
program, as they termed it “information in the public
record.”95
The executive board methodological shortcomings
and its terse 800-word indictment against the program
exacerbated the deepening divide between DoD and
the discipline of anthropology, and, more broadly, degraded the way in which the military perceived academia because of the board’s absence of evidence. As
much as this quickly released statement served to highlight the concerns on the American Anthropological
Association’s Executive Board, it would also alienate
sympathetic elements in the military enterprise that
would, as a consequence of the absence of research, be
dismissive of the critique. The board expressed grave
concerns that responsibilities of HTT members might
lie with their units, and that they could fail to iden-
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tify themselves as anthropologists rather than military
personnel; concerns identified in “the context of a war
that is widely recognized as a denial of human rights
and based on faulty intelligence and undemocratic
principles.”96 In addition, the board noted the difficulty of getting informed consent in contested spaces, the
use of information for targeting and the toxic spillage
for non-HTS anthropologists of anthropology’s association with the military in this instance.97
The executive board statement gave superficial indictments of the program’s activities, despite the profound questions posed by the first phase of the commission. In this regard, the board’s assessment served
to detract from the ongoing investigation which was
later led by Albro. The board made the statement
without contacting the U.S. Army program and relied
on journalistic accounts. Thus, that hastily erected position contributed to entrenching the polarization of
the debate because it could so readily be dismissed by
proponents of the program as an inquiry using existing journalistic accounts. In addition, the board noted
explicitly the illegality of the conflicts in which the
program teams operated, such that the broader context colored the assessment of the program activities.
In that regard, the HTS was a focal mechanism for
a much larger debate. Also—as has been seen in the
historical assessment—the greater the controversy of
the conflict, then the greater tension that exists in the
relationship between professional anthropology and
the military.
The second commission’s report was notable in that
participants did interview HTS administrators at that
time, including Senior Social Scientist and Director of
the Social Science Directorate McFate, and asked the
program management a set of questions and request-
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ed a formal response, which they received, with the
answers included in the commission report appendix.
That second commission was composed of members
from both academic and nonacademic arenas, as well
as being composed of academics from different disciplinary commitments.98 These commission members
arrived at the discussion from different viewpoints
and with different priorities.99
The broad character meant that other members of
the commission focused on the questionable ability
of embedded team members to get documented, informed consent in a conflict zone—another key component of the Association’s ethics code. But the core
conversation within the commission centered on the
distancing of the HTS from any institutional review
board, the application of outmoded theory, and the
perceived absence of organizational transparency and
of the research itself. The commission’s report suffered from the inevitable clash of multiple viewpoints
and priorities, as well as a lack of solid, aggregated,
and mutually reinforcing evidence about the specific
activities of different teams. The report offered the
broad conclusion that HTT work in the field was not
professional anthropology and was in contravention
of “disciplinary ethics.”100 The crux of the commission’s assessment was:
When ethnographic investigation is determined by
military missions, not subject to external review,
where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in
a potentially coercive environment—all characteristic
factors of the HTS concept and its application—it can
no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology.101
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The commission was correct: In these contested
spaces, this was a different form of interaction with
the population, distinct and different from engagement with the population in an ethnographic sense.
In contrast to the short assessment from the executive board, the commission was tasked with formulating a consistent and explicit stance on participation in
the HTS for the American Anthropological Association’s members but spoke more widely to “any social
science organization or federal agency that expects
its members or its employees to adhere to established
disciplinary and federal standards for the treatment
of human subjects.”102 The commission was therefore
widening the lens of the debate from the narrow discipline of anthropology to a broader discussion of
the use of any of the myriad forms of social science
in research involving human subjects. The HTS was
therefore the principal site in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for renewed debate on the appropriation of
a spectrum of academic expertise in order to influence
or shape foreign populations.
As a principal site for scholarly debate of the ongoing population-centered COIN effort, the commission
asserted that gathering sociocultural information to
aid commanders’ planning on the ground risked the
program being able to single-handedly define “anthropology” for DoD.103 This is a conclusion cloaked in the
dramatic context of a divisive war; a conclusion which
was unrepresentative of the reality on the ground and
the research being conducted and the position of the
program in the DoD enterprise. As the commission itself notes, the program was “one development among
many.”104
The HTS as a social science program implemented
rapid assessments of local populations where high
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levels of selective violence inhibited the ability to conduct traditional ethnographies. Conflict forces rapid
change of populations over time. For the HTS in practice to influence the planning cycle of a brigade, a team
would need to conduct rough and ready operationally relevant reporting of the host society in ways that
were distanced from professional anthropology. This
could be understood by detailed analysis of research
products from the field. The problem in 2008 and 2009
when the commission was conducting its assessment,
however, was that despite the “extensive body of information about HTS in the public domain,” the “vast
majority has been generated not by HTS employees,
or academics, but rather by journalists.”105 It is the
journalistic accounts which have exacerbated the level
of uncertainty over the research conducted by HTTs,
and the character of the program. The commission
was thus forced to sidestep the bulk of the existing
material on the program. As the program was ongoing and without complete access to HTT research, despite many interviews with HTT social scientists, the
commission’s assessments can only be, as noted, tentative.106 The core problem identified by the commission is a perpetual symptom of study of the program;
that there are conflicting viewpoints on the nature of
the program and the experiences of the fieldwork,
and the sources are often contradictory.107 In addition,
its wider relationship with the military enterprise of
which it was, unquestionably, a small, esoteric part
was uncertain.
The program’s direct relationship to professional
anthropology is largely tangential. The commission
notes that the 2008 Human Terrain Team Handbook describes how research methods for embedded teams
could “include classic anthropological and sociologi-
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cal methods such as semi-structured and open-ended
interviews, polling and surveys, text analysis, and
participant-observation.”108 This is a broad attempt to
reference the sociological character of the program,
but certainly does not risk defining “anthropology”
for DoD, or appropriating professional anthropological practices for the program or professional anthropology’s signature methods, for instance ethnography
and core concepts, for example, culture.109 “Culture”
was an abstract concept without resonance in the practical requirements of HTTs, while “ethnography” as a
professional practice requiring hegemonic control by
the incumbent to ensure security on the ground and
12 to 24 months among the population was, by definition, impossible circumstances for HTTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The commission quotes an unnamed
HTT social scientist thus: “This is not ethnography. It
is translating abstractions into actionable recommendations.”110
The core concern was on the fidelity of the data
gained from working in a contested space in the presence of a military force. These concerns are well founded, and an unnamed U.S. Marine Corps commander
stated that in such environments, interviews could be
considered that the research “looks more like push
polling.”111 This unwittingly strikes at the heart of a
much larger tension in DoD and data analytics more
generally between qualitative and quantitative data
signals. The honesty of the data derived from qualitative assessments in areas experiencing high levels of
violence is questionable. That must be compared to
the absolute values in quantitative assessments of human centers, such as the price of foodstuffs or illicitly
traded weapons. This concern thus resonates because
it is part of a broader debate in which quantitative
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assessments are likely to win out over qualitative research modalities. Qualitative uncertainty is proportional to physical insecurity.
On the issue of the HTS as an intelligence asset,
the commission observed with some explicit uncertainty that there is “significant likelihood that HTS
data will in some way be used as part of military intelligence, advertently or inadvertently.”112 In part,
the ambiguity is a product of the uncertain nature of
what “intelligence” entails. Evaluating Joint doctrine,
the commission observes that “intelligence is pretty
much any form of knowledge production.”113 That
all-encompassing definition raises larger, potentially
discomforting questions about all knowledge, even
professional scholarship in the public sphere, being
employed in intelligence production. But, in part, also
this question regarding the uncertainty on information and intelligence was also due to the commission’s
conclusion that: “There is significant variation in the
ways that HTTs interact with the intelligence elements
in their area. This seems to rely, at least to some extent,
on the inclination of the people filling social scientist
roles.”114 The ethical character of the research lay at
the heart of this argument. Research guarantees both
anonymity and the safety of participants, or it does
not.115 It is a clear binary state. Teams could choose to
cross over the line or not, with the ability to choose being facilitated, if not dictated, by the laissez-faire freedoms experienced in these contested spaces found in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
The commission foregrounded the ethical character
of the program and ethics dominate the broader professional discussion.116 The commission observed that,
in the creation of the HTS, the American Anthropological Association’s Code of Ethics, which identifies
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the need for “the establishment of voluntary informed
consent, taking care to insure that no harm comes to
research participants as a result of HTS research, and
full disclosure to research participants what will be
done with collected data,” appears to have been ignored.117 This is largely anticipated, given the applied
nature of the research: McFate has observed that in
developing the research modalities for the team, she
consulted the Society for Applied Anthropology’s
Code of Ethics.118
The character of this applied social science research
being developed by the HTS was unique and posed
problems in relation to standardized professional practice. The American Anthropological Association in its
close inspection of the program in relation to ethics
concluded that “so far as we can tell, HTS does not currently use an IRB [Institutional Review Board].”119 At
the level of the combat brigade, where there was high
operational tempo in areas experiencing high levels
of selective violence by insurgents, this was likely unfeasible in these contested spaces. Research was often
dictated by the transport available; where the military
logistics determine the opportunity for research—for
example, route clearance or resupply convoys. An IRB
would thus have to have been staffed 7 days a week,
for every hour of each day, and had a panel available
to assess the research proposals in the U.S. and send
them back to each team; in the rapid evolution of the
program, this type of novel IRB system seems unlikely
to be able to implement. With longer research modes
in regions where there are less pronounced insurgencies, the IRB seems not just feasible, but a prerequisite
for the HTS were it to continue to evolve beyond the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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The American Anthropological Association chose
the ethical dimensions of the research to critique most
heavily rather than the value of the work done. Albro,
consistently eloquent and considered on the conversation between the profession of anthropology and
the military enterprise, voices concern about the discipline’s persistent use of ethics “as its stock in trade,
to talk about where anthropologists should be, what
anthropologists should and shouldn’t be doing and to
define the lines between academic anthropology and
mostly everything else.”120 Moreover, the American
Anthropological Association and senior professional
anthropologists in the United States were not united
in their broad assessment. The Network of Concerned
Anthropologists, a group of professional anthropologists that included members of the commission and
executive board, gave a petition to the U.S. Congress
in 2010 in a bid to halt funding of the program. The
petition was signed by six of nine living former presidents of the American Anthropological Association,
meaning that a third chose not to take an explicit stance
against the program in this manner.121 This absence of
a concerted stance; the different investigative modes
of the board statement and the commission; the varied
concerns of those members of the commission; and the
rapidly evolving nature of the program being studied
each contributed to ameliorating the impact of these
fundamentally important concerns of professional
anthropology.
Effectiveness, however, rather than ethics, arguably mattered most to the military customer. On the
back of Schweitzer’s estimated quantitative assessment of his embedded team’s contribution to a reduction in kinetic activity, which was presented as fact,
the need for careful investigation of the program was
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implicit. Indeed, the trenchant position of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists arguably hindered equitable discourse, but their point that there
is no evidence that HTTs are effective points to the
singular problem in appropriating social science research modalities for combat zones. How do you measure success? The arguments of the professional anthropologists were further hindered by the difficulty
in offering homogeneous assessment of the program
when there was a spectrum of voices in the critique
and a spectrum of voices from the program itself, often
generating conflicting viewpoints, was pronounced.
In 2012, Albro and Gusterson wrote that they
stood by the 2009 conclusions of the commission, specifically that the program contravenes anthropological
ethics and falls short of professional standards for ethnography.122 Based on the commission’s findings, Albro and Gusterson also expressed concern at possible
plans to reconfigure the program to a shaping tool in
regions where insecurity may prove to be problematic
to U.S. interests, noting that research conducted in a
military setting lacks the integrity to be considered
professional anthropology and that compared to other engagements between the military enterprise and
anthropology, “HTS is different because it threatens
the integrity of that core relationship between anthropologists and their subjects.”123
This dominant theme regarding the ethics of
the profession stems from a larger concern which is
grounded in the historical military engagement with
the social sciences, namely, the actual utility of academic knowledge which was used to defeat insurgencies. This is why Albro is right to identify the particular emphasis placed on ethical research forms as an
issue of importance in and of itself. Historically, social
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science research methods and theoretical conceptualizations are integrated into military epistemologies for
actionable benefit. But the relationship has not been
continual or one of constant progress or evolution. Instead, the complex discrepancy between expectation
and reality regarding what social science research can
offer the military enterprise has meant the historical
encounter has been wrought by opaque experiments
often curtailed by consistently uncertain ends. The
overarching question when the engagement between
anthropology and war is taken as a whole is: To what
extent does social science research augment the operational picture?124 Across generations, that question
has never been adequately answered, and it is for that
reason that we find this intergenerational story continuing. Surrounding the detailed assessments by the
American Anthropological Association’s commission
and the statement of the board, the specter of the opposition to the Iraq and Afghan wars inevitably hangs
heavily over the existing debate on the HTS.
Toward Pragmatism.
Packaging anthropological knowledge in a form
which was both comprehensible and actionable required the use of parsimonious frameworks for modeling the operating environment. Presciently, Price
had suggested there would be a selective uptake of
anthropological methods when he wrote:
There is much of anthropology that the military does
not want: the military does not want anthropological critiques of power, imperialism, or neocolonialism. It does not want empathetic understandings of
‘the other’ unless this can be used as an ‘asset’ for
‘leveraging’.125
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What was taking place in the crisis of Iraq was a
rapid and selective uptake of social science. As part
of that selective uptake and a site for sustained debate
was the program’s utilization of structural functionalism. This theoretical construct was a social model of
the environment which had been fashionable in the
1950s but was now perceived as being outmoded.126
For HTS, however, there was significant utility in the
theoretical framework because it models society as
symbiotic elements which aggregate to a single organism. In this model, propagated by American sociologist Talcott Parsons, culture, traditions, and institutions are organs within the societal body, the function
of each impacting the viability of the whole. Addressing one to the detriment of any other would distort the
fragile equilibrium, generating imbalance such that
the societal structure is disturbed.
These anthropomorphic and reifying tendencies
of the theory were attractive to a military enterprise
modeling insurgencies in a resonant manner. The
model utilizes a consensus theory in which a coherent
society is developed through the architecture of order, a balancing of interest in those interrelated macroscopic elements upon which the society functions.
Pertinent to the COIN doctrine being propagated,
structural functionalism had the added advantage of
foregrounding the role of culture in shaping the societal edifice; values, norms, ideas, and beliefs are all
causally relevant. Culture is the binding force to the
extent that it “is seen as a patterned, ordered system
of symbols that are objects of orientations to actors,
internalized aspects of the personality system, and institutionalized patterns in the social system.”127
The contemporary position of the academic discipline of anthropology with regard to this model was
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at odds with its renaissance in the military, however.
The academy had consigned this system to possessing largely historical significance, comparative to its
situation in the 1950s and 1960s as the “primary organizing paradigm for most of American sociology.”128
As a criticism, using the model decades later fundamentally misrepresented the intellectual moment of
the discipline of anthropology. Instructively, in her
1994 doctoral dissertation, McFate had already noted
that there lay a discrepancy between the scholarly
discipline of anthropology and military application
of its models, but argued for its relevance to the military as a simplistic model encouraging understanding
and constructing an intellectual bridge between the
military and academia:
Although structural-functionalist methodology has
long been unfashionable within anthropology, the
oscillating equilibrium model (with the addition
of population dynamics and catastrophe theory) is
now being used in military operational research for
predicting the oscillating force-structure patterns in
counterinsurgency.129

It demonstrates an aspiration within the military
for modeling the character of warfare in complex environments; in this instance, the variation of force-size
around a central value with respect to time.
Moreover, as Gezari notes in her examination of
the program, as a student, McFate “wrote papers arguing that structural functionalism was invalid because it objectified and dehumanized the subjects of
anthropological observation. But the pragmatist in her
rejected this argument.”130 Pragmatism in stabilization
and enabling operations is paramount in successful
planning and execution of plans; where decisiveness,
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assertiveness, and clarity by necessity win out over
uncertainty, deference, and detail.
Structural functionalism can be viewed as a stepping stone for military engagement with sociocultural
expertise resident in the academy; a tentative step toward collaboration between two poles; one emphasizing the production of knowledge for unity of purpose,
the other, granular exposition of knowledge for no
particular end. This theoretical model thus served as
a platform for the military to move ahead in their conceptualization of the human terrain. Indeed, as Gezari
notes, rather than a traditional military predisposition
to amalgamating disparate elements such as “politics, economics, social organization or the ideas that
people have in their heads,” unhelpful in explaining
tribal systems, kinship organizations, religion, and the
fact that “not all tribal systems are Islamic and not all
of Islamic societies are tribal,” there was the necessity
to make a distinction in order to “clearly explain to
people in uniform what is going on downrange [in
Iraq and Afghanistan].”131 Structural functionalism
therefore offered an accessible academic language
that could clarify the embedded work conducted by
the HTTs, as well as engaging existing conceptual
frameworks which the military enterprise was utilizing for assessment of social environments in which it
operated.
The bridge between theory and practice may require compromise. Teaching structural functionalism
to model and make resonant the human environment
in complex contested spaces is one such compromise.
As McFate explains, structural functionalism “is predicated on looking at society as a holistic entity and the
view that all parts are all elements of the society at
some function” but importantly, it must be thought of
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as “a heuristic model, not as an accurate description.
Some way in which to capture a bit of social reality and
make it explicable to people who do not know what
these words mean, it is not such a bad approach.”132
As much as a model is a compromise between clarity and detail, so the teaching of the model itself is a
compromise.
Social scientists on embedded teams thus represented a first attempt to bridge the gap between the
academy and the military in person, albeit functioning amidst the high operational tempo of stabilization
operations. To enable conversation and collaboration, HTS taught its recruits basic social theory, and
tracked with structural functionalism by making
“society” analytically distinct from “culture,” something which the military historically had not tended
to do.133 Struggling to comprehend the character of the
insurgencies developing in Iraq and Afghanistan, a
structural functionalist interpretation of culture was
the de facto lens through which to identify and understand societal constituents. Perhaps the model’s
single greatest limitation was an absence of quantitative methods which allowed the statistical representation of data. This approach therefore foregrounded
qualitative assessments of the environment in training which were subsequently brought into the field
environments. Ultimately, however, a model is an abstraction of reality according to a certain conceptualization and that model can facilitate communication,
learning, and analysis about relevant aspects of the
underlying terrain provided that the categorization of
that terrain is expressed in a language which enables
understanding.
The model shows the divide between the contemporary academic setting and aspects of the teaching
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and training in the HTS program despite the possibility that structural functionalism may experience
an evolving renaissance in scholarship more broadly,
even beyond the confines of DoD. As shown by McFate, there is value in its application in a military
setting. But as a misrepresentation of the contemporary paradigms of the discipline, the concerns of the
American Anthropological Association’s commission
regarding the narrative that the HTS is able to direct in
DoD have some resonance:
The potential problem here is that, despite the fact
that HTS is just one modest program, among many, to
which anthropology might contribute in DoD—and in
the security sector broadly conceived—its notoriety is
shaping prevailing wisdom about what anthropology
is and what the role of anthropology should be among
military and security policymakers, in ways that might
very well be to the detriment of everyone else, or other
more constructive arrangements, collaborations, and
ethical applications of anthropological practice and
knowledge.134

Despite this tense historical engagement and
contemporary setting against the backdrop of controversial conflicts, the program gained funding and
expanded rapidly. Given the controversial nature of
its existence and the granular critique from the American Anthropological Association, I ask why the U.S.
Army embedded civilians in military units in Iraq and
Afghanistan to conduct research using social science
methods. In Chapter 3, I examine the origins of the
program and its evolution into a proof-of-concept entity with a physical home at the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
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CHAPTER 3
FROM A MILITARY CRISIS
The prevailing orthodoxy asserts that Human Terrain System (HTS) is a counterinsurgency (COIN)
tool created to provide sociocultural knowledge in
that capacity. From the outside-in perspective, it is
easy to link the social science research program to
requirements for military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, outlined explicitly in Field Manual (FM) 3-24.
Bluntly, the American Anthropological Association
argued that the program performs a “tactical function
in counterinsurgency warfare.”1 In their authoritative
study, Lamb et al. argued that the population-centric
approach to COIN required “protecting and eliciting
cooperation from the population” and that “the principal instruments for delivering this understanding to
[General David] Petraeus’ military forces in the field
were Human Terrain Teams” (HTT).2 The problem in
this reading is that if COIN was the solution, we must
search for the problem to understand why the HTS
was considered valuable. Examining only the solution
will do nothing to inform evaluation of future contours in military planning.
Searching for the problem, we run into difficulty.
COIN is a diffuse concept, and there is no identified
casus belli for the social sciences uptake, other than
a general reading of two wars gone awry. Professor
Hugh Gusterson, a critic of the conflicts, wrote that
the national security apparatus took a “cultural turn”
after “deciding that anthropology might be to the
‘war on terror’, what physics was to the cold war.”3
The introduction of the COIN FM, suggests another
scholar, was:
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a response to the near-implosion of Iraq, where an
insurgency mutated into horrific communal violence,
while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
tries to navigate the tribal world of Afghanistan and a
resurgent Taliban.4

Eminent political geographer Derek Gregory’s paper on the cultural turn, what he terms “the rush to
the intimate,” notes that the interim COIN FM 3.07-22
released in 2004 was an “attempt to shore up the rapidly deteriorating situation” in Iraq.5 For Gregory, the
ensuing cultural turn was “a heterogeneous assemblage of discourses and objects, practices, and powers distributed across different but networked sites: a
military dispositif if you prefer.”6
By the end of 2006, the George Bush administration simply ran out of ideas, according to a leading
critic of the handling of the Iraq occupation that had
supported the initial invasion.7 Fred Kaplan suggests
it was driven by Petraeus and his “cabal” or “mafia”;
graduates from the West Point Department of Social
Sciences who adapted their enemies’ tactics to overhaul their own military and reorganize it for small
wars.8 While critical of COIN doctrine, retired U.S.
Army officer Ralph Peters notes that it is part of “a
growing sense that the reality on the ground in Iraq
and elsewhere contradicts the theories we were fed.”9
Theory driven approaches to this renewed emphasis on cultural understanding have been employed
but produce different conclusions. Janine Davidson,
writing as a leading author of the COIN FM, argued
not for the why but for the how; employing organization theory to argue that there was a remarkable
flexibility within the U.S. Armed Forces to respond
to novel threats which enabled victory in Iraq and
Afghanistan.10
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Seen as a novel threat, it is unsurprising that deterioration in security in Iraq generated specific calls
for a paradigm shift in military thinking to circumvent
an apparent Cold War conventional warfighting paradigm which had proved unable to counter the insurgency patterns in the country. In 2004, COIN expert
David Kilcullen called for “a new paradigm, capable
of addressing globalized insurgency.”11 In 2005, Montgomery McFate placed the need for a transition into a
historical trajectory, arguing that the end of the Cold
War had altered the “nature of the enemy” and that
globalization, failed states, and small arms proliferation required, “An immediate transformation in the
military conceptual paradigm.”12 In 2006, Petraeus
echoed earlier calls for a paradigm shift in thinking to
combat the deleterious situation in Iraq.13 These calls
built on identified requirements in the field: Major Michael S. Patton, speaking to The Washington Post from
Baghdad in 2003 argued that the Iraq conflict was a
new form of war where “Everyone is an intelligence
officer—that’s sort of our theme. If you’re talking
about a paradigm shift, this is it: You have to see everyone you come into contact with as having intelligence value.”14
Seen as part of this trend for cultural awareness,
Human Terrain System was thus part of a cultural
turn in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Paul Joseph,
Professor of Sociology at Tufts University, in his 2014
account asserts that the “very existence of the program’ reflected a trend in the Department of Defense
for deeper understanding of operations “among people whose reactions to those operations will significantly influence, if not ultimately determine, success
or failure.”15 For Joseph, it was part of a culture wave,
during which “HTS emerged during this recogni-
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tion of the need for greater cultural sophistication.”16
Other studies arrive at similar conclusions. The Center for Naval Analyses assessment of the HTS argued
that the program was “intended to provide military
decisionmakers in Iraq and Afghanistan with greater
understanding of the local population’s cultures and
perspectives.”17
In this chapter, I argue against the cultural turn in
the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts catalyzing formation and of the HTS. Instead, I assert that the military
crisis created by the improvised explosive device (IED),
primarily in Iraq, engendered an “anything goes” approach to combatting the insurgency. I use Freedom
of Information Act requests to obtain elements of the
Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS)
(see Appendix D for explicit linkage of HTS to the IED
defeat fight) in order to deepen understanding of this
evolution. Understanding of the character of this particular military crisis and the clamor for novelty it engendered is useful. It informs discussion on the manner in which peripheral ideas and projects can rapidly
become the normal and accepted modes of thought in
periods of military fragility.
The remaining piece of the puzzle is why the HTS
departed the counter-IED (C-IED) enterprise and
emerged into the broader COIN realm concerned with
understanding the population. The answer is threefold; idealism, pragmatism, and pecuniary motives all
contributed. First, the ascendant COIN theory in the
Department of the Army allowed the HTS to develop
as a nonkinetic asset which sat more comfortably with
McFate’s vision for the future of the program than as
a primarily C-IED tool. Second, the move was pragmatic; it fell into line with the work McFate was doing with Petraeus on the FM 3-24, which, especially in
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Chapter 3 (part of which had been written by McFate)
could then be used to highlight to brigades what HTTs
could offer.18 It was also easier to recruit civilians
through a COIN narrative than a C-IED narrative, the
latter being the largest cause of U.S. casualties in Iraq.
Third, by mid-2007, when the U.S. Central Command JUONS was drafted by the program management, COIN doctrine, which sought a high profile
in the U.S. media and received it, had emerged with
powerful fathers. Petraeus, then commander of the
Multi-National Corps-Iraq and General James N. Mattis, commander of 1 Marine Expeditionary Force were
staunch advocates. With the HTS set for Iraq after a
surge replaced the penciled draw-down of forces, linking the program to a scholarly, nonkinetic dimension
of the COIN operations was the only game in town
and in a crisis, “anything goes.” Begun in late-2005,
HTS preceded the COIN push, but as it burgeoned, it
became easy to transition the HTS, a C-IED tool, to the
COIN fight.
REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION
HTS evolved to such an extent that by 2010 the
Outreach Coordinator for the program stated that it
was not in the program’s mandate “to pursue information related to insurgents, improvised explosive
devices or other weapons employed by insurgent
elements” but insecurity and its attendant manifest
elements arise frequently in interviews with the local
population, such that, ambiguously, “HTS teams only
provide their unit with information related to IEDs
and insurgent activity, if this information is provided
to them, unsolicited [my italics], by the people they are
interviewing.”19 It is the argument made in this chap-
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ter that the IED was the lodestone which catalyzed
need, funding, and ability to create the HTS.
Given the controversy surrounding it and the
many individuals involved in its genesis, the origins
of the program are difficult to capture. Vanessa Gezari
has made this assessment eloquently in writing:
The roots of the Human Terrain System are ambiguous
and contested, stained with bad blood and accusations
of impure motives, its origin myths embellished by
ambitious and therefore potentially unreliable narrators who, nevertheless, each holds a piece of the story.
Its elements evolved simultaneously and organically
from various corners of the defense establishment and
flourished in the atmosphere of ferment that grew out
of the Army’s realization that it was losing the war in
Iraq.20

Nevertheless, I use primary and secondary sources,
including interviews with McFate and documentation
obtained from Freedom of Information Act requests to
construct a trajectory of the origin of the program and
its relationship with the C-IED landscape.
The crisis generated by the IEDs in Iraq created
rich funding opportunities for myriad initiatives designed to counter the threat.21 In keeping with the
military preference for technological solutions to
mitigate emerging threats, there was an initial focus
on technological solutions to combat IEDs; products
which would fight, if not negate, the effects of the device itself. By 2006 with key personnel changes in the
C-IED landscape and as the limitations of applying
technological alone solutions became obvious, there
was a shift in emphasis, if not focus, from combatting the device to attacking the network behind it,
with consequentially increased importance placed on
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intelligence and social science research techniques in
order to better understand the nature of the social networks in Iraq and Afghanistan. This shift is explored
in two steps: first, an investigation of the evolution
of attempts to combat the IED; second, an examination of the development of the HTS from the C-IED
architecture.
LETHAL AMBUSH
Giving a historical trajectory to the problem of
the IED in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lieutenant General
Thomas Metz told the House Armed Services Committee: “In its most fundamental form, the IED is a
lethal ambush, and men have been ambushing their
enemies for thousands of years.”22 Within the ambush,
the IED has proliferated to become the weapon of
choice to implement the tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problems posed by IEDs today are six-fold:
first, they require little or no physical confrontation
with opposed forces; second, they are difficult to detect or counter with current technologies and their improvised nature means that they can be quickly modified to overcome countermeasures defined to defeat
them; third, they prevent security on the ground and
therefore inhibit reconstruction efforts; fourth, they
do not require military hardware, instead often being
assembled from nonmilitary products such as fertilizer; fifth, the inability to retaliate against the opponent
responsible has a deleterious effect upon soldiers’ morale; and sixth, events against coalition forces appear
on insurgent and terrorist websites. As such, the IED
is a weapon that can have strategic impact, possessing
the ability to deliver the goals of an insurgency by exerting considerable influence on popular perceptions
of the conflict.
115

Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the IED
was immediately the weapon of choice for insurgents
because of the abundance of deteriorated munitions
throughout Iraq following the fall of Saddam’s regime
and its ease of manufacture, cost-effectiveness, and
brutal effects. Its use evolved to such an extent that,
by late-2003, there was already a crisis in military operations and only the first and second battles of Fallujah in 2004—in which there was small arms fire and
close quarter combat—temporarily lessened the IED
casualty rate as a percentage of overall fatalities. By
December 2004, IED casualties accounted for half of
all U.S. military casualties, and, by the following year,
all major forms of IED were apparent in Iraq.23 Road
side bombs had evolved early in the Iraq campaign as
a way to exploit the relatively unprotected underside
and lower sides of armored vehicles, especially the
Humvee, and were conducted against the spectrum of
coalition vehicles, including Abrams tanks.24 The explosively formed penetrator, which received particular media coverage as a technology possibly having
been “brought” to Iraq by Iranian actors, was present
as early as 2004.25 One study suggested that the explosively formed penetrator never accounted for more
than 5 to 10 percent of the total number of IEDs detonated, but accounted for 40 percent of the casualties.
Although the study does not define the time period, it
demonstrates the capacity for the IED to cause widespread casualties.26
An absence of deep planning for the post-invasion
scenarios meant that the IED threat was not provisioned for in the equipment spectrum of coalition
forces. Without any specific C-IED technologies, U.S.
troops improvised by “hanging armored vests on the
doors of vehicles and placing sand bags on the floors
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of Humvees to absorb blasts.”27 Troops also began to
use scrap metal to up-armor the vehicles for enhanced
survivability. In June 2003, General John P. Abizaid,
who had taken over from General Tommy Franks as
Commander of United States Central Command, declared IEDs his “number one threat.”28 Franks had
failed to envisage the rise of militias antagonistic to
coalition forces and had appeared disconnected from
the rapidly changing events on the ground.
The powerbrokers in Iraq remained the Coalition
Provisional Authority and Multi-National Force-Iraq,
but Abizaid’s observations are valuable in being the
distilled analyses from the situation in Iraq. Implicit in
the appointment was a changing emphasis where intent lay less in coercing the population than winning
them over. Abizaid was a fluent Arabic speaker who
combined military experience with scholarly learning,
and he had already indicated his desire for greater
training for troops engaged in peacekeeping. Showing the awareness at the highest levels of the evolving insurgency, in a statement to the Senate Armed
Services Committee in September 2003, Abizaid considered that U.S. forces in Iraq were already engaged
in “a wide range of activities” including “counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, stability, and civil-affairs
operations.”29
The primary modality of the evolving and increasingly violent insurgency was the IED. It was inevitable, given the scramble for additional armor being
sought by military personnel, that the ensuing push
for C-IED projects was orientated toward finding
technological solutions. In October 2003, the United
States Congress approved U.S.$572 million for more
armored Humvees and U.S.$100 million for bolt-onarmor retrofits to existing vehicles.30 Yet armored
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Humvees provided only a minimal increase in protection because they had been designed to combat land
mines, not the lateral blasts from many of the IEDs.31
The problem, however, was more than a technological
one, as an unnamed senior Army officer noted; if the
armor was increased, the insurgents would just build
bigger and better IEDs.32 The admission hints at the
psychological effects of the ubiquitous device in Iraq,
as well as the ability of the insurgents to adapt to U.S.
innovation with ease and develop cost-effective solutions to mitigate vastly superior U.S. technology.33
In parallel with the escalating IED crisis was an
emerging identity to the campaign in Iraq. By March
2004, Abizaid considered that U.S. forces were “waging a counterinsurgency against an enemy hiding
within the population and operating without rules.”34
Explicit now was the military’s preoccupation with
the IED, and Abizaid considered at this time that
the central element of the COIN effort would be human intelligence collected through myriad initiatives,
which would include the cultivation of the populace
and its leaders.35 Yet, Abizaid did not link the IED to
the COIN campaign; in combatting the former, he was
a staunch advocate of rapidly deployed technological
approaches to fight the device. At this stage and under this leadership, COIN and the IED were discussed
largely in separation.
An absence of a single joint instruction to produce
a blanket, unified C-IED strategy meant that units on
the ground produced ad hoc tactics, techniques, and
procedures as insurgent tactics evolved.36 Organizationally, the U.S. Army relied on the Rapid Equipping
Force created in 2002 and the Operational Needs Statement which enabled combat commanders to bypass
standard acquisition channels for materiel solutions
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by creating an urgent need. At this early stage, C-IED
was still oriented toward materiel solutions aimed at
defeating the device itself. The variation was most obvious between Armed Service components.
Within the Marine Corps, initial C-IED efforts
were based at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, responsible for developing material
needs.37 Requests for C-IED material to the Command
accelerated from two in 2002 to eight in 2003 and 26 in
2004. Of all requests to the Command during 2002-04,
13 percent were for C-IED material.38 Conscious of the
rising requests, in 2004 the Marine Corps established
a C-IED cell which was later transferred to the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and during this period, the Urgent Universal Needs Statement was developed to allow rapid fielding of critical technologies.
Given the crisis unfolding and the lack of direction from the top of planning, myriad C-IED initiatives proliferated at the component services level. The
Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, established
by the U.S. Army in 2003, performed physical, biometric, and tactical exploitation of evidence from IED
attack scenes.39 The cell included early attempts to
acquire biometric data and analysis of enemy tactics.
In 2004, the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division served as an administrative sponsor
to the cell. The Technical Support Working Group
was also involved in fielding technologies as part of
the Combating Terrorism Directorate at the Joint Staff
Operations Center. The Terrorist Explosive Device
Analytical Center was formed in 2003 to investigate
recovered IED components in order to provide actionable intelligence to coalition forces. According to officials, the center “focused on higher-level strategic
issues rather than tactical ones” and thus shows the
tactical and strategic threat posed by IEDs in Iraq.40
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With the Army bearing the brunt of the IED fight,
in October 2003, Lieutenant General Richard Cody,
the Army’s Vice Chief, created the Army IED Task
Force. Cody was acutely aware of the danger posed by
the IED to coalition forces, calling the IED the “poor
man’s cruise missile.”41 Cody nominated Brigadier
General Joseph L. Votel, then Army Deputy Director
for Information Operations, to head the nascent task
force. With a budget of only U.S.$20 million allotted,
this task force focused primarily on the cultivation of
intelligence and, to that end, deployed small numbers
of contractors (former Special Operations Forces) and
officers to the field to investigate the IED landscape
and make recommendations for best practices in the
light of their findings.
These suggested revisions to operational and
training methods were sent back as lessons learned
from field teams to a coordinating cell in Washington
and relayed to the Army Center for Lessons Learned.42
The first team deployed to Iraq in December 2003, and
in April 2004, another team went to Iraq and a first
team was sent to Afghanistan. In addition, the organization communicated across the Armed Services and
Department of Defense (DoD), finding some islands
of technological expertise already in the structure, for
example, at the U.S. Army Engineer School.43 An IED
cell was established at the Army center for incorporating lessons into the training of outgoing troops in
Iraq and deployed a very limited amount of C-IED
technology.44 But with such a limited budget and no
interservices authority, there was no scope beyond the
relatively narrow remit afforded to it; its only option
was to continue its major initiative to train soldiers on
how to detect or avoid IEDs.
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At this time, Colonel Steve Fondacaro, who would
later become the driving force behind development of
the HTS, joined the Army IED Task Force headed by
Votel. Fondacaro had known Votel from his time at
the Army Rangers.45 Fondacaro was one of the officers
sent to Iraq to head the field-deployed projects against
IEDs which Lamb et al. note in their study, “were by
far the largest cause of U.S. casualties in Iraq and the
most prominent operational problem confronting U.S.
forces there.”46 During his time in Iraq, Fondacaro was
working in close proximity with Andrea Jackson, who
had been assigned by the now-defunct Washington,
DC-based public relations firm, the Lincoln Group, to
work for Multi-National Corps-Iraq headquarters on
the Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE)
project.47
Diyala province was chosen for the proof-of-concept in part because prior research had been undertaken there for the Iraq Training Program. The project’s
aim was to:
provide commanders on the ground with a tool that
will allow them to understand operationally relevant
aspects of local culture; the ethno-religious, tribal, and
other divisions within Iraqi society; and the interests
and leaders of these groups.48

It was thus through the C-IED architecture that key
relationships in the HTS network began to develop.
In addition, at a Booz Allen Hamilton event held in
Tampa, Florida, in early-2005 that focused on how
sociocultural knowledge could be employed to defeat
the IED, McFate met Fondacaro, and they would begin to sketch the first outlines of what would become
ultimately the HTS.49 The aim was to depart the C-IED
landscape and to examine and understand the under121

pinning of the conflict, the “reason why the population were silent witnesses, passive and sometimes
active supporters.”50 From Fondacaro’s experience in
Iraq, notably with the JIEDDTF, focusing on the IEDs
themselves “resulted only in minor incremental advantages that were very temporary, while the problem continued endlessly.”51
As the task force showed, there was an increasing
need for information on the character of asymmetric
threats and to deploy specialists to acquire the specific
knowledge from the theater. Therefore, in order to advise commanders on methods for combatting irregular
arranged adversaries, at the request of Army Operations staff engaged with the IED Task Force, an Asymmetric Warfare Group was nominally created in April
2004. The group was termed the Asymmetric Warfare
Regiment at conception, and was then redesignated
the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) in April 2006.
In reality, the Army began organizing the AWG in
January 2005 to be operational by the middle of that
year.52 As early as March 2005, a part of the group already involved “Linkages to the warfighter [which]
will be established through dedicated liaison teams to
functional and geographic combatant commanders.”53
The model for the organization of the group included an operations squadron, the job of which was to
“provide the trained and ready teams that deploy forward to collect, develop, and disseminate tactics, techniques, and procedures and observations.”54 Further,
“The operations squadron will be able to provide liaison and staff integration with supported commands
and will be capable of assisting deployed units in the integration and training of rapidly fielded countermeasures
[my italics].”55 A U.S. located training and assessment
team trained personnel prior to their deployment into
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theater, and incorporated feedback from the forwarddeployed operations squadron into that training.
These AWG teams consisted of military personnel
and contractors, and deployed typically for periods of
90-120 days. The establishment of the AWG indicated
an important juncture had been reached in the fight
against IED networks. The Army had decided that as
well as a technological approach, there was clearly the
necessity for specific expertise to low-intensity kinetic
environments, and that it would go to some lengths
to develop that capability. In a 2005 article, Brigadier General Votel and Lieutenant General James J.
Lovelace concluded that conventional U.S. warfighting methods and technological solutions to the violent
insurgency had been overrun in Iraq:
Every new or improved capability, however, no matter how dominant, brings with it a whole new set of
inherent vulnerabilities. A smart, resourceful enemy
will seek out those chinks in his adversary’s armor
and attack them with asymmetric means.56

Tellingly, the authors note that “A stark example of
this is the current threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq.”57 Among the required initiatives to fill existing gaps at this time was “adequate
knowledge of indigenous cultures and availability of
skilled linguists.”58
The task force and the AWG were Army-only solutions and did not capitalize on the strengths of all
the services which were pursuing their own C-IED
programs independently. The need for a coordinated
department-wide effort led Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on July 12, 2004, to establish the
Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT) in a 1-paragraph
memorandum. The team would be the core of DoD
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efforts to combat the IED threat and would be led by
the Army. As a consequence of this action, the Army
IED Task Force became a Joint IED Task Force. The
team was organized around and incorporated the existing Army IED Task Force but also pulled together
the myriad existing initiatives within DoD, academy,
and the private sector; the primary focus was on
technology-based solutions.59
CULTURAL PREPARATION
OF THE ENVIRONMENT
In 2004, Lieutenant Colonel William Adamson returned from Diyala province, Iraq, to serve a joint tour
in the Pentagon, having been a strong advocate for
better understanding of the population in an area of
operations. Adamson believed that military comprehension of civilian networks had been fundamental to
securing local support among the population but that
after leaving the area of operations, this knowledge
had not been stored in a way that could be easily accessed by relief forces.60 Adamson and Dr. Hriar Cabayan, Chief Science Advisor for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff J-3, thus worked at the Pentagon on development
of a methodology to solve that problem across different areas of operations. At the same time, McFate
had undertaken a project for Marine Corps Brigadier
General Thomas D. Waldhauser, based on a need to
understand the cultural environment in an area of operation, and which centered on interviewing Marines
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Waldhauser
had participated in combat operations in southern Afghanistan and Iraq before returning to serve as Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and Deputy Commander, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, and thus was well-placed to
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sponsor small-scale investigations into the application
of cultural layers to aid warfighting.
When the project finished during 2004, McFate
briefed the assessment around the Pentagon framed as
a problem with the requirement to understand better
the population in order to mitigate insurgent activity.
It was this networking which brought McFate to the
attention of Hriar Cabayan, as a suitable person for
the project being developed with William Adamson.
At that first meeting with Cabayan, Adamson, and
project manager Nancy Chesser, the plan unveiled
was the creation of a database called Cultural Preparation of the Environment, which would be designed by
the MITRE Corporation.61 Significantly, the funding
source was from the C-IED architecture; the Joint IED
Task Force provided U.S.$1.2 million for the creation
and testing of the device between 2004 and 2006.
The network behind the IED was at this point unintelligible to U.S. forces operating in Iraq. The use of
IEDs had proliferated as an effective ambush weapon,
causing significant physical injury and impact upon
morale. Any tool that promised to decipher these networks and decode the population was of immense
utility in such an atmosphere. In 2005, Abizaid was
given a demonstration of the Cultural Preparation of
the Environment platform and observed that, with
it, “we would know more about Iraq than we do the
US.”62 As part of this database drive, McFate and Jackson wrote a briefing with notes which was sent to numerous individuals as part of the networking push,
including the then-editor of the Military Review, on
how to solve the sociocultural operational problems.
The briefing was published as an article in the JulyAugust 2005 edition of that journal.63
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It was that article which laid out the organizational dimensions for an HTS capability. In the words of
McFate speaking retrospectively: “You need to have
an entity that can do research in a war zone, that can
advise military forces, that can conduct independent
research, that can train,” and stressing the importance
of historical models, McFate notes that she “was reading a lot at that time about the OSS [Office of Strategic
Services] and the OSS structure” which influenced the
thinking regarding structure.64 McFate and Jackson
were tasked with developing taxonomies and ontologies for the data, and, to begin this process, McFate
noted that it was necessary to “try to go back and not
start from scratch; somebody, somewhere must have
done something similar to this in the dim, distant
past.”65 The research that was conducted was focused
on templates in the civil affairs communities, organization in historically relevant models such as the Human Relation Area Files, because McFate could find
no analogical models in existence after 1945. There
were further complications because those files were
organized differently as they concerned comparative
analysis. McFate was not concerned with comparative
analysis in an area of operations, but instead emphasized that the program envisaged “quick and dirty
presentation of data in a way that a military officer
could understand; not for social scientists.”66
McFate had already written about the organizational context of the IED social network. In the MayJune 2005 issue of Military Review, she painted the
security landscape of the IED problem, noting their
ubiquity and lethality, it was argued that while “U.S.
defense science and technology communities have
focused on developing technical solutions to the IED
threat,” it must also be considered that:

126

IEDs are a product of human ingenuity and social
organization. If we understand the social context in
which they are invented, built, and used we will have
an additional avenue for defeating them.67

For McFate, a “shift in focus from the IED technology to IED makers requires examining the social environment in which bombs are invented, manufactured,
distributed, and used.”68 Focusing on the bomb maker
and their enabling social network would then require
four areas of evaluation of the organization, the material procurement, and the surrounding population.
The IED network, shadowy and indistinct, was thus
the terrain on which McFate could launch the need for
an HTS capability. Based on sources, McFate argued in
the article that IED production in Iraq stems from an
Iraqi Intelligence Service (part of Saddam Hussein’s
toppled regime) unit called M-21 (also known as the
A1 Ghafiqi Project). In short, McFate concludes, “The
ISS M-21 unit is a key reason the Iraqi insurgency is so
adept at constructing IEDs,” providing a skeleton of
the body of the nascent post-war insurgency.69 At this
juncture, a specific date is highlighted—September
2003—when the IED threat escalated because “IEDs
became more sophisticated, evolving from simple suicide attacks to more complex remote-control, vehicleborne IEDs and daisy-chain IEDs using trip-wires.”70
The increasing sophistication over time indicated
“that their design and construction has become a specialized function within the insurgency, rather than a
dispersed function.”71
Thus September 2003 became a temporally identifiable crisis point in the escalation of IED use to which
no solution had yet been created. This meant in con-
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clusion that “identifying the bombmakers must be an
absolute priority.”72 To that end, the bomb making
organization must be analyzed because, “Members
of insurgent cells operate part-time and blend back
into the civilian population when operations are complete.”73 The presence of foreign fighters aside, McFate argues that the “majority of insurgents are native
Iraqis connected to each and to the general population by social networks and relationships. The most
important social network in Iraq is the tribe.” Indeed,
“The tribes provide money, manpower, intelligence,
and assistance in escape and evasion after an attack.”74
But theory was complicated by practice; work on
the taxonomy for the Cultural Preparation of the Environment tool designed to identify the tribal network
behind the bomb maker was complicated by the nascent networks being developed which were essentially alien to those involved; at that time, the Tactical Ground Reporting System was being developed
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;
the Combined Information Data Network Exchange,
a tactical reporting database, which would become
critical to the proliferation of HTS products in the
field had not yet been created, while Palantir and the
Distributed Common Ground System-Army were not
widely utilized.
The result was that the project managers were “operating blind” in the creation of categories for the data,
after which the MITRE Corporation, the contractors
for Cultural Preparation of the Environment, created
the interface.75 The data call for that system was unsuccessful, with requests from different agencies on number and structure of tribes in Diyala province bringing wide variation in answers. The absence of deep,
robust information about the province was indicative
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of a wider problem in the intelligence community, to
which, as McFate explains, the solution was to:
do the research on the ground. And when you are talking about Iraq and Afghanistan these are societies that
have been closed to social science research for about 30
years, more or less and mostly it has never been done
at the very granular level that we were being asked to
look at.76

These closed societies would also mean finding
subject matter experts to deploy later in the HTS was
an extremely arduous, if not impossible, task.
As this Cultural Preparation of the Environment
tool was beginning to be field tested, the pronounced
impact of the IED was foregrounded in the American
media sphere. By the end of 2004, there were detailed
reports of the IED crisis; a prominent Chicago Tribune
article in October noted that over half of the more than
8,600 war casualties were caused by the “low-tech”
IED threat.77 In public, Votel conceded that there was
a lack of intelligence about how the adversaries’ IED
network was structured. Asked in a National Public
Radio interview if the threat originated from a unified
command structure, Votel responded that there were
probably different groups which were united only in
a common goal to oust U.S. forces, and he could only
assume that these disparate elements were sharing
intelligence with each other.78
This is the military problem that we have been
searching for in this chapter, for which the C-IED
was the ascendant solution. In identifying the trajectory of the expanding problem, we are able to chart
the rise of the nontechnological solutions to the IED
threat, of which the HTS was to become a high-profile example. The stark gap in knowledge about the
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insurgents that were escalating their use of the device
was pronounced. It was also difficult to cover up. In
2005, Votel conceded that predicting the number of
attacks by the enemy in the following year would be
difficult, because he was “not sure he knows enough
about their capabilities.”79 Votel obscured discussions
that the use of technology might defeat the IED blasts
in Iraq because they had so far proved ineffective. Instead, Votel asserted that greater efforts must be made
to track the perpetrators and cells behind the atrocities.80 A World Tribune article from the same month
observed: “Officials said the army appears to have
reached a stalemate in the war against IEDs.”81
Without obvious solutions to the IED, Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defence, who had replaced
Paul Wolfowitz in June 2005, recommended evolving
Wolfowitz’ Joint IED Task Force into a Joint IED Defeat Task Force. The difference between the two entities is a small but important one for identification of
the evolution of the C-IED enterprise as the latter now
assimilated the Force Protection Working Group and
the Joint Integrated Process Team. England formerly
had been Secretary of the Navy and in that capacity
in 2004 had met with senior government scientists,
agreeing upon the need for a comprehensive approach
to combat the IED threat. In the new iteration of the
C-IED enterprise, a spectrum of solutions would be
sought, and, because of the existential threat to the
military venture posed by the crisis, funding could
circumvent traditional DoD bureaucracy.
Retired General Montgomery Meigs was appointed the first director of the new task force, reporting
directly to Deputy Director England. Meigs held a
doctorate in history from the University of WisconsinMadison and had been an International Affairs Fellow
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at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; therefore, he was ideally suited to fuse an academic approach with practical approaches to warfighting. His
academic work had focused on the hybridization of
civilian expertise and military initiatives. Meigs’ 1982
doctoral thesis was titled “Managing Uncertainty:
Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, and the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945.” In the thesis,
Meigs argued that civilian expertise had been vital to
solving complex military problems which threatened
national security.
In 2003, Meigs published an article on asymmetric
warfare in the U.S. Army journal, Parameters, in which
he noted that to “isolate al-Qaeda’s true advantage,
we should begin with a look at the historical roots of
asymmetric warfare.”82 Framing the current confrontation as one of permanent ambush, Meigs argued
that, in Afghanistan, the situation now resembled one
which is characteristic of the situation faced by Afghan fighters throughout the centuries: “a relatively
conventional military force on the ground attempting
to chase down groups and individuals almost invisible in the native culture and terrain.”83 On beginning
his appointment with the Joint IED Task Force on December 12, 2005, Meigs brought with him Maxie McFarland, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, at the Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), with an immediate but temporary responsibility to increase the intelligence capability of the task force. In 2005, McFarland
had authored an influential article in Military Review
entitled “Military Cultural Education,” which stressed
the need for lessons learned to be transported back to
the United States. As part of his remit, Meigs travelled
to Iraq and Afghanistan, and McFarland travelled
with him. Earlier, Meigs had expressed the need to develop investigative skills in forward operating roles.84
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Fondacaro was head of the JIEDDTF-Iraq. At the
time of his deployment there, he considered that an
information technology revolution of the past 30 years
meant that narratives rather than technology were key
to victory; “Perception truly now is reality, and our
enemies know it. We have to fight on the information
battlefield.”85 He considered himself a “radical” who,
in revolutionizing the way the war in Iraq would be
conducted, required the help of academics, specifically, social scientists because it was necessary to go beyond incremental gains which could be made against
the effects of violence and look closely at the causes,
the “human terrain” as he termed it.86 Yet, Fondacaro
identified problems with the Cultural Preparation of
the Environment capability: brigade staffs were already overloaded with technologies for which they
had no time to learn how to utilize; there was also
a lack of sufficient baseline knowledge allowing the
military to most efficiently use the information; and
there was a marked absence of social scientists to produce valuable cultural knowledge.87 It was to address
these shortcomings that McFate and Jackson produced their briefing published in the Military Review.
The result of the field test, however, was that the CPE
tool was returned to the C-IED enterprise and as a tool
the conclusion was that it lacked utility. As Fondacaro
explains, “It was not granular enough, was not timely,
the information sources for its content varied wildly.
It was clear the unit had to do its own research, in its
own AOR [Area of Responsibility] for the content to
be relevant and usable.”88
Despite the increased budget and raised profile,
a DoD official interviewed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggested that, by 2006, the
temporary status of the Joint IED Task Force made
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attracting and retaining qualified personnel difficult.89 This meant that working for the organization
was fraught with professional uncertainty, making
it difficult to recruit experienced personnel with the
desired expertise. A temporary status for an organization which was central to combatting the crisis in Iraq
was clearly unacceptable. Plans were already underway at the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
in late-2005 to make the organization permanent,
which was achieved in February 2006 with DoD Directive 2000.19E, turning the task force into a permanent
entity and jointly manned activity of the department.
Renamed the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the permanent structure
now had a budget of U.S.$3.7 billion. This budget was
delivered, according to one official, “with the intention to provide the institutional stability necessary to
attract and retain qualified personnel.”90
The establishment of that new organization was arranged in the absence of DoD having formal guidance
for establishing joint organizations but rather developed through conversations between high-level officials in various departments and services. The ad hoc
construction of the new organization, JIEDDO, along
with its considerable budget, undertaken through
informal channels and without official guidelines to
implement a joint organization, demonstrated the flyby-wire nature of the C-IED project and the ample
resources allocated to it because of the nature of the
IED crisis. That its sui generis procurement system
was necessary also more broadly highlighted existing
difficulties in the acquisition system which were not
solved during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Importantly for the development of HTS, programs seeking JIEDDO funding were likewise largely configured
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without official oversight. In addition, Fondacaro had
finished a tour for the organization and thus had credibility for program funding based on findings in the
field. For funding, to rapidly field capabilities, only
programs requiring over U.S.$25 million required annual briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s
Senior Resource Steering Group.91 (See Figure 3-1.)

Source: Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC.

Figure 3-1. Evolution of C-IED Organizations
Versus IED incidents in Iraq.
The organization had specific instruction from
DoD to sponsor a spectrum of potential capabilities.
While focus was on technology-based solutions, it
could approve “some counter-IED initiatives without
vetting them through the appropriate service counterIED focal points because the process allows the organ-
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isation to make exceptions if deemed necessary and
appropriate.”92 In practice, this meant that the Director of JIEDDO C-IED training center could “make
exceptions when training requirements and training
support activities need to be accelerated to meet predeployment training requirements.”93 Such was the
parallel importance of knowledge in the C-IED landscape that the organization bypassed its acquisition
process by working directly with individual service
units and organizations to address specific capability
gaps.94
According to Vincent T. Clark of the U.S. Navy,
JIEDDO was specifically created to “circumvent the
bureaucratic processes of the Services.”95 Clark wrote
of a “paradigm shift” in bureaucratic procedure, particularly in budgeting, allowing previous obstacles
to be surmounted.96 The organization worked with
TRADOC to establish the Joint Training CounterImprovised Explosive Device Operations and Integration Center. Although this went ahead without input
from the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Office and sat
uneasily with the Army’s existing C-IED initiatives,
it demonstrates the broad and strong development
of a doctrinal aspect to counter the threat. McFarland
had brought the idea for the center back from his
work with the JIEDDTF, but it struggled for funds, as
Fondacaro notes.97
In early-2006, Abizaid conceded in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that the IED was the “perfect asymmetric weapon” and “the single greatest source of our casualties,”
being “the enemy’s most effective weapon.”98 The insurgency, however, was not easily defined, and, consequently, knowledge about the nature of the adversary in Iraq remained acutely inchoate. IEDs, Abizaid
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continued, were a “strategic threat,” seemingly ubiquitous, adaptable, and continually augmented in their
lethality.99 At this point the U.S. Central Command focused its intelligence efforts on the IED challenge.100 So
great was the crisis that Abizaid stressed it was necessary to “mobilize our country’s resources, both military
and civilian [my italics], to better understand the region
and the extremist enemies we face.”101 In a prepared
statement before the House Armed Services Committee in November 2006, Abizaid emphasized the need
in Iraq to invest in “more manpower and resources
into the coalition military transition teams, speed the
delivery of logistics, and mobility enablers.”102 Echoing the need for nonorganic additions to the military
enterprise to assist in understanding, General Michael
Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
in a Senate hearing on Iraq and Afghanistan in that
same month, described the situation in Iraq as “unquestionably complex and difficult.”103
FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE
With Cultural Preparation for the Environment
running into problems both with information and
data presentation at TRADOC, Maxie McFarland, who
both McFate and Andrea Jackson had known previously, asked McFate to participate in Unified Quest,
the Army wargame run at the command. McFate and
McFarland also met with John Agoglia, Director of
the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in Fort Monroe, Virginia, to discuss the basic
idea of an HTS-type capability. With Andrea Jackson,
McFate followed up with McFarland at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and McFarland noted that TRADOC
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was well-placed to develop an HTS capability within
the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).
Dr. Jacob Kipp, Karl Prinslow, Lester Grau, and
Captain Don Smith, members of the FMSO, were then
directed by McFarland to audit the weekly video teleconferences for the CPE capability where Fondacaro
was briefing for small teams of experts to be embedded with brigades to offer a solution, instead of the
tool which had notable shortcomings. All four men
possessed expert knowledge of the Soviet experience
with fighting Afghan and Chechen warriors, and the
problems the Russians encountered fighting irregular
conflicts in both countries.104 Indicative of these professionals’ expertise in identifying military capability gaps, in 1987, Lester Grau quoted Soviet General
Shkirko on their Chechen experience, that the Soviets:
did not have a war which had been expected, for which
the troops and staffs were preparing, which had been
studied in academies and planned accordingly, and
which would have complied with regulations and
field manuals.105

Don Smith, in particular, was enthusiastic about the
idea of an HTS capability and met with McFate at Fort
Leavenworth, where Smith expressed interest in taking the idea forward, which seemed logical to McFate,
“Because this is something that has to happen in the
military,” and he was a uniformed military officer.106
Cultural Preparation of the Environment was drawing to a conclusion, absent requisite funding and posting results of no value from the field.
The CPE tool, one of the many technologies Fondacaro oversaw in Iraq, was “chewed and regurgitated” data when what was required was “information
that was a couple of days old.”107 The CPE, basically a
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laptop with data entered, was irrelevant, because the
brigade commanders were already “drinking from
a firehose turned on full blast” with databases and
technologies from the PRT, the CIA, and myriad other
entities, when what the commander needed was:
living people, humans, on my staff, on my team . . .
I need someone on my team doing research, going
out on operations every day, explaining the granular
problems I have and then telling me the recommendations they have in terms of Courses of Action. I need
them to do all this work.108

As interest moved to an HTS capability of deployed social scientists as a successor to the poorly
performing Cultural Preparation of the Environment,
there were questions as to where it would sit in the
military architecture, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3,
home to Hriar Cabayan, lacked the ability to run joint
programs. Personnel who worked on the CPE were
meeting with different entities which possessed the
capability to stage the HTS prototype, including the
State Department Humanitarian Information Unit in
March 2005, the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command in June 2005, and the Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity in July 2005, all of which
refused. The FMSO then suggested that the capability
could be housed with them at TRADOC.109 Cabayan
was sceptical of the FMSO arrangement, considering
the office to be best suited to long-range analysis.110 In
addition, the most enthusiastic member of the FMSO,
Don Smith, was only a captain, and it was uncertain if
he possessed the stature to consolidate the program.
However, Cabayan’s Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Group at the Pentagon agreed to transition the
Cultural Preparation of the Environment capability
138

to the FMSO for further development into an HTS
prototype in February 2006; the CPE capability was
the hardware which would come to form mapping
the human terrain (MAP-HT).111 Fondacaro, who had
been a Joint IED Defeat Task Force commander in Iraq
from 2005-06 and thus well known to McFarland, was
transitioning to retirement when the HTS capability
came up. This was also a meeting of minds; McFarland had been brought into the task force when Meigs
began his appointment on December 12, 2005—while
retaining his role at TRADOC—and with an immediate responsibility to increase the intelligence capability of the task force. McFarland had also been present
at the Baghdad briefings to Meigs by Fondacaro and
Jackson.112
McFarland could act in a supervisory capacity for
the FMSO program, and lacking viable, funded alternatives for the program as envisaged, the idea of developing a possible HTS prototype became integrated
into the remit of the office. If the COIN requirement
was so pronounced, there would have been a clamor from different entities in the Department of State
and DoD to fund the program. There was no clamor,
but at the FMSO, the particular areas of expertise of
the staff gave them a heightened awareness of culture and sociocultural knowledge in stabilization
operations, and:
how it impacts not just decision-making at the highest
levels, but down to the tactical level. And we saw this
in Afghanistan in the [19]80s. That knowledge bled
through everything the Foreign Military Studies Office did in the creation of HTS in the beginning—those
guys’ ability to understand different how perspectives
impacted on warfighting was vitally important to
where the programme came from.113

139

By April 2006 the FMSO team had a draft design
for the HTS program, which was published in Military
Review.114
Through his work with the C-IED initiatives, McFarland had seen firsthand in Iraq the necessity to
move “left of bang,” and to do that would require enhancing cultural awareness not only on the ground but
in a pedagogic capacity.115 McFarland was uniquely
placed within the architecture of TRADOC as its G-2
Intelligence chief, and had seen firsthand the requirements for sociocultural information on the ground
to enable such a transformation. McFarland created
a steering committee for what was now termed the
Cultural Operations Research-HTS prototype in July
2006. Smith and Fondacaro continued to attempt to
procure funding for the program now that it had a
physical home, but, as McFate explains of DoD budget
allocation:
it’s not like venture capital in the civilian world where
you’ve got a widget and you’re going to go out and
meet some guys in the Silicon Valley, and they are going to pony up $2 million. There is no one place in the
Pentagon to go if you want to raise money so basically
you just have to go meet as many people as you can,
and this is what they were doing.116

In addition, as Fondacaro explains, at this point
there was a “solid plan to operationalize HTS,” and
Dr. Robin Keesee, the Deputy JIEDDO Director, who
approved the initial funding, was a human dynamics
engineer that Fondacaro had previously employed on
his team when he was running the Objective Force
Soldier Study for General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff
of the Army, when Fondacaro was a brigade commander in 2002.117 Being the end of the Fiscal Year
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also worked in their favor; with unspent money in
departments which could be spent quickly on unfulfilled requirements.118 At the same time, they made a
proposal for funds to JIEDDO for a U.S.$20.4 million
five-team proof of concept and, with neither permanent office space nor training facilities, began the first
HTT training with those funds.119 The funding proposal for Cultural Operations Research-HTS therefore
came from the C-IED enterprise. During this time and
as part of this process, while expecting the proposal
to move forward, the FMSO developed the prototype
at TRADOC. They used reservists to assemble two
field teams and two research teams, spending an estimated U.S.$700,000 in salaries and materiel. While the
office lacked sufficient funds to deploy a team, training could begin.120 It is unclear, however, where the
U.S.$700,000 came from and may have formed part of
the standard assigned salaries to the reservists as part
of their active duty tour, paid wherever they deployed
and thus not part of an HTS project per se but part of
a budget which already existed.
Instructively, it was also JIEDDO which set the
original proof-of-concept objectives in 2007: to provide
brigade information and knowledge; to minimize loss
in continuity between incoming and departing units;
to archive cultural information to enhance operational
effectiveness; and to maximize effectiveness of operational decisions by harmonizing courses of action with
target area cultural knowledge.121 In this original iteration for the proof-of-concept, there was no mention of
interaction with the host population, and no allusion
to COIN doctrine, despite it being an ascendant trope
in policy. JIEDDO wanted the capability to provide
cultural expertise to enhance operational effectiveness.
But the physical home at TRADOC, cautioned against
by Cabayan, was still problematic. Ultimately, in
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retrospect, Fondacaro observes that TRADOC “doesn’t
operationalize anything” and had no existing funds to
develop the HTS concept itself, so that the priority for
the longevity of the idea was:
to get it started, because if you gain credibility, if you
gain support, then you figure out where it is supposed
to go. But there is no Department of Good Ideas in the
Pentagon; there’s no place like that. JIEDDO was as
close as you could get to a new ideas funding source.
And I had credibility there.122

Within a very short period after AF1 deployed to
Afghanistan, The Multi-National Corps-Iraq JUONS
was generated. This statement created a requirement
for five teams to deploy to Iraq by mid-2007, the refreshing of AF1 as an enduring team, and 13 further
teams and four Human Terrain Analysis Teams, the
latter serving at the division level. This statement effectively jettisoned the original blueprint for a 2-year
proof-of-concept program. The HTS was always an ad
hoc program “to see what works, so we had, it was
like ‘It’s an experiment, it’s an in-situ experiment, I
love grounded theory. Let us see what works’.”123 But
after the JUONS, the HTS, instead of testing, experimenting, and analyzing these teams over time would
be forced to create an entirely new enduring capability and thrust them into the field. In the words of Fondacaro: “We were building this plane in flight, that is
what the JUONS did to us.”124 This new requirement
marked a distinct evolution in the program; from the
experimental, ad hoc nature of AF1, to a deliberate effort to replicate AF1 with the five teams in Iraq, as well
as backfilling people into AF1.
The creation of the JUONS meant that Fondacaro, as program manager, met with the Joint Rapid
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Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to determine whether to “fill
or kill” the HTS capability; to designate it as an Immediate Warfighter Need.125 The JRAC is instructive
in the sense of building innovation through crisis;
established in September 2004, it was, in Fondacaro’s
words as someone who briefed successfully to it, one
of the “rapid workarounds created by the war.”126
The brief had to explain that without the capability
there was risk of mission failure and put soldiers’ lives
at stake. As a result of the meeting, Fondacaro was
promised U.S.$16 million, which was later expanded
substantially, as part of organizations making surplus
budgets available to the proof-of-concept program.
A program brief from May 2007 notes that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had developed a Surge Support Initiative in February 2007
that “recommended redirecting and expanding HTS
to support operations in Iraq (Baghdad)” and that requests for HTTs had come from Command Groups of
the 10th Mountain Division; II Marine Expeditionary
Force; 1 Cavalry Division/III Corps; 82nd Airborne
Division; Special Operations Command, Pacific; and
the 4th Infantry Division.127 At the same time as this
rapid expansion into the combat brigades, Fondacaro
had an ongoing, broader plan to transition the capability into a strategic one, housed at the Humanitarian Information Unit at the Department of State. The
program creators initially had funding for the HTS
capability turned down by the unit, but maintained
engagement with the Department of State for funding
and integration.
The briefing for CENTCOM and Multi-National
Corps-Iraq in mid-2007 also included the raw results
of two 10-person focus groups conducted by the Lincoln Group in Baghdad in June 2006, which “resulted
in an increased understanding of opinion in Baghdad
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about several of the main issues facing the Coalition
in Iraq” and the “participants expressed the opinion
that the Iraqi government is weak or non-existent.”128
It was this understanding of the popular perception
in the areas in which coalition forces fought that was
seen as pivotal to winning against the insurgency. The
briefing was also to include raw results from 34 interviews entitled “Mahdi army” which asked unnamed
cases 77 questions ranging from demographics to perception of the insurgency.
In addition, a “Social Science Research and Analysis: Implementation Plan for Baghdad” presentation
from Andrea V. Jackson, who had been Director of
Research at the Lincoln Group and was a consultant
to the HTS, proposed conducting in eight districts of
Baghdad 1,500-person random sample surveys; 40 interviews with members of each militia; 40 interviews
with members of each ethno-religious group; one set
of two focus groups (one male, one female); and observational research based on a research question.129
It was this aspect of the presentation from the work
done by the Lincoln Group, which created the Social
Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) element of the
HTS program and which commenced in both Iraq and
Afghanistan in 2008, subcontracted to Glevum Associates by BAE Systems. The SSRA Research and Analysis Management Team used indigenous contractors
to conduct polling, surveys, focus groups and semistructured interviews of the population on a variety
of issues which could be useful in understanding and
countering insurgencies, conducting quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the results.
Against the backdrop of this initial and detailed
assessment of what could be provisioned in order
to fill a capability gap, the concept and the program
developed robust support. As the teams were sent
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to Iraq and Afghanistan, their positive and negative
effects on the brigades could be assessed, and also
briefed. It was this ongoing, iterative process which
allowed feedback on outcomes. On January 8, 2009,
for example, Congressman Tim Baird, Chairman of
the Science and Education Committee, set up a meeting which included Ike Skelton, Chairman of the
Armed Service Committee; Tim McClees, Staff Director for the Subcommittee on Terrorism; and Mike
Warren, an HTT leader. The meeting was a chance to
outline the capabilities of an HTT to Skelton as well as
existing shortcomings, and Skelton highlighted that,
in his opinion, the capability should be expanded to
Combatant Commands beyond CENTCOM, and that
he wanted to assist with resourcing, when the Army
identified requirements.
The solution to the capability gap offered by the
HTS resonated further; across coalition partners in Afghanistan, where the complex social patterns required
intricate understanding of the population in order
to engage it effectively. From January 8 to January
9, 2009, Fondacaro and McFate met with representatives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
Joint Force Command, and the Strategic Communications Advisor, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, to discuss integrating an HTS capability into the command structure in Afghanistan. The
Joint Force Command were “unclear exactly what
they desire” and ultimately for the HTS, it was “not
clear what the support expectation from ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] actually is.”130
Additionally, the HTS program also engaged with
the NATO Tiger Team to examine ways in which the
role of culture could be integrated into interagency
intelligence procedures.
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CONCLUSIONS
Speaking in the throes of revolution, Abraham
Lincoln observed:
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the
stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case
is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves.131

Crises are existential threats which exert intolerable pressures upon the status quo. There is a necessity
in the throes of a crisis to think anew and act anew.
After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, military resistance proliferated to the extent that an examination
of the enemy and the population in which they operated could not be ignored.
Despite its immense size, the intellectual tools and
the experts necessary to understand the character of
the human terrain at the granular level on the ground
were absent from the military enterprise. That capability gap required prompt action: as Robert Gates
argued at the National Defense University on September 29, 2008, “No one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions
of warfare.”132 To that end, the expertise found in the
intellectual reservoir of the academy was considered a
necessary and immediate addition to the warfighting
effort because the military structure did not possess a:
deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or
elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict—and
to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces
engaged in these conflicts.133
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Future planning for irregular warfare had been
proceeding in the periphery of military thought
throughout the post-Vietnam era, but by 2006, Petraeus could suggest that the complex insurgencies experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan would become the
central modality of conflict in this new century.134 The
pivot in planning was borne directly from a perceived
necessity to understand the character of the adversary
in order to attack the network behind the IEDs. The
ensuing need to understand the terrain on a cultural level stood in marked contrast from the hubristic
beginnings of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in which
there was “a relative lack of concern by the President
and the top military leadership” regarding Iraqi culture and consultation with academic experts.135 In the
HTS in particular, there was an identified requirement to “understand the cloak in which the insurgent
wrapped himself in: the population.”136 Focusing on
the insurgent would lead to collateral damage and
popular support for the insurgency. If the population’s needs were met, the insurgents can be exposed
and isolated.137
Early in his military career, Petraeus ghost-wrote a
Parameters article for Southern Command commander
General John Galvin.138 In it, Petraeus observed the
conditions necessary for a shift in emphasis in military
thinking:
We arrange in our minds a war we can comprehend on
our own terms, usually with an enemy who looks like
us and acts like us. This comfortable conceptualization becomes the accepted way of seeing things and,
as such, ceases to be an object for further investigation
unless it comes under serious challenge as a result of
some major event—usually a military disaster.139
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The rapidly expanding IED threat which spread
from Iraq to Afghanistan was such a military disaster.
But despite U.S.$20.4 million from the JIEDDO—the
only funding the HTS could find—the program was
not configured to trace IED networks. The MAP-HT
was configured for social network analysis, like the
CPE before it, in order to identify networks in the area,
but it was used “to understand the problem in the AO
[area of operations] in all its dimensions, educate the
BCT and plan research.”140 Fondacaro had planned
to transition the HTS into the Department of State
and MAP-HT was a tool which would facilitate that
migration. As noted in the Concept of Operations:
The mission of MAP-HT is to support multi-disciplined Civil, Social analysis through dynamic fusion
of data throughout the civil picture that will require
interaction between Non-Governmental Organizations, Governmental Organizations, and Interactional
Organizations.141

The HTS ended as a quasi-nongovernmental organization (NGO) disavowing any assistance to kinetic
targeting. The emerging COIN milieu of military
thinking quoted in the 2006 FM Counterinsurgency as
the “graduate level of war” heightened the ability of
the HTS to recruit from the civilian sector as it promised smart war, superior tactical thinking in order to
conduct more population-centric operations.
In crises, we think anew and act anew.
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CHAPTER 4
TRIAL, ERROR, AND AMENDMENT
The Human Terrain System (HTS) began as a startup program from a proof-of-principle in 2006, with
the intention of putting two teams into Afghanistan
and three teams into Iraq. Training and recruitment
were designed de novo, and continually revised as
part of an ongoing reflective process.1 As Janice H.
Laurence notes, the:
HTS was experimental, and thus the whole HTS program, especially training, was meant to evolve. As a
learning organization, HTS adjusted to experience on
the ground as the organization learned how to serve
the military mission better. Training was iterative; the
composition of teams was iterative; human capital
strategies and program and personnel management
practices were iterative. One might even say that the
whole war was iterative.2

The original concept of operations for the program
completed in January 2007 left the role of the embedded team on the brigade staff unspecified because the
team was a new tool for the U.S. Army, and it was not
known how best to proceed. However, a brigade commander cited in that original concept had envisioned
a permanent presence of the embedded team on staff,
along with other elements deployed to the forward
operating bases (FOBs). This was how AF1 was configured, with team roles being a team leader, cultural
analyst, regional studies analyst, research manager,
and human terrain analyst.3
In April 2007, the concept of operations was refined to provide specific recruitment and new posi-
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tions for the five Iraq teams, IZ1 to IZ5, which would
become the blueprint for the Human Terrain Teams
(HTTs). The roles were now: team leader; two social
scientists; a research manager; and a human terrain
analyst.4 As a result of lessons learned from AF1, the
roles of the HTT were refined and broadly could “improve the human terrain understanding of the brigade
staff.”5 The structure of the teams and the identities
and functions of those in it had been difficult to deduce from the beginning. Steve Fondacaro had been
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from May 2006, and in
2007 took AF1 to FOB Salerno, Italy, for 2 weeks. Despite being immersed, the team roles did not emerge
as obvious ones, but the HTS wanted social science
research and thus there was a “social scientist” role
from the beginning.6 Instructive in the complexity of
recruitment, AF1 team leader Rick Swisher was hired
through a BAE Systems subcontractor, Echota.
In a May 2007 brief to outline how HTS filled a “tactical” capability gap, Fondacaro and Bob Reuss note
that “COIN [counterinsurgency] and 4th Generation
Warfare has clearly identified people as the Center
of Gravity in future conflict” and that “at present, no
capability exists to research, process and apply information on the local population.”7 To solve the problem, the proof-of-concept objectives as outlined were
to provide the brigade combat team (BCT)/regional
command team (RCT) commanders with the means
to “collect, process, and apply relevant, sociocultural
data, information, knowledge and understanding”
and to “integrate that understanding into their military decisionmaking process”; enhance continuity of
action between units during Relief in Place/Transfer
of Authority; provide a support structure to “research,
interpret, archive and make readily available cultural
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data, information and knowledge”; and, “Maximize
effectiveness of tactical operations by harmonizing
COAs [Courses of Action] with target area cultural
context (population).”8
The three pillars of support to the brigade were
divided into collection, analysis, and application. Collection was subdivided into:
Patrol Debriefs (U.S./Indigenous); SOF [Special Operations Forces]; NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations]; PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team]; LEPs
[Law Enforcement Professionals]; CA/PSYOP [Civil
Affairs/Psychological Operations]; Survey Data; Local Hires; Special Events.9

In order to train recruits in each of the three pillars,
the May 2007 brief outlines a 3- to 4-month training
program which would include:
Social Science Field Research Methods Training; MapHuman Terrain (MAP-HT) Toolkit Training; Area Orientation/Study; Counterinsurgency (COIN) Instruction; Capstone Exercise (BCT MDMP); Basic Military
Common Skills.10

Training was an iterative process. Complex training elements such as the teaching of advanced military tradecraft—for example, behavior in key leader
engagements—is “something that HTS in the beginning didn’t have time to do,” and it continued to be
“hard to develop a way to communicate that uniformly throughout the program, coherently, cohesively,
over time.”11 The troop surge in Iraq and commensurate expansion of the number of HTTs required in the
country to support deployed brigades meant that the
pace of, and demands on, the program did not allow
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opportunities to implement fixes.12 Of the primary researchers with the teams, the initial focus was on social
scientists, the first of which was a cultural anthropologist. The expansion period in 2007 to equip the surge
is indicative of the malleable and amorphous identity
of the program in its earliest stages, which gained
initial funding from both counterterrorism (CT) and
counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) sources.
Under pressure to develop the HTS as a programof-record and given the expanding numerical requirement for embedded teams, it was difficult to address
problematic contours between the program, its contractor, BAE Systems, and its parent, the U.S. Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). As a program
start-up, financing was the core concern and senior
management was working on that aspect. From his
perspective as BAE Systems program manager, David Zacharias asserted that Montgomery McFate and
Fondacaro were a powerful force, driving the HTS
and securing funding.13 Fondacaro himself notes that
McFate was able to produce the theoretical social science frameworks, while he provided the operational
knowledge and understood the military enterprise,
ultimately tessellating to produce a viable program
architecture for the HTS.14
The iterative process meant that it became a necessity to formalize lessons learned from the field. These
lessons were captured from both within the embedded teams and from feedback from the brigade and
the divisions that were using them—U.S. and coalition partners—and examine the best way to train team
members specifically and more generally improve the
program. Some of these investigations were from program resources and some were externally directed;
they included the West Point study, Paul Joseph at
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Tufts University, the Center for Naval Analyses and
the Institute for Defense Analyses between 2008 and
2010.15 In addition, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) found that the HTS had not used
“good judgement” on which people “could deploy
and live in an austere environment and serve there for
9 months or more.”16
The problem of hiring was not resolved for the duration of the program’s time in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It created a serious division between the HTS program
management and its parent, TRADOC, which was the
recipient of significant funding from both the Army
G-2 and the Department of Defense (DoD) for the
sociocultural capability. Screening for the program
did not involve a specialized team to hire for social
science positions. This is problematic because social
science itself is “very fluid; there are many ways to
be a social scientist. You have to define what the field
encompasses.”17 Jennifer Clark explains that the program “did not individually select. If I didn’t have the
background I did, or the personality I have, I would
have failed miserably. So part of that is personality so
how do you code for personality? You can’t.”18
Coding for personality is certainly problematic, but
rigorous interviews are not. BAE Systems had a thin,
laissez-faire recruitment process, as related by the majority of HTT social scientists interviewed in the book.
There are four requirements for effective HTT social
scientists: first, regional area expertise, the knowledge
component; second, field experience, the practical
component; third, physical ability, the dynamic component; and fourth, mental adaptability, the psychological component. Interview phases grouped around
each component in turn would ensure the very highest caliber of recruits to the program. The first three
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components are self-explanatory and easy to access
through examination while the fourth requires further
refinement for assessment.
Ultimately, this points to the overriding problem
of the application of social science techniques to warfighting. Unlike a technological solution, social science cannot be taken out of a box and applied in a
prescriptive manner to an obvious end.19 Definition of
success in the application of social science is problematic, and, for that reason, demonstrating value over
time is arduous, based around unmeasurable dimensions of amorphous notions such as “understanding”
or “culture.” The problematic application is mirrored
in recruiting.
In the summer of 2008, the HTS and TRADOC contacted PDRI, a training solutions company, to assess
the recruitment and selection process, partly because
of the difficulty in defining jobs which did not previously exist, partly because of contracting issues. Published in February 2009, the report observed that the
recruitment process was so dispiriting that it was reasonable to assume self-selection out of the process was
continuing out of “frustration with a contractor.”20 As
part of that evaluation, PDRI also created a structured
interview pilot test on which to evaluate current HTT
trainees at Fort Leavenworth. The evaluation highlighted that some personnel in training in all roles,
“provided responses that showed they were unable to
work effectively with others when dealing with challenging situations.”21 In addition: “Several trainees for
all HTT jobs provided responses that indicated they
would have problems dealing with individuals from
other cultures.”22
For future research platforms that might address
this complex problem, there is a wealth of experience
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resident in former HTT personnel regarding “what
works” when embedded. Assessing feedback from
each HTT member regarding every other member
of that team and coding thematically would allow a
deeper picture of the ideal social science disciplines,
ideal level of academic attainment, age, language capability, personality traits, skills, research methods,
and gender comments to emerge. For example, female
HTT social scientists, especially in Afghanistan, could
engage more easily the “forgotten 50 percent” of that
society. From that detailed picture of 7 years of HTS
across two COIN campaigns, a picture will crystalize
of optimum capabilities and psychologies. This will
resonate beyond the program itself because personality examination has connotations for all Armed Service components concerned with intrateam dynamics.
To examine what the program management considered to be the optimum HTT social scientist, I investigate the training cycle and its evolution through
development groups created by the program. Better
understanding of the role of social scientists in Iraq
and Afghanistan can be gained by examination of the
internal investigation of HTT performance conducted
during the period of program revision. This evolutionary process based on lessons learned, feedback
from commanders and best practice sheds light on the
ways in which the U.S. Army, as the primary customer, wanted to utilize embedded teams and thus goes to
the heart of the question.
RECRUITMENT
Why was recruitment for the program problematic? In answering this question, I include material
from an interview conducted with Zacharias, BAE
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Systems program manager for the HTS between 2008
and 2009. Zacharias, who was the third BAE Systems
program manager for the HTS and entered during a
period when the relations between the HTS and TRADOC had already deteriorated, explains that recruitment during the early period incorporated a blanket
approach, including papers and websites, with most
of the applicants citing the website advertisements as
being where they first saw the vacancies.23 From the
beginning, starting with AF1 team leader Swisher, private contractors were used for teams because of the
difficulty of recruiting from the existing DoD pool.
The omni-contractor for TRADOC, BAE Systems, was
awarded the contracting role without a tender process.
The recruitment process was laissez-faire. During
his time with the program, Zacharias estimates that
there was approximately an 80 percent success rate
of the people accepted for interview.24 This high success rate was a result of the contract; BAE Systems
were given no bonus for the quality of the contractor
and were not forced to bid for the contract. The high
success rate was also a result of a gulf between the
program and the contractor. Social science was an abstract term, and there appears no attempt to refine the
selection process for the social scientist. BAE Systems
managers were not convinced that the concept of a social scientist held tangible substance.25 HTS managers
were working from a “best guess” about what might
work in Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS management
in order to define the role of social scientist had given
BAE Systems a list of graduate degrees that management “believed constituted a social science degree.”26
This list included anthropology, sociology, social psychology, cultural geography, political science including International Relations, area studies, and especially expertise sets related to the Middle East or Central
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Asia. Moreover, “field experience” was of interest
to the HTS management, as was personnel who had
qualitative backgrounds; showing that the program
was always configured as primarily a qualitative
research function.27
The Iraq surge requirements prompted BAE Systems to accelerate its use of subcontractors that had
their own recruiters, and, as the rapid expansion of
the number of teams created hiring tensions, David
Zacharias took over the BAE Systems management
for the program.28 The contractor assessment has been
largely obscured in recent studies, with the exception
of the Center for Naval Analyses investigation and
thus has value in investigating further here. Highlighting the amorphous nature of social science and
the difficulty of comprehension, Zacharias observes
that HTS “needed anthropologists and they needed
social scientists, but I would say that it was harder to
come by the anthropologists than it was a social scientists, so it turned into a social science hunt.”29 But,
from the beginning, the HTS was always configured
to employ “social scientists” as noted in the original
blueprints for HTT structure. Moreover, both HTT
personnel and at least one BAE Systems subcontractor have expressed dissatisfaction at the BAE Systems
role and function.
The problematic definition of social science manifests most acutely in the contracting requirement,
where the disconnect between the HTS program management and the TRADOC omnibus contractor was
pronounced. As Zacharias notes of his time as BAE
Systems program manager, “What kind of credentials do you need to be a social scientist? How do you
choose a social scientist? I don’t know and neither did
they.”30 This, however, fails to explain the scope and
severity of the contracting missteps. Returning to the
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four components identified as core to an HTT social
scientist—knowledge, practical, physical, and psychological components—the social science component
is only one section of the requirement. The program
still hired physically ill-suited individuals, personnel
who lacked field experience, and personalities which
were overtly immiscible in training and when embedded with brigades. The HTS program could not vet
hires, only reject them when they arrived at Fort Leavenworth to begin the training cycle. With the urgent
requirement to field teams, this created a dangerous
situation where there was a necessity to embed personnel, and resulted in the arrangement where many
former personnel have related teams becoming dysfunctional when embedded in the brigades.
The dialogue between the program management,
TRADOC, and BAE Systems became fraught, having a deleterious impact on any attempt to remedy
the fractious relationship. This disconnect may have
gone unnoticed in a less visible program, but the HTS
was the subject of intense media and academic scrutiny. McFate and Fondacaro were not bureaucrats.
Working effectively with BAE Systems to develop improved selection processes would require significant
interaction and collaboration. This was a controversial
program which embedded civilians into combat brigades, and it would have required sustained dialogue
between both parties—BAE Systems and the program
management—in order to quickly refine the recruitment process. The opposite occurred, and worsened
to the extent that, when the BAE Systems contract for
the HTS was offered to tender, TRADOC did not inform the HTS of the process when it began.
The HTS management had minimal ability to set
the job skills or influence the hiring process. Further,
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the dimensions of the Iraq surge of forces amplified
the problem by necessitating a large number of contractors to be recruited rapidly and quickly embedded.
While the interview process has come in for substantial criticism from former team members interviewed,
there were positive endorsements of some contacts
regarding subcontractors, which strongly suggest that
if the contractor in the first instance had been selected
carefully, the net effect of the program may have been
altered, perhaps minimally but also perhaps significantly. One social scientist who deployed to Afghanistan noted that the interview process over the phone,
the first contact with the program, actually added to
his or her motivation to join the program because of
the competent, caring nature of the contact. The social scientist at this point already knew of the myriad
concerns regarding the program, but the contact gave
the individual names of people to talk to who were
already in the program, and engaged in substantial
conversations about the type of research which would
be undertaken, the risks, and the negatives in the program.31 Ultimately, the contact was lucid about the
problems, the serious issue regarding recently issued
Status of Forces Agreement, such that the social scientist went into the program “fairly well informed.”32
This conversation was with BAE Systems subcontractor Alion, an employee-owned technology solutions
company. The positive feedback is important as it
suggests that careful selection of the recruiting contractor could have created more positive feedback of
the process and prevented many of the hiring missteps. Indeed, PDRI, in its assessment of recruitment,
stated that: “There is substantial variation in the selection procedures used by contractors after the initial
resume screen.”33 Moreover, “Several subcontractors
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noted that it was often unclear what BAE Systems was
looking for in a candidate.”34
In addition, the absence of small-team assessment
protocols or personality assessment protocols in the
recruitment process meant that there could be myriad
problems which crystallized acutely in Iraq and Afghanistan to devastating effect. As one former HTT
social scientist explains:
If you have this very relaxed recruitment process you
are going to get a lot of people who don’t belong on
the program and certainly don’t belong in a war zone:
and they don’t belong in a small-team environment in
a war-zone because these are all very stressful things.35

Given the poor suitability of many hired personnel, which deleteriously impacted the reputation of
the program at best and hindered combat brigades at
worst, recruitment issues were a singular problem in
HTS throughout the program’s lifespan in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As one social scientist explains, “It all
started with recruitment and selection, and then training, and everything else just piles on top.”36
In practice, the laissez-faire contracting meant that
there were a number of recruits in the training cycle
who were ill-equipped whether academically, physically, or psychologically to insert into a combat brigade. The idea and passion of Fondacaro drove the
program forward, and McFate’s intellect provided
the pedagogic fabric which conditioned the teams,
but there were vast tears in the cloth which resulted
in problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, where, embedded in combat brigades with high operational tempo,
the deficiencies were magnified. Zacharias notes
that he could name more team failures than successful teams.37 In context, the quantitative assessment is
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purely anecdotal and based on perception from someone removed from the HTS program management, but
it hints at the magnitude of the failing in this critical
area. The capability gap was real, but filling it with illsuited recruits did not provide an effective solution.
Insufficient training of military command structures,
low standards of recruiting, high pay relative to the
military units in which they embedded, lack of operationally relevant products and poor interpersonal
skills could contribute to the problem. When AF5 was
ordered to leave FOB Shank, Afghanistan, in the winter of 2009-10, to become a battalion support element
at FOB Airborne, Afghanistan, it was unprofessionalism in the HTT and poor relationships with the unit
which caused the relocation. The absence of a strong
HTS bureaucracy or in-country oversight also limited
the ability of the program to correct problems when
they arose in theater.
Problems in the program’s natural evolution thus
stem from this contract hiring process. There was not
enough oversight of BAE Systems by the program
management in the beginning of the program, and
the problems were not solved. BAE Systems was a
technology corporation, and the services element was
new and, as a consequence, underdeveloped. In its infancy with such work, BAE Systems should have been
monitored more closely, and there should have been
collaboration rather than confrontation. In the end, a
“jaundiced eye” marked the relationship which was
increasingly detrimental to the program. This continually placed manifestly ill-suited personnel into the
training cycle and created this empirically observed
five-to-one ratio of functioning to nonfunctioning
teams. The successes of AF1 showed it could be done,
but they just had to find the right people because, if
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they did not do so, a brigade would reject the embedded team at first contact.
As Fondacaro notes in a memo written during the
surge of forces in Iraq, screening up until that point
for HTS had been “somewhat “hand-to-mouth”” and
that, while BAE Systems had improved its “responsiveness to HTS with regard to applicant screening
and coordination with HTS staff” there was a need for
urgent improvement given the expanded scope of the
program necessitated by the JUONS.38 Fondacaro explains that the HTS managers:
require additional support. In particular, we need
people who have appropriate human resource skills
to screen resumes, engage candidates, and hire HTT
members . . . We must avoid hiring unqualified candidates because of hasty and deficient screening.39

As the quality of the candidates arriving at Ft.
Leavenworth continued to be highly variable, it was
inevitable that the personal relationships between
the HTS management, the primary contractor, and
the TRADOC parent would deteriorate, with significant implications for the character of the program
as a whole.
Nevertheless, according to Zacharias, in 2008, the
managers in the BAE Systems team working on the
HTS program won one of the Chairman’s Awards,
an annual prize-giving which rewarded outstanding contributions to the profile of the company.40 In
part, this may have been to capitalize on the intense
media publicity surrounding the program after positive reports from outlets including The New York Times
and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Zacharias,
however, remains sceptical of the enterprise today:
“It was a prestigious award, given because it was so
unique what we were doing. But it was miss-sold [the
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civilian expertise providing sociocultural capability to
BCTs].”41 Sociocultural capability in war is an abstract
concept, one which McFate notes has few historically
comparable examples. To create a recruitment process
so quickly without detailed guidelines, after the original model for five teams embedded over 2 years had
been quickly and inexorably expanded, led to strategic missteps.
By 2009, after the contractor deaths, and negative
publicity about the relationship between BAE Systems and the program management, recruitment, and
training, the attitude from BAE Systems management
hardened irreversibly. For Zacharias, it crystalized
around the contractor deaths:
we had three people killed. And that was the overriding factor for BAE Systems; when you pay out six million dollars for each death, it drives home that this is a
very liable system. You get a bunch of people killed, at
six million apiece, pretty soon, three hundred million
dollar program, doesn’t take many people.42

Zacharias attended the funeral of Paula Loyd
which casts the role of BAE Systems in a strange hue;
at once it was a human enterprise, but at the same
time, it was a contractor with a bottom line. The HTS,
like any other BAE Systems contract, was subject to a
cost/benefit ratio analysis despite the immense scale
of the personal tragedies unfolding on the program.
Lack of bureaucracy hampered the program in
wider ways beyond the contracting. Going from “zero
to a hundred miles an hour with no prep time” meant
that there was little available time for program structure development.43 As McFate explains:
We didn’t have the personnel to manage a program
that large, and we didn’t have the budget; the whole
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budget that we had was geared towards teams, not to
staffing. So we had no money, we had no manpower,
we had no facilities.44

The program office was opened in Newport News,
Virginia, but the staff was split between Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Newport News, with the result that upper management were divided from the
training facility, and, put bluntly by McFate, “that just
doesn’t work.”45 As well as management facilities, an
operations cell was created to be staffed 24 hours a
day, with space made available from the C-IED Operational Intelligence Center, an underfunded initiative
McFarland had created upon his return from the JIEDDTF (showing again, from a different angle, the early
relationship between the HTS and C-IED initiatives).
The program sat beneath the TRADOC Intelligence
Support Activity in the organizational chart, which reported to the G-2. Ultimately, at this time, it was “live
and learn.”46 The expansion as part of the Iraq surge of
forces, while a “catastrophic success,” also enabled a
wide number of research initiatives on the experiences
of the embedded teams to be conducted; such that the
period 2008-10 was about trying to systematize what
they had done originally in a way that would ensure
success in the future.47
The program structure and the status of embedded
team members were complicated by the prohibition of
private contractors after 2008: The U.S.-Iraq Status of
Forces Agreement commenced January 1, 2009, prohibited all U.S. private contractors from operating in
Iraq. Consequently, HTT personnel transitioned from
contractors to government civilians which exerted a
profound impact on program hiring. There was no
obvious corresponding government civilian position
which had an equivalent remuneration package to the
HTT social scientist position as a private contractor. To
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ensure consistency across both Iraq and Afghanistan,
the program management applied the status change
to deployed program members in Afghanistan, as
well as Iraq at that time.48 The change in status impacted earnings and posed a significant problem for
an already beleaguered recruitment practice.
Because of the Status of Forces Agreement, the
Center for Naval Analyses assessment estimated that,
at this transition point, the program lost 30 percent of
team personnel either because they did not qualify for
the government positions or resigned rather than convert to federal civilians.49 It was also suggested that the
problematic attrition rate was exacerbated by “limited
staff support” available to assist in the transition.50 The
HTS’s own estimate, in a 2010 Congressional Staff Update, was that between April 2009 and January 2010,
256 personnel (89 percent) converted from contractor
to Department of the Army Civilians.51 The discrepancy may be because a large number of personnel had
already departed by the beginning of April, such that
the HTT core personnel remained, en masse. Regarding the limited staff support, it is instructive that the
majority of funding had gone toward team staffing,
rather than expanding the number of program managers. In August 2009, HTS calculated that funding requirements would be composed of Army Base Funding, approximately U.S.$18 million to U.S.$20 million
between Fiscal Year 2011 and Fiscal Year 2015 as the
program transitioned to an enduring concept—but
zero before—had to fund training, logistics, the RRC
and program management. The majority of the funding, through the DoD share of the Overseas Contingency Fund—requested at between U.S.$93 million
and U.S.$133 million per annum, Fiscal Year 2009
through Fiscal Year 2015—was for embedded teams
in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM
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and IRAQI FREEDOM, “on a COCOM [combatant
command] demand basis.”52
The departure rate cited by the Center for Naval
Analyses, however, is indicative of the significance of
the remuneration package in motivating many of the
contractors. Those that remained could be argued to
be motivated by more altruistic concerns and therefore important to the future prosperity of the program.
However, the relatively high remuneration package
in the civilian pay scale generated animosity from the
government side, asking why HTT personnel were being made federal civilians and, while the program endured, “It was not easy recruiting from then on in.”53
In truth, it had not been easy from the beginning, and
the Status of Forces Agreement exacerbated an already
significant problem. Crisis had facilitated the creation
of the HTS but that febrile atmosphere also facilitated
a laissez-faire approach from program managers and
contractors. In part, this was also due to command of
the teams. TRADOC was the training entity for the
teams, but when embedded, they were under the authority of the brigade commanders. Hence, after the
4-month training period at Ft. Leavenworth, when the
teams entered Iraq or Afghanistan, they were no longer hinged to TRADOC and the brigade commander
had to understand how to use them effectively. Crises
hinder as much as they enable.
To augment military operations, HTTs were
present to:
Conduct operationally-relevant, open-source social
science research, and provide commanders and staffs
at the BCT/RCT and Division levels with an embedded knowledge capability, to establish a coherent,
analytic cultural framework for operational planning,
decisionmaking, and assessment.54
176

For some social scientists, and, tellingly, for the
convergence of two cultures, it was a necessary experience to have fused theoretical learning with practical understanding of areas in military conflict. Such
areas are a different country: they do things differently there. War creates its own borders. Ryan Evans
explains, having recently completed a master’s degree
at King’s College London, United Kingdom (UK),
before signing up to HTS, that:
In my whole career, I had been writing about what
other people were doing, instead of doing. And so I
thought it was important to experience what I would
be devoting my career toward which is conflict and international politics. So I wanted to experience conflict
and contribute, so the HTS seemed like a good way to
combine my academic interests with that aim.55

Another social scientist emphasizes the desire to
remedy disconnects between theory and practice; abstract knowledge and concrete experience, observing
that “I wanted to get my hands dirty. I felt like if I was
going to be a peace fellow, I should know what conflict looked like on a firsthand basis. So that was one of
the big attractors for me.”56
TRAINING
The early training cycles exemplified the ad hoc
character of the program. Lamb et al. suggest that the
first team, AF1, received more than 6 months training, but it was not systematic, essentially making it
up as they went along and, in parts, the process was
auto-didactic. The only official military phase of
the training was the pre-deployment training at the
Combat Readiness Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, conducted with the 82nd Airborne Division of the U.S.
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Army.57 That research, conducted through interviews,
elucidates a more accurate version of the first AF1
pre-deployment, as previous material, including an
account from the HTS, suggests that AF1 undertook
training at Fort Leavenworth from September 2006 to
February 2007, which included 3 weeks on social science methods.58 In the subsequent iteration of training undertaken by the next five teams, training was
developed as a 16-week training rotation and shaped
to correspond roughly to what commanders should
want to understand about the human terrain in their
area of operations and the nature of research which
could be conducted in insecure and highly insecure
environments.
To understand what the HTT social scientists were
doing in the fields, towns, and cities of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is necessary to understand the character
of the training. The 16-week training cycle involved
core courses, and commenced with an “HTT Capabilities Brief” given by Fondacaro and McFate, although
at least one social scientist asserts that this did not
happen until later in the program and may have been
dictated by their availability, given various roles they
were performing.59 Subsequent courses were “Military Culture and Army 101,” and “Subversion and
Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army,” “Intelligence Oversight,” and lessons of Army culture, in
addition to courses in radical Islam and populationcentric COIN.60 The training cycle was refined again
after returning IZ1-IZ5 teams gave feedback on the
process in February 2008 to the Program Development Team, which had been initiated by Fondacaro
to study and evolve the proof-of-concept program.61
Program improvements included: refining the week
of in-processing and orientation; 3 weeks of tool training; 3 weeks of COIN, stability operations, and the
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military decision-making-process; 5 weeks of social
science methods; 3 weeks on negotiations, mediation,
and debriefing; 1 week for the capstone exercise; and
10 days of Combat Readiness Center training.62
Given the ad hoc nature of the training cycle, the
inevitable problems, which quickly surfaced, led the
program to award Georgia Tech Research Institute a
U.S$8 million contract on September 30, 2008, to redesign the training curriculum after it had originally
been awarded to BAE Systems subcontractor, Echota,
as part of the TRADOC contract with BAE Systems.63
According to Lamb et al. on the basis of interviews
conducted as part of their research, program manager
Fondacaro had argued that Echota wrongly prioritized military training by former Special Operations
Forces personnel and minimized academic training.64
In addition, it was believed that Georgia Tech would
“increase the credibility of the training program in the
academic community and distance the program from
McFarland’s influence.”65
In training for the teams developed to meet the
requirements specified in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS) in 2007, there were
classes with cultural anthropologists such as Jeffrey
C. Johnson, a cultural anthropologist possessing expertise in research design, research strategies, interview research, and social networks. This was focused
on team dynamics and basic approaches to cultural
anthropology.66 After this initial baseline knowledge
development, there were several weeks of briefs by
people within the program, developing the concept of
the HTS. In these earliest iterations, this was difficult
because only one team, AF1, had embedded. Such a
small sample, accompanied by the “rose-tinted sunglasses version of what that team did from two individuals on that team” and lacking ability to commu179

nicate effectively the research AF1 had actually done,
along with the functions of the team members, was
“detrimental to the program.”67
This problem with the returning AF1 cohort was
indicative of a wider problem which existed through
multiple iterations—though not isolated within the
HTS but part of a much broader issue—regarding
bringing local contextual, relevant timely information back into the training cycle. As one social scientist who began training in April 2009 and deployed to
Afghanistan noted, “We didn’t read a report or even
interact with the Research Reachback Center until
the very, very end when all our classes were done.”68
Teams would divide up into Afghan and Iraqi culture
classes conducted through contracts with the Center
for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska and
the University of Kansas, for Iraq studies.69
There was, however, a problem within these country-wide examinations, being the lack of specificity
of geography for the team. As a social scientist that
deployed with the Marine Corps to Helmand province, Afghanistan noted the problem was that, at the
sub-country level, nobody knew the actual regions
they would be assigned, nevertheless, “These guys
knew a lot, it was all old, from the 1970s, or whatever,
it was still much more relevant than the time spent in
class.”70 Lamb et al. assert that in this aspect of training
there was, indeed, a lack of current knowledge of the
areas such that much of the teaching was a “conceptual level,” and, while a “popular program,” it was
dropped due primarily to cost constraints.”71
One former HTT member that went to the University of Nebraska in Omaha for the Afghan immersion
training in December 2009, explains that groups split
up for a month based on whether they would go to
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Iraq or Afghanistan.72 In Nebraska, the team members
were taught Dari and had culture lessons taught by
faculty from the University. Classes consisted of approximately 2 to 3 hours of language and a culture
class every day, or some different aspect of it. But
these two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, for the
last decade at least, had been largely closed societies.
However, a singular problem was that the faculty had
last been in Afghanistan in the 1970s, and, while their
knowledge of that time was profound, its relevance
to the current trajectory was necessarily limited. This
problem, returned to in the final chapter, hinted at the
difficult nature of sociocultural research, which could
be deep and thus distanced from the present situation,
or rapid, thus relevant to the present but of limited
depth. As one social scientist explains, the lecturers:
had a lot of information about the politics, pre-Russian
invasion, and the politics after that, but it wasn’t local cultural information which was useful, especially
if you are going to Helmand, so much as it was a great
history lesson.73

While learning Dari was only of limited utility
when deploying to Helmand, it helped when working
with the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police who came from the North, “but going to a
Pashto speaking area,” the social scientist had to learn
that language skill in theater as well as could be managed.74 The lack of current knowledge of the operating
environment—an environment which was subject to
rapid change and extremely insecure—was a problem
which remained unsolved through the duration of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Retaining Expertise.
There were two issues regarding the systemic
failure in the program to retain individual expertise.
First, there was no out-processing structure, a problem amplified by the program not being located at the
U.S. Army Forces Command level, the element of the
United States that deploys operating forces overseas.
The HTS lacked its own capability to deploy and reinsert, such that HTTs deployed out of Combat Training
Centers and returned to them, geographically away
from TRADOC, and the program had no legal or
regulatory authority to order them back to Fort Leavenworth.75 Second, retention vehicles through which
to hire returning personnel were absent because the
program had no control over contracting. This meant
that there was a lack of individuals in possession of
experience from the contemporary situations in Iraq
and Afghanistan teaching in the classroom.76
The transition from contractor to government term
employee made it “possible to retain those people and
keep them as government employees on the staff, because the term of contract was 3 years.”77 The transition was about money, but it was also logistical, about
the number of billets on the organization chart of the
program.78 Government term employees possessed
a specific number of billets in the Department of the
Army Table of Organization and Equipment and Table
of Distribution and Allowances. Contractors could be
employed in any number, but in the transition to term
government employees, the defined billets proved a
problem for the rapidly expanded program.
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Training Two Cultures.
Despite these granular aspects inhibiting optimum teaching during the cycle, the central problem
throughout remained the difficulty in successfully
merging the military and civilian cultures. Tensions
would be greatly exacerbated in the theater of war.
Returning deployed personnel integrated into the
teaching, even if short on the appropriate ethnographic methods used, could be valuable simply for
answering very simple questions, such as how in the
military “they pee in front of a bunch of people” and
other basic elements of life on the functioning military
base.79 But ultimately, many teams deployed with inadequate knowledge of operational requirements and
previous reporting methods and processes.80
These iterations of the training cycle involved negligible military learning for civilians, while at Fort
Leavenworth. This highlighted the tale of two cultures
because for those with previous military experience,
basic training was needless, while for civilians about
to embed with a large-scale military operation engaged in countering an insurgency, it was invaluable.
As one social scientist observes of training: “everyone always asks, for the training, “Did you ever go to
shooting ranges?” assuming the whole thing is about
the military; and there was zero; zero.”81 That social
scientist explains that military training at Fort Leavenworth was conducted by trainers informing program recruits that this was necessary—carrying the
weight of a rifle, helmet, etc.—yet “there was no sense
of military in the sense of being fit, being comfortable
around firearms, knowing how to shoot one.”82 Absence of military integration experiences in the training structure “sends a really bad message to the military, if you have people showing up who have had no
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weapons training, I think it needed to be strong from
the start,” and likewise the physical element, because
it would be necessary in the area of operations to go
out on patrols.83
Research methods and COIN instructors briefed,
in which Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, written by
John Nagl was a key text, and there was a discussion
on the origins of terrorism and the extremist Muslim
ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Theoretical discussions,
however, were of limited utility. Rather, one social scientist remembers of great value the talk given by Dr.
Christopher King, who would later become Director
of the Social Science Directorate, speaking:
at length about this quantitative study that he had
done; he showed us the statistics, showed us the questions, showed us the methods, and this was one of the
first times we had really seen what a team was doing
and what they might be doing.84

The same social scientist remembered an element of
the teaching, McFate and Fondacaro discussing the
program and what it was—“the Montgomery and
Steve show”—and this was a passionate appeal, but
as that social scientist notes: “I do feel as if that was
the myth, I saw the myth and it took a while to figure out what the reality was.”85 Practice was of more
value than theory, but given the sui generis nature of
the tasks ahead of them, even practical discussion had
limited utility when the teams embedded.
Weston Resolve.
Elements of the training cycle are invaluable for
understanding why social scientists were introduced
into Iraq and Afghanistan because they demonstrate
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what management hoped would be achieved. After the
completion of methods teaching, the capstone event
called Weston Resolve commenced (named after the
town in Missouri where the exercise was conducted).
Over time, the teams in subsequent training cycles
branched out into other communities in the Leavenworth area, but continued to combine anthropology
research and integrate that into military staff processes
with a heavy focus on just the staffing process.86 Conducting this mock field research was valuable, as was
briefing results to a mock brigade staff, which allowed
the teams to develop a feel for the military structures
and operational tempo. For the first time, the academic intake could interact with experienced, retired military officers who had performed these roles in practice. This was also valuable for developing small team
interactions and working out the dynamics within the
teams. However, that understanding of the military
structures could be lost on academics at the time, as
one social scientist explained: “I did not get it at all, I
did not get what our point was until I got to Afghanistan, when I got it a little bit more.”87
Despite the obvious value, there were critics of
that mock field research component. Jennifer Clark
explains of that “cavalier” time in the program that,
for the brief moment during Weston Resolve after
the research element, the program management afforded the teams a period of time to prepare for the
briefing. However, the teams were advised that they
would be allowed only a few minutes to brief because
“the operational tempo was really extreme, and you
had to be fast.”88 Managers on the exercise gave teams
“pointers” on the content and delivery, and military
officers who would offer advice: “be quick; don’t do
this; do this.”89 The problem for Clark was one of
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ethics: the briefing had to be interlaced with that of
the commander’s critical information requirements.
These requirements were “mostly kinetic in nature,”
but here the teams were “supposed to read between
the lines and try and advise them [the commanders]
on the things they would need to know to help them
turn into a non-kinetic scenario.”90 However, the team
wanted to gain information which could be used for
kinetic targeting, while Clark “was the lone anthropologist, saying ‘that is not our objective’.”91 Experience of the operational tempo was critical to developing in the social scientist mind the rhythm of military
operations on the ground. It was a necessity for civilian social scientists to learn the operational tempo
of the combat brigade conducting stabilization and
enabling operations. However, prior to the Status of
Forces Agreement in Iraq that was enacted on January 1, 2009, HTT members were all contractors and as
such were limited by time. In the training cycle, that
meant that personnel were only allowed on-site for 8
hours a day, and were between very strict parameters
on what could be done. This was a shortcoming of
early iterations of the training cycle: “you cannot do
an Operational Tempo and learn about that if you are
confined to an 8-hour work day.”92
Pre-Deployment.
Positive experience, when embedded with brigades, was often amplified by earlier initiative taken
during training that was focused on developing rapport and relationships with preferred teammates.
This was due to reluctant “ruthlessness on our part
in the training cycle, effectively paring people out.
None of us enjoyed it, it becomes a bit political,” but
it was necessary because “there were some people in
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the training program who meant well and were nice
people but who didn’t have anything obvious to offer
to the mission. It wasn’t clear what they were going
to do once they deployed.”93 Being confident in each
other’s talents thus ensured that the team leader could
be hands off with the research elements of the team.
One social scientist highlighted “a lot of horse trading” by a “very proactive” team leader to ensure that
he obtained the personnel he wanted in his team, but
even that “only came together in the last few weeks of
training.”94
The composition of the team was only known at
the end of the training process, and, when the program
expanded beyond the original five teams subsequent
to AF1, this was also true of the location the teams
would be sent to, which inevitably had a deleterious
impact on planning. As Evans explains, local politics
and local history are the most important aspects of
pre-deployment knowledge:
There were people who didn’t know what team they
were going to until they were already deploying. And
there were people who thought they were going to
one place, and by the time they arrived, they ended up
going someplace completely different.95

This meant that they were often unable to research
the location of their deployment to the best of their
ability, creating a mindset that training had been inadequate. Clark explains that it “was so bad” that at the
end of pre-deployment training, she was supposed to
be embedding with IZ10 in the south of Baghdad attached to a U.S. Army unit, and it was only during
departure that Clark learned she had been reassigned
to the a Marine Corps unit elsewhere in Iraq. So Clark
was “literally walking onto the plane” when she received “orders to report to al-Anbar,” in effect going
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from a Shi’ite community which she had been studying for 4 months “to a Sunni community that was the
heart of the insurgency.”96 Moreover, Clark was going
from envisioning her deployment with the Army, to
embedding with Marine Corps, which is a “whole different bag of beans.”97
Many embedded team members were sent as individual replacements to existing teams. Even when
entire teams were sent intact, there could be problems
in the training cycle. One social scientist explains that
they were sent to the National Training Center at Fort
Irwin, California, to do a “role-player scenario” with
artificial towns in the desert. The military integration
meant that it was “by far the best” part of the training cycle” where 10-15 members of the training cycle
could feel military equipment, go on patrols in substantial heat, understand the pace of operations, sleep
on the cots, “just the whole thing—getting in and out
of a Humvee, all of it was really key to me for understanding really what we were getting ourselves into.”98
However, the social scientist was embedded with the
Marine Corps in Afghanistan, whereas the National
Training Center integration was with an Army unit
heading for Iraq. This highlights a broader problem;
that the embedded teams were an inorganic addition
to a brigade which had grown and developed through
pre-deployment training. In the Marine Corps—more
centered on personal relationships than the Army—
this made integration even more arduous. As Ben
Connable explains generally, there was no period in
the pre-deployment phase during which the HTT was
able to:
build rapport with the staff, to establish its bona fides, to establish its role, and so that led to additional
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points of friction when the deployments took place.
And rightfully, there were commanders questioning
what they were hearing from these people that they
did not know.99

EVOLUTION
Practical missteps highlighted by deploying members of the program necessitated the creation of two
different processes to evolve the HTS. The first, the
Program Development Team, was an in-house lessons learned investigation designed to capture what
was happening with embedded teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The results would then be fed back into
the organization in order to advance the program iteratively. The second process was the Operational
Planning Team, necessary because the program had
grown too fast relative to the number of systems and
structures in place such that there was no organization chart spelling out individual responsibilities and
roles in the program, the character of the training, or
control over human resources contracting. This lack
of organizational identity and clarity were “enormous
problems and very hard for a fledgling entity to deal
with especially when you are trying to fight with your
upper management for the right to even run your
program.”100
Program Development Team.
Created in 2006, the Program Development Team
was a multifunctional research and management
group comprised of former embedded team social
scientists, senior management and military members,
the latter providing important input on the nature of
the research required by the primary customer. The
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development team reporting process was instigated
by the HTS program manager as a means to absorb
lessons learned. The development team’s official
mission was to:
manage organizational transformation through project evaluation and the development of change requirements to ensure HTS remains relevant and continues
to meet the needs of a rapidly changing environment;
and to expand the understanding of HTS through engagement with external critics to facilitate the institutionalization of the HTS concept.101

The development team was required because,
while there were historical models which were “somewhat similar” to the program, such as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program and the Office of Strategic Services field units
(although mission and structures were different),
HTS was “basically running an experiment because it
wasn’t like we had an off the shelf model for what we
wanted to do.”102
In truth, policy-directed information to capture
funding was found to be fundamentally disconnected
from the realities of the field such that, as McFate observes, “we didn’t know what would work, and we
had to find out what would work based on empirical evidence not because we made it up in the Pentagon.”103 By 2009, it was apparent that lessons learned
from embedded teams had not been adequately captured; a problem exacerbated by the fact that many
returning HTT personnel had not been retained in the
program, leading to a critical departure of field expertise. Variation between theaters and brigades meant
that there was no “one-off solution”; no “plug-andplay” for training and doctrine which could work
across the spectrum of embedded teams.104
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The development team was thus tasked with visiting embedded teams to examine form and function
in Iraq and Afghanistan using a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and
Facilities framework, an assessment used to identify
deficiencies in holistic warfighting capabilities. Using
this framework, the development team captured a diverse array of problems in the field, from not using
zippers in Iraq because of the sand, to emerging issues
concerning ethics, to training foci, to requirements for
extra emphasis on methods teaching.105 A key finding
of the development team linked specifically to training in that “people do what they have been trained for
over their lifetime, not what you try to teach them in
2 weeks” (see Appendix L).106 The decision was made
to develop experiential learning opportunities so that
future embedded team members in training could apply skill sets already learned to new environments.
This meant the requirement to develop highly structured tools for reporting either a long-term research
process or a short-term research effort of 1 to 2 weeks.
Specifically, these tools were designed to enable social science research as part of a bureaucracy to enable
tracking and ethical oversight. The goal was “getting
the people to understand this is different from writing your dissertation, this is about simple, quick,
structured communication of what it is that you are
doing”—in short, operationally relevant reporting.107
From inside the organization, the development
team’s work was not simply about capturing and implementing lessons learned in order to evolve the program. The HTS was encountering myriad difficulties
and was the subject of multiple external assessments.
To defend the program’s record, solidify its existence,
and propagate funding streams, the development
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team was an opportunity from within to generate
an empirical record which could demonstrate robust
performances, consolidating and amplifying funding
requests. According to one member of the team:
the PDT [Program Development Team] was mostly
about trying to provide forms of justification for HTS
to exist. It allowed us to go to our primary customer;
which were units downrange [in Iraq and Afghanistan] and take their reporting on our performance to
congress and everyone else for funding.108

The role of the development team as a vehicle to
facilitate funding was part of a larger modus operandi
identified in the detailed congressionally directed
Center for Naval Analyses assessment, that the program management devoted most “effort to selling the
Project [HTS] at the expense of leadership and effective management.”109
Operational Planning Team.
A core component of the program was the training cycle because it prepared team members for a
role which had no historical analogue. Without prior
examples to serve as templates, teaching was based
around educated surmising of the needs of a commander in the unique situations presented in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Inevitably, then, the training had
“mushroomed,” based on subjective feedback of idiosyncratic concerns for particular types of training
from returning HTT members, such that every iteration of the training cycle had been unique.110 Comparison between iterations proved futile, given the
rapid expansion of the program and unforeseen developments such as the Status of Forces Agreement in
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Iraq which led to the termination of the use of private
contractors. This situation with each training cycle being sui generis was clearly untenable for longitudinal
development of the program because it did not allow
for any coherent planning. The training restructuring
based on evidence could only proceed if it was known
what the individuals on teams were supposed to be
in terms of role and performance—individual tasks.
Individual tasks could only be known if the exact role
of the team is known—collective tasks. At this time,
McFate moved to Missouri to work on the HTS Operational Planning Team where she could interact closely
with Jeff Bowden, who was leading the curriculum
review.111
During the work of the planning team, two critical problems became apparent which fundamentally
affected the performance of HTS as an organization.
First, there was no knowledge management system
adequate to the requirements of the HTS as a viable
program. This vacuum necessitated the development
of a knowledge management aspect to be incorporated
into the work of the planning team. Second, there were
clear inadequacies in the social science component of
the training; the overarching concern being how to
train social scientists in methods and concepts given
that the work of the teams in Iraq and Afghanistan
was largely unknown to recruits in the United States
who were based in Fort Leavenworth.
Evidence collated from the development team and
products which had been provided by HTTs to the Research Reachback Center assisted in this investigation,
however, there was no broad knowledge of how these
products were changing across areas of operations or
across time and which classes of research—economic,
political, or social—were proving most valuable to the
commander. McFate stated the problem thus:
193

Are they being asked to give training to military units?
Are they being asked to give briefings? Are they just
sitting by the commander whispering in his ear? How
are they inputting into the Military Decision-Making
Process? What kind of analysis are they doing?112

In addition, it was necessary to know what research
the teams were doing and how they were doing it:
“Are they coding their notes? How are they analyzing
their notes? Are they doing any statistical analysis?”113
Ultimately, the task became reflexive: “We cannot
even answer the question because we have not analyzed ourselves well enough to know what we need
to know in order to train people to do it more effectively.”114
To do it more effectively, the Social Science Working Group—part of the knowledge management component of the Operational Planning Team—sought to
shed light upon these processes. The working group
was tasked with assessing, categorizing and tracking information; and structuring knowledge. Core
concepts for training were thus identified, along with
the principle research methods employed in the field
and identification of the types of analysis that different teams were performing (see Appendix L).115 From
there, it was possible “to say these are the actual skills
you need on a team to carry out the mission, and here
is how we believe the skill sets fall into buckets.”116
Therefore the Operational Planning Team process
was to proceed via 10 steps:
1. development of a vision statement;
2. initiating review of the social science concepts
and methods;
3. review of collective tasks (those of the HTTs,
Human Terrain Analysis Teams, and Research
Reachback Center);
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4. identify knowledge management requirements
(products and processes);
5. develop the knowledge management plan;
6. develop individual tasks for team members;
7. identify knowledge skills and attributes;
8. develop terminal learning objectives;
9. create enabling learning objectives; and,
10. conduct curriculum design.
In March 2009, the vision statement was developed: “Providing decision makers with sociocultural
understanding to enhance achievement of desired
outcomes across the spectrum of conflict”; and the
mission statement:
Recruits, trains, deploys, and supports a dedicated,
embedded social science capability; conducts operationally relevant research and analysis; and develops
and maintains a sociocultural knowledge base, in
order to enable culturally astute decision-making,
enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and
share sociocultural institutional knowledge.117

Despite the difficulty in teasing out a definite character of social science research in Iraq or Afghanistan,
part of its categorization of knowledge, the working
group separated direct and indirect tasks generated
by the commander or staff. Direct tasks were specific
information requirements directed by the command;
whereas indirect tasks were broad, umbrella concerns,
such as the problems posed by entering a new area of
operation, without giving the HTT specific guidance
for their mission sets, but ascertaining that certain information would be required for the execution of the
mission in general and executing tasks to achieve that
for the command. The other mode could be termed
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entrepreneurial and would be where the embedded
team discovered “basic knowledge gaps that the brigade didn’t have, based on their observations of the
unit they were supporting.”118
A Perfect Storm.
Shaping this research and development was the
initial inability to define social science knowledge
which as a corollary obfuscated the role that HTTs
were designed to perform when embedded in a combat team. The amorphous and poorly understood notion of both social science and sociocultural knowledge
meant that many embedded teams could fall back to
the lowest common denominator; merely augmenting
existing intelligence cells’ techniques, falling back on
a broad definition of “culture” to explain myriad collection techniques focused on an array of categories
of information from the economy, to agriculture, to
demographics.
The planning team and development team could
resolve a number of issues within that sphere. For
example, based on feedback, ideal composition of
teams were developed for three-, four-, five-, six-, and
seven-person roles, with three and seven then being
rejected as too parsimonious and too complicated, respectively. The four-role team would remain the same
as those which had deployed previously; five-role
teams would allow specialization with the Human
Terrain Analyst position, which would separate into
two, a research-focused Human Terrain Analyst and
a separate bilingual, bicultural advisor, because the
problem had been that both types of personnel were
being hired to the same broad Human Terrain Analyst
position, but they behaved differently and had differ-
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ent skill sets when embedded.119 The six-role team
would allow specialization at the social science level,
disaggregating quantitative and qualitative social science analysis, where, “because good quantitative scientists and good qualitative social scientists tend not
to come in the same package, even if they think they
do.”120 The seven-role team included separating information technology and operations functions in the
Research Manager role—with the latter serving as a
quasi-assistant to the team leader—but this team was
ultimately rejected on the grounds that the differentiation between roles was not pronounced.121
Ultimately however, both the development team
and planning team failed to resolve who the ideal
social scientist might be in terms of discipline, level
of field research, level of education, and preferential
research modes. The personalities and skill sets of
the social scientists that had been embedded were so
broad as to be amorphous and indistinct in terms of
identification and categorization. Complicating this
investigation, many of the personalities conflicted, but
each individual still functioned effectively. In short,
as a general rule, individuals with excellent interpersonal skills and field research experience might perform well, but there was no black and white answer
to the question of what made a successful social scientist. This perfect storm may never be resolved because
even assessment of optimal academic achievements is
muddied by the broad and changing requirements of
stabilization environments. The West Point study, for
example, concluded that:
Limiting academics to only holders of doctorates may
be inadvertently missing a talented and eager group
of academics with master’s degrees who may bring
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other needed attributes to the team. While Ph.D.s tend
to provide ‘deep thinking,’ we have observed a civilian team member with only a BA (and some MA level
work) providing outstanding analysis and linkages.122

“Infinite Opportunity”: Curriculum Redesign.
Despite the absence of a black and white solution
to the question of the character and content of the ideal
social scientist, there was enough research conducted
by the program managers finally to redesign the training cycle. The process of curriculum redesign has been
traced back to the HTT Handbook, published in October 2008.123 The handbook, produced by a Doctrine
Development Team:
delineated the Mission Essential Task Lists for the four
roles of the HTTs—team leader, social scientist, human
terrain analyst, research manager—and presented a
list of five contributions embedded teams could make
to brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.124

The curriculum redesign process then began more
formally with the creation of the Operational Planning
Team in December 2008. The team telephoned HTTs
in the field and in January 2009 developed a document which posed questions to embedded teams to
assess the evolution of research.125 In order to assist in
the development of the planning team, the HTS sent
out a survey research tool to all the embedded teams
that were currently in the program. This survey used
a combination of survey methodology and social network analysis to try and isolate what tools were being
used by what teams, where, when, and why.
The sample returned was enough to contribute
to the redesign process, but according to one former
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HTT member familiar with the process, the problem
was that the disparity:
in terms of what people understood they were doing was so broad, whether you are talking to a social
scientist, whether you are talking to a military officer,
whether you are talking to this team, that team. That
it was very difficult to even code their responses in a
meaningful way.126

This initiated a series of working groups over the
subsequent 6 months, which employed strategies such
as pile sorting and focus groups and fed into the mission to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Program Development Team had used a series of interviews on particular issues that were identified on the working group
process; the information gathered afforded the opportunity to start developing ideal team structures in the
future. As Lamb et al. explain as part of their detailed
study, at the start of 2010, the HTS had produced a
document “Terminal and Enabling Learning Objectives” and the “document provided a de facto roadmap for program reforms.”127 The HTS held a training
curriculum review conference from January 26 to February 5, 2010, to assess how much of the HTT research
was useful to the commander, and if the research is
“incorporated, in a timely fashion, with the unit’s decision making process.”128 It was also envisaged that
redesign could allow the HTS to integrate into other
TRADOC activities such as post-Afghanistan and Iraq
Brigade Combat Team road-to-war exercises.129
Meanwhile, the first Operational Planning Team
meeting took place at Oyster Point in January 2009 focusing on the vision statement and mission statement
for the program, led by Colonel Mark Crisci and developed by Robert Holliday, whose position as Director
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of Doctrine Development began in November 2008.
This initial meeting took the U.S. Central Command
JUONS and used it to deduce an HTS vision statement, a mission statement, and basic task specialization. The follow-up meeting in March 2009 attempted to generate a collective task list for the program,
which is what the individual tasks were that had to be
accomplished by organizations within the HTS. The
collective task lists composed highlighted that, while
there were identifiable bureaucratic tasks for people
to execute, there was lacking actual mission-specific
tasks that pertained to social science. This was a problematic issue identified by myriad social scientists that
embedded in Iraq and Afghanistan. To that end, in
early-2010, the rapidly convened Social Science Working Group attempted to bureaucratize social science in
the context of the HTS.
In its formation, the Social Science Working Group
was intended to review core social science concepts,
analyze social science methods used by embedded
teams, and redesign two core courses in the HTS curriculum: the “Introduction to Anthropology” and
the “Social Science Research Methods.” Broadly, the
group was convened to attempt to arrive at a common
set of methods for what the teams were to do when
they embedded with combat brigades.130 It was found
necessary to assess what commanders actually wanted to know from the HTTs, in order to work toward
developing the common set of methods for the social
scientists. Identification of these core concepts would
enable teams to conduct more effective baseline assessments, aggregate data from the brigade combat
team to higher units to develop a common operating
picture and re-energize social scientist use of the mapping of humain terrain (MAP-HT), the technology tool
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brought over and developed from the Cultural Preparation of the Environment, but which was a failure
like its precursor.
There were two basic questions from which the
undertaking could commence. First, answering what
the brigade commander wants to know about society
and culture in the area of operations. Second, what the
commander needs to know about society and culture.
The answers were deduced from a pile-sort of requests
made by HTTs to the Research Reachback Center for
both Iraq and Afghanistan. In developing data categories, the working group examined relevant concepts
such as: doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency and FM 3-07, Stability Operations; and other
models maintained in repositories like the Human
Relations Area Files at Yale University relating to
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people,
events, political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.
The working group analyzed the main methods
through which several teams conducted research,
which were centered on three techniques: semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews and literature reviews. To a lesser extent, research also included
social network analysis and rapid ethnography, driveby reporting, surveys, Research Reachback Center requests, pile sorts, and broad observation. Each data
collection method, and the additional methods of key
leader engagements, mixed methods and focus groups
were assessed according to five criteria: the level of security the method required; the scope; the type of data
produced; the strengths of the method; and cautions
and caveats. Methods used, however, were not indicative of the brigade needs but rather were the result of
team competencies (see Appendix L). In combat zones
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experts stayed with the skill sets they understood best
and the MAP-HT tool did not allow HTT personnel
to generate “usable” outputs. This highlights why
MAP-HT was so difficult to integrate as a tool into the
HTTs, and led to the proliferation of Microsoft Office
software to generate research products. The Social
Science Working Group produced a list of supported
unit deliverables (finished products) which included
the structure that different PowerPoint presentations
and generic reports should take.
As part of the redesign, an HTS Ontology Working Group was created to produce operationally relevant data taxonomies. The MAP-HT tool based on
the Cultural Preparation of the Environment was the
most coherent existing attempt to classify data; being
by country, ethnic group, confederation (tribal affiliation), and province. Problematic was that many of
the sub-branches of each category which were developed in order to add granularity to existing data
taxonomies often overlapped with other sub-branches
in other levels. It was therefore necessary to redesign
these main branches and sub-branches in order to be
more discrete and hence prevent overlap. The recommended categorization became: region or geographic
area; physical geography; demography; economy; political government; education; crime/justice; history;
religion; social organization and relationships; and
culture/material culture. After review by the Social
Science Working Group, the finalized list became: region/geography; demography; infrastructure; economy; politics and government; security/justice; education; health; history; religion; social organization and
identity; and general and material culture.
The individual tasks necessary to perform the
collective tasks were developed, which was accom-
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plished from information collected from the Program
Development Team, and identified under the team
structure those individual tasks, finally bureaucratizing the program in terms of social science: who does it;
how they do it; how they work together; and how they
communicate. This material became the opening documents to the Knowledge Management Conference in
January 2011—and was the final layer of the fundamental question for HTS writ large in its relationship
with the military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: “If
this is what we do, how do we train it?”131
The Capstone publication, Joint Publication (JP), 3-0,
Joint Operations, highlights the necessity for information management because it “is an essential process that
receives, organizes, stores, controls, and secures an organization’s wide range of data” and is “important for
the commander’s battle rhythm and the development
and sharing of information to increase both individual
and collective knowledge.”132 The conference was thus
concerned with alloying social science expertise to the
customer; specifically the types of technology HTTs
were using to enable communication to achieve these
tasks set out in the redesign. This involved identification of the customer; data repositories; and future data
management strategy. The collective tasks are instructive in how the HTS had developed to that point; the
program now defined operationally relevant sociocultural knowledge as focused not on friends or enemies,
but on the population and the environment and that
“operationally relevant” means that the sociocultural
information has utility for the supported unit and
their mission, in support of unit requirements and not
for personal gain.133
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The new training curriculum was finally executed
in August 2011.134 Separation of activities occurred
such that the process was now divided into three
phases: foundation skills and research operations
(common training); individual training (specialized);
and collective training (combined training in collective environment as part of teams, to understand how
they will work in the field).135 The social science 2-week
pre-deployment training configured as part of the redesign was still part of the larger training program in
the collective class. The subsequent team break out
focused, first, on collective task training as teams;
subsequent to that were the individual team training
tasks and exercises specific to the job training. The social science 2-week training period relates to that third
phase of the training cycle. After this period was a final phase, a team exercise using newly developed skill
sets, reconvened as a team in preparation for possible
pre-deployment.
The primary problems were two-fold. First, because of the range of social science graduates in the
class, from master’s graduates to post-doctoral trainees, creating a generic level of teaching was difficult.
Questions inevitably arose, such as: was the cohort
disposed to quantitative or qualitative methods? Each
cohort was thus sui generis, in that they had their own
identities already formed from considerable academic
qualifications and thus teaching them as a whole was
problematic. The solution as created by the team was
to implement practical exercises which afforded the
students an opportunity to contextualize the skills
that they already knew, but in the environment that
they would be operating in. The work undertaken by
the Program Development Team had shown that the
training program failed to alter preferred research
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techniques already central to the social scientist. As
one HTS member familiar with the redesign observed:
even if we tried to teach them new skills, they still
wouldn’t use them. Because that was one of the key
findings in 2009—people do what they have been
trained for over their lifetime, not what you try to
teach them in 2 weeks. People will try and pull that in
but what is more important is giving them the experiential learning opportunity so that they can take the
skills they already know and readily provide those in
a new environment.136

The training element thus focused on research
planning and design tools developed under the auspices of the Program Development Team. Ultimately,
in translating the two cultures, it was about emphasizing a type of research which could best be termed
“operationally relevant reporting.”
Familiarization with tools (resiliency training) was
the first section; the subsequent day was the baseline
assessment which was a literature review focused on
the area, if known, in which the social scientist will
operate in. This provided mission-specific training,
utilizing academic expertise inherent in the construction of a literature review. It was also considered that
this document would be organic; there would be an
existing baseline assessment by the embedded HTT,
into which this literature review could be integrated,
and further research, once in place, could be added.
This thus represented an attempt to develop a form
of institutional memory, and a coherent central narrative, though this ultimately failed as an attempt and
points to a severe challenge in the Army’s continual
quest to develop institutional knowledge.137
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The dynamic between language and culture training favored culture training because deep language
training was far beyond the time frame of the course;
thus Day 3 examined cultural training and included
a 1-hour familiarization class with MAP-HT. These
1-hour classes were insufficient to make the equipment central to the team and only the Research Managers got more than 1 hour training with the tool in
this resource-constrained curriculum. The remainder
of the first week was for the social scientist to develop
the baseline assessment. Baseline assessments meant
that they had familiarization with at least one area in
Afghanistan (combat brigades had by this time departed Iraq), and they could understand where resources
exist to get information and further how it would be
possible to integrate that information into existing databases using instruction.138 Despite the high academic
standard of the trainees, there were problems discovered, particularly an inability to conduct the literature
research or an inability to structure thoughts “in a
way that could be simply communicated.”139 These
gaps were mitigated by remedial lessons.
The second week focused on research methods.
Day 1 discussed quantitative research. Teaching
methods in the abstract, it was found that training
was facilitated by identifying categories through
quantitative analysis rather than entering into a discussion over what categories of analysis could be used
and would be necessary for a discussion of qualitative analysis. That class introduced concepts of survey
research, but emphasized validity and reliability; in
short, the challenges in doing combat research. Those
social scientists that were already trained in quantitative methods were then instructed in some of the basic sources in the military, which were unknown to
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the academic community; military databases that an
operational researcher in Iraq and Afghanistan would
utilize. Then using the research template generated in
the previous week, an exercise focused on attempting
to communicate to a commander the goal of the research project to be implemented. At the core of this
process was effective communication to a commander
about what the social scientist is trying to do; to communicate that HTS is ethically sound in its research
proposal; to communicate to the rest of the team what
is required of them in the research process.
The subsequent qualitative section created conditions of a conflicted area; to get the social scientists to
design qualitative research within constraints based
on the information given. The social scientists would
then be asked who they would interview, how they
would interview them, what they would ask, and what
research material they were expecting to get out of the
process. Culturally insensitive actions or unrealistic
goals could be corrected by the training supervisor.
On the third day of the second week, the social scientists continued the qualitative research design, and on
the fourth day, they presented papers. The final day
capstone project incorporated an information brief
for the area they were going to that would replicate
a baseline assessment, and then the social scientists
were allowed to design a research project as appropriate, without supervision, taking “the training wheels
off” and allowing “infinite opportunity,” such as that
which existed in the operating environment for HTTs
when embedded in insecure areas.140 Various designs
for research to be conducted over the subsequent 9
months were created and drafted to support the unit.
At this point, the social scientists for the first time
developed a baseline assessment in the context of the
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province, including a background of what qualitative
and quantitative methods are possible. Put simply:
they finally have the opportunity in an Afghan context, real world environment, to say: ‘Oh this is what I
think my job is supposed to be, this is how I would do
it, and this is how I would communicate to the team
what my role is’.141

ETHICS AT WAR
Due in large part to the absence of historical analogies to the program and the sense of crisis in which
it was formed, when the HTS was created, there
were no ethical guidelines for the embedded teams.
Dr. McFate has noted that the OSS served in some
ways as a basic blueprint, and Fondacaro specifically
highlighted the Jedburgh teams, as part of the OSS,
but beyond those basic ideas there was little information upon which to draw. The HTS personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan were conducting research in highly
insecure areas, integrated into the brigade staff, and
it was not known how this program would develop.
Broadly, the remit of reducing military and civilian
casualties was the architecture which would guide actions in an area of operations.142 As the HTS 2007-08
Yearbook explains, social science was a broad church
such that a unified ethical architecture beneath which
all its social scientists sat was unlikely. In addition, the
HTS Ethics Guidelines were released in 2009, created by
five former HTT social scientists that comprised the
Ethics Working Group and incorporated an additional
group of social scientists who were deployed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The problem in formation of the ethical guidelines, however, was instructive of the wider
problem of homogenization of research and research
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methods of the broad net of social scientists: “you had
an interdisciplinary group, again with different ethical considerations trying to come up with a common
set of standards, which of course, doesn’t work.”143
On the academic side, given that AF1’s social scientist was a graduate-trained anthropologist and McFate
possessed a Ph.D. in anthropology and a juris doctor
degree (J.D.), it was most logical to consider the Code
of Ethics of the Society for Applied Anthropology, as
it related to field research and human participants.144
On the military side, the beginning of the program
was marked by examination of Title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 219, Army regulations pertaining to human subjects.145 As McFate explains:
there is a big loophole there; you don’t have to do an
IRB [Institutional Review Board proposal to the Army
Human Research Protections Office] if certain conditions are met. We were in the middle of supporting a
war, so the idea that, ‘Stop everything we have to do
an IRB’ was simply not feasible. It is totally impractical
and also probably unnecessary.146

Unnecessary, because McFate considered that, in
the field, social scientists could identify themselves to
informants, gain permission to interview, code notes,
and not share those notes, or any names with commanders—the exception being public figures already
known to the unit—because “you’re not going to say
“Sheikh X” when the brigade commander was at that
meeting and he knows the guy’s name.”147
Criticism by the American Anthropological Association of the program inhibited applications from
a top tier of professional anthropologists while master’s graduates in anthropology would have fewer
concerns, and those outside that specific discipline
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would see only tangential relevance to their own
fields of study. Instructively, as one bio-archaeologist
and former embedded social scientist noted, “The
cultural anthropologist side was the least side of my
concerns, and so it didn’t really bother me what the
AAA [American Anthropological Association] had to
say.”148 Indeed, McFate argued instead that the publicity saw “increased numbers” apply to the program.
She used an interesting analogy for the effect of the
American Anthropological Association Executive
Board’s statement, on applications to work for the
program, likening the impact to:
when Google Maps published Barbara Streisand’s
beach house location, and she sued them. Suddenly
everybody was on Google trying to figure out where
Barbara Streisand lives. If she had done nothing, then
no one would have cared, no one would have noticed:
so, thank you AAA.149

Social scientists embedded at the patrol level in
combat units nevertheless presented a particular
problem to the academy because of their consistent
proximity to host populations in the presence of coalition soldiers. For Robert Albro, this was a particular problem because the data that is accrued from the
embedded teams is going to be uploaded to a shared
system at some point, SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network) for example, and from there, the
data and information can be used in any way for any
purpose, out of the hands of the social scientist who
collected and processed it.150 Highlighting the notion
of two cultures, from inside the military architecture
such criticism was seen as hypocritical, particularly
when:
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people in academia underplay from an ethical point
of view the number of people who have access to their
research information through FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests and everything else.151

According to the Army Human Research Protections Office (AHRPO), Department of Defense (DoD)
Instruction 3216.02 requires the protections office Institutional Review Board to approve DoD-supported
human subjects research that is more than minimal
risk.152 In McFate’s assessment, however, the first iteration—the first five teams—fell into Title 32 CFR Part
219 exemptions for human research protection and
thus did not necessitate approach to the protections
office. Research was exempt beneath Title 32 when it
involved survey or interview procedures, if the procedures did not allow human subjects to be “identified,
directly or through identifiers” or when any disclosure of the subject’s “responses outside the research”
could endanger them.153
In 2007, the program management approached the
Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) at TRADOC citing the nature of the mission, the broad character of the field work, existing legislation, and asking
for an authorizing letter. Jennifer Clark had returned
from her role as a Human Terrain Analysis Team
social scientist in Iraq to become Deputy Director of
the Social Science Directorate to assist in strengthening the ethics aspect of the program. Clark’s position
with regard to the protections office was that HTT investigations in Iraq and Afghanistan “did not fit the
parameters of research as outlined by any of the ethical guidelines.”154 This led Clark to request exemption
status because the only position at which research, as
defined by the protections office, was being conducted was at the Theater Coordination Element, because
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they were using surveys from the Social Science Research Agency, a survey capability which employed
members of the host population. After 2 years of approaching the Judge Advocate General quarterly, the
HTS management received confirmation that the program fell into the exemptions under Title 32.
Information Versus Intelligence.
In March 2011, Major General Michael Flynn called
information and intelligence the fire and maneuver of
the 21st century.155 The observation made is one which
cuts to the core of the HTS; an apparent discernible
difference between information and intelligence in
which both are discrete and separate entities. Yet, in
practice, is such a conceptualization feasible? One
Theater Coordination Element social scientist that
deployed to Afghanistan argued: “Everything is intelligence. Everything in the world is intelligence; depending on who analyzes it and for what purposes.
But HTS was not designed to provide intelligence in
the classical terms.”156 Indicating the propensity for
cross-cultural misunderstanding, one social scientist
observed that “the term intelligence is special in the
academic community” without necessarily being well
understood, and that at the level of the Theater Coordination Element, at least they gathered information,
but did not collect information.157 The differentiation
is an interesting one: one analogy is of the woodsman
collecting firewood; the collector will cut down a tree
and chop up the trunk into logs while the gatherer
will find broken off branches on the ground and take
them away to be used.
The HTTs existed in a grey area physically because
there was an unresolved issue by mid-2008 of where
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to situate the team in the organization of the brigade.
The original concept had been broadly composed to
allow flexibility in positioning the teams, such that
they could be located in any structure deemed appropriate by the brigade staff.158 This was left at the
discretion of the brigade staff, but it posed a unique
problem because there were only two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, the brigade commander could
integrate the HTT into other intelligence assets at the
level of the S-2 (military battalion and brigade level
intelligence staff); in that scenario the embedded team
would likely devolve into providing sociocultural information that was broadly in line with existing military products, in order to integrate them successfully
and gain leverage. In the second scenario, as social
science researchers filling a unique gap, they could
be isolated from other assets and conduct academic
social science research with hypotheses, methodologies, and caveats, but therein would be the risk of an
inability to make that research product integrate successfully into the other cells’ products, or influence the
commander as a consequence. This is a fundamental
issue and goes to the heart of both the program’s form
and function in stabilization operations.
At the program level, the relationship between the
HTS and intelligence continually shifted throughout
its time in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is to be expected
given the sense of crisis which pervaded the U.S. Army
which thus permitted some scope for the program in
regard to an aspect of research which was tangential
at best to operational success. Moreover, war blurs
distinctions and refashions borders, not just physical,
but social, ethical, and moral. McFate clarified in the
training cycle that the HTS was not an intelligence
program, and that the job of embedded teams was not
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to collect information which could be used for lethal
targeting. The problem, however, was located in the
reality of the conflicted area; being, how far from intelligence does an HTT stay, physically and ethically?
Can information from an HTT be given to intelligence
assets?
One former HTT member recalls the heated debate
in the training cycle over a scenario where intelligence could be used to save American lives but which
would imperil its source. The former HTT member
draws the analogy of the 1980s television program,
Ethics in America. In one debate, in 1987, called “Under
Orders, Under Fire,” a hypothetical scenario is posed
to reporter Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes in which he
embeds with a fictional North Kosanese unit which
is preparing to ambush American Soldiers; Wallace asserts that, as an impartial journalist, he would
cover the story and not warn the Americans of their
impending fate, leading to astonishment from other
distinguished panelists, including Brent Scowcroft.159
The HTT member relates that in training, there were
several social scientists who wanted such impartiality;
similar to the ethical debate in 1987. The training class
considered a scenario where you had information on
an improvised explosive device (IED): would you tell
that unit where the IED was? There were individuals
who said “no” and horrified other people in the class,
and it made them feel like they were in danger and
probably should not embed in Iraq and Afghanistan
at that time, bringing up questions such as loyalty and
the idea of betraying the most sovereign trust that any
soldier could have, of being supported on their left or
right.160
The ethical dilemma heightened cross-cultural
tensions: as the program evolved, its character crys-
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tallized such that, while its teams would be doing a
different job from that of intelligence assets, it was
necessary to partner with intelligence; to use their
research as well as to provide them with information
in a collaborative process as part of the unit. To that
end, and to avoid confusion and make coherent the
identity, in 2011, it was made clear that the program
was an intelligence asset.161 The study of society and
culture in stabilization and enabling operations cannot be the sole preserve of an HTS; it is also within
the remit of myriad intelligence cells. Inevitably however, HTS as a fully fledged intelligence asset pushed
the program further away from academic traditions.
As a publicly facing asset in its inception, operating in contested spaces continued to compromise the
program’s identity:
I think you have to acknowledge that we were in partnership with intelligence, that we provided information to intelligence and drew information from them,
but that is no different from private companies in the
United States or academics who willingly publish
their information in journals which are read by intelligence officers and utilized accordingly. But to label
us as intelligence, particularly at the beginning of HTS
and even now, I don’t think the Army has come to be
able to understand what studying society and culture
is, to a degree that they are capable of understanding
how that could be different from current intelligence
functions.162

According to one former senior member of the
program, developing it as an intelligence asset under
Sharon Hamilton meant that the program:
started to lose its unique identity; where a lot of the
tool sets that we could have brought to bear were sim-
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ply left by the wayside because we chose to go with a
military, bureaucratic version of what intelligence is,
you lose that value of social science methodology:

Inevitably, however, the U.S. Army could only allow
the new program to do that for an initial period, “but,
man, those were the days.”163
Many Hats.
When the House Armed Services Committee directed the Center for Naval Analyses to investigate
the program after journalistic and academic scrutiny, allegations of severe mismanagement, and three
contractor deaths, in 2010, the AHRPO contacted the
program management formally, requesting a visit to
see the managers, as well as requesting specific documentation. The program convened social scientists in
DoD from outside and from within the HTS. At the
conclusion of that consultation process, the AHRPO,
too, considered that the program was exempt from
Institutional Review Board checks.164 This served to
confuse the identity of the program further because
it had publicly stated it was an information-gathering
vehicle, but it was not reporting to AHRPO. In reality, however, a full human subject review process was
impossible because many of the turnaround requirements for HTT research in the field were days, even
hours, and:
a full review would have been the equivalent of requiring an anthropology student who is embedded
in a village in sub-Saharan Africa to contact his committee every time he wanted to conduct an interview,
which doesn’t make sense even in academia.165
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There was still a necessity to develop a level of
review appropriate for embedded teams, which required a “process of negotiation” with the AHRPO.
As of November 2013, HTS is a full participant with
the AHRPO.166 AHRPO guidelines are met by an HTT
in the field developing a research proposal or concept,
then sending it to the senior social scientist at HTS to
ensure it meets AHRPO guidelines and report that
proposal to the office.167 The ethical alterations affected speed of research in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
with implications for the nature of what HTTs could
accomplish in the field. The office required “determination for research proposals rather than the entire
project,” which in form was a questionnaire employed
to determine if research was human subject research
exempt and took “two minutes to fill out, but it was
required before you submitted any proposal to your
commanding officer.”168 At this juncture and beyond,
compliance with the result of the collaboration with
the AHRPO was necessary because Congress had suspended funding, such that diminishing operational
speed in contested spaces was secondary to restarting
the funding stream.169
The dialogue with the AHRPO centered on the
character of HTS as either a social science research
program or an intelligence function.170 If the program
was a research asset, then it fell under AHRPO guidelines; but if it was an intelligence asset, it did not.
How, then, is the program to be defined within the
Army architecture? This definition lies at the heart
of the program’s relationship with the Army and has
central relevance to elucidation of the thesis question.
In order to afford HTTs maximum flexibility in function, in reality, the character of the program meant it
possessed a dual personality, possessing the ability
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to conduct intelligence or information depending on
the decisionmaking process of the individuals and
teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. As one anthropologist
familiar with the program explains, “There was a fair
amount of shenanigans with them trying to keep HTS
away from the review board process.”171 This intrigue
was necessary in order to allow the fledgling social
science research program room to maneuver.
CONCLUSIONS
By 2011, the HTS had evolved to command an annual budget of U.S.$150 million.172 But the program
was beset by problems resulting in a congressionally
directed assessment. As one social scientist, who deployed three times with the HTS and also worked at
the program management level, felt that, while McFate
and Fondacaro were focused on “building the program,” by 2010, the HTS “had reached the age where
it was time for someone to come in and introduce bureaucratic structure; standard operating procedures;
normalization of this weird, new program.”173 Moreover, Fondacaro had ostensibly, if not consciously, resisted the bureaucratization of the HTS into the TRADOC organizational architecture such that significant
tensions existed between the program and its parent
organization.174
To prevent escalation in tension, in 2010, Maxie
McFarland’s Deputy Colonel Sharon Hamilton was
made interim program manager in place of Fondacaro,
and subsequently confirmed as the permanent director. McFate also departed the program in September
2010 to be replaced by Dr. Christopher King who had
deployed as a social scientist to both Iraq and Afghanistan.175 Hamilton had scientific training, allowing her
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to approach this complex problem from a very linear
trajectory. The emphasis was on developing a bureaucracy which would enable the program to become
much more in line with other elements in the military
structure as well as develop a less fraught relationship
with TRADOC and the main contractor. In addition,
the program would develop a more coherent and concrete identity, such that, in Hamilton’s words, it was
now firmly in the intelligence architecture.
The evolution of the program allows insight into
the function of the social scientist. Examination in
detail of training experiences and the work of the
program management in restructuring that cycle in
order to better instruct program members is valuable
in identifying why social scientists were embedded in
combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Aspects of
the recruitment deleteriously impacted the quality of
the program. This was, in part, a consequence of the
need to quickly expand the number of teams after the
U.S. Central Command JUONS (see Appendix F); because the contract with BAE Systems did not include a
bonus for quality of candidate hired; but also because
the idea of the form and function of a social scientist
is something amorphous; it was not entirely understood by the program management, as Jennifer Clark
has noted, and that incomprehension was larger still
in the recruiting apparatus.
Initial training iterations were done on an educated
guess about what social science teams might require in
order to perform adequately for their customer in stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There
were no templates and the JUONS expanded the program at such velocity that it was difficult to conduct
lessons learned on the training cycles adequately, although eventually this was performed. The Social Sci-
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ence Working Group showed that the HTS was a qualitative research function and that, importantly, social
scientists performed in the manner in which they had
already been trained. The ethical examination shows
that, until at least 2010, social scientists had freedom
in both Iraq and Afghanistan to structure the research
as they wished and record data captured in myriad
forms and for use by intelligence functions. It was
beneath this broad umbrella constructed by the program management that embedded teams conducted
research in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 5
THEORY AND PRACTICE
In 2008, in Salah ad-Din province, north of Baghdad, a recently deployed Human Terrain Team (HTT)
joined the Brigade Commander from the 101st Airborne and his personal security detachment on a
mission. This HTT’s specific purpose was to collect
information on the Abna al-Iraq (Sons of Iraq). The
Sons of Iraq were a security force, the bureaucratic
embodiment of the tribal sheikhs’ uprising against
al-Qaeda in Iraq. This revolt began in the summer of
2006 in response to the brutality of the al-Qaeda splinter group which had become entrenched in al-Anbar.
Understanding the motivation and expectations of the
Sons of Iraq, the security force pivotal to stability in
the area, was a strategic priority for U.S. forces as they
prepared to withdraw from the nation.
The convoy’s first visit was to an electrical plant
in Bayji, where members of the embedded team went
into a side office to interview mid-level plant officials.
The research manager of the team had an M16 rifle
rather than an M4 (a result of being armed at a Continental United States Replacement Center and not
as an infantry soldier) and a pistol. As they walked
into the confines of the small office, his first thought
in this, his first engagement with the Iraqi population,
was that, “This room is way too small for me to shoot
someone if I have to pull out my weapon, because the
barrel is too long.”1
Realizing that the rifle was redundant in the confines of the room, the research manager undid the
catch on his pistol, thinking that “If someone comes
through the door, I have got to be able to draw my
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weapon within this very small space, totally logistically thinking.”2 The mid-level Iraqi officials in the
small room looked stunned, and the research manager realized he had made a mistake of judgement and
perception. While those in the room “glossed over”
the incident, the research manager observed that there
were connotations of the:
role of the pistol as a status symbol of intelligence officers in the secret police in Iraq during the era of Saddam Hussein. To walk into the government official’s
office and basically do everything but draw a pistol? It
was incredibly culturally insensitive in so many ways,
not to mention rude,

such that he realized that this was his “first introduction to “Oh yeah, this is a lot harder to do in practice
than in the classroom.”3
This situation emphasized a gap between theory
and practice. It suggests that the experiences of HTT
members in the field are a necessity in any examination of the Human Terrain System (HTS). For that
HTT member in Salah ad-Din, it highlighted “the
importance of experience-based learning”; that:
even with all the 6 months of training and talking, even
knowing intellectually what was right and wrong, the
military training and the idea of personal safety somehow made me gloss over all of that for an instant.4

Ultimately, in this reading, “it’s a reflex that you have
to train out or at least develop some understanding
of how you use it. It’s very subtle tradecraft things
like that make all the difference when you are dealing
with people.”5
American anthropologist H. Russell Bernard has
written that, “Good ethnography is about the narra232

tion of good stories.”6 In the military environment,
ethnography is also about developing quickly an
understanding how seemingly insignificant body
movements can become inflated in the atmosphere
of conflict to assume disproportionate problems for
researchers. There are limits to what a training cycle
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, can prepare recruits for,
because conflict zones possess their own norms where
the social boundaries in the United States no longer
exist. The complicated discrepancies between theory
and practice as related by a former embedded team
member are exacerbated by the change in the character of the military during forward-deployed operations as opposed to training in the United States. As
Jennifer Clark notes starkly, “It is a different culture
over there [Iraq].”7
Theory and practice diverge on two distinct levels.
First, at the individual level of the HTTs in the stabilization and enabling operations, there is observable difference between the theoretical architecture constructed during their training and the reality on the ground.
Second, a conflict zone is a unique environment. It is
a “war culture,” where the system is characterized by
a tendency toward increasing societal disorder, which
has its own reality. Prussian military theorist and practitioner Carl von Clausewitz observed that war, as an
absolute, theoretically tends toward chaos because of
its intrinsic modality but is constrained from reaching absolute disorder by policy—the goal for which
the conflict is waged and hence the method used to
achieve it.8
There is a notable lack of literature on the actual experiences of HTT social scientists in Iraq and Afghanistan, these “war cultures.” I cannot answer why social
scientists were required by the Brigade Combat Teams
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(BCTs) without investigating their involvement in the
brigades, the research they undertook, and the products they created to plug the sociocultural capability
gap in operations. This chapter investigates these aspects of the social scientists’ experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I find that the deep research they undertook was able to augment BCTs’ understanding of the
battle space.
To varying degrees, the information could influence planning, but this influence was limited by existing policy, which shaped operations, and the duration of research, which by the time it was produced,
spoke of a sociocultural picture which was already
an artifact from the battle space. Therefore, the best
research was in ad hoc operations devoid of overarching strategy, conducted in synchronization with the
battle tempo. When that tempo was slow, the deep
research had greater probability of influence thinking at the staff level. This investigation thus has value
in ascertaining why HTS might have value as a tool
for long-range planning, plugged into the strategic
level of planning in Army service regional component
commands.
IN CONFLICT
The military enterprise embraced intellectual curiosity, as seen in their doctrine, teaching, exhaustive
list of publications, and open-source platforms for
publication. Those products stem from the desire to
arrive at solutions for complex problems faced in the
spectrum of threats facing the nation. At first contact,
however, civilian academic integration into the military enterprise can suffer from seemingly insignificant
elements such as technical language. As Zok Pavlovic,
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who went through training in the June 2010 cycle and
embedded at the Theater Coordination Element level
in Afghanistan notes, foremost among these particular differences which create confusion is the aspect of
language and terminology, words such as “diffusion,
other scholarly terms; our colleagues [in the academy]
have to understand that these are not terms the intelligence community would use.”9 For Pavlovic:
When you bring an academic crowd into a military
environment, each side wants to remain in their own
domain. The military wants to run things the way
they want to and they are the customer. The academic
crowd has difficulty adjusting to the customer’s needs
and that generates issues. It is difficult to adjust that
working environment to the planning process, to the
decision making process and to address the issues that
commanders need.10

These clashes were not predetermined, and it is
part of the problem with attempts to offer generalization of the HTS that each encounter was sui generis.
A highly adaptive academic and an engaging brigade
staff could mitigate such issues. In adaptation, it could
be the reverse, that academic language was integrated
into the military decisionmaking process, and valued
as part of a highly unique solution set.
The military planner requires objective facts and
clear language, and this must be made explicit and
understood by the academic. The military is a highly
adaptive enterprise because it has to evolve in order
to defeat its adversaries. Failure to do so costs lives.
As a consequence, there is no doubt that the U.S. military enterprise learns academic concepts extremely
well and extremely quickly. There was a deficit of
sociocultural knowledge in the military in 2006, how-
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ever, which meant that the HTTs had to couch their
products in military concepts which already existed
in order to integrate it into the staff operations process. This strikes upon a wider problem; that existing
models such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and political,
military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) were ill-suited to the sui generis challenges facing each HTT, but they were the concepts
which were widely used in the brigades at this time.
The adaptive academic sociological requirement of
warfighting demanded by the December 2006 U.S.
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency is yet to
be integrated into the military enterprise.11
Parsimony was very much required. Verbiage omnipresent in scholarship would obfuscate the findings
of granular research conducted by HTTs. Academic
orientation toward research for the sake of knowledge
rather than for an operational end would require curtailment. Moreover, that end product had to be presented in a concise manner which could integrate into
the military decisionmaking process. The tendency
in academia was for complex data to be conveyed in
complex manners. The HTS was an amendment of
that pathway, taking complex sociocultural data and
parsing it into intelligible forms.
This transition was not immediate and required
the understanding of the brigade while the embedded
team adapted to operational demands. For the HTT,
that embedded to plug a capability gap, the burden
was on that team to adapt to the military customer.
That required amelioration of language, simple representation of granular research and development
of products that maintained pace with a fast opera-
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tional tempo. The HTS had to plug into the brigade
staff through the team leader, who in the original
conception would be a retired or reservist colonel or
lieutenant colonel in order to be of an equal military
stature to brigade staff, but the HTTs also comprised
a field element and, as such, had to attach themselves
to military convoys. They had been trained to conduct
research in that manner, write up reports, and push
them to the staff in order to inform the operating picture. Failure was not inevitable in this reading, but required both excellent HTTs and adaptive brigades. If
those two elements united, then there was every reason to expect the HTTs could significantly augment
detail of the human terrain.
Consider Dr. Montgomery McFate’s use of structural functionalism to model and make resonant the
human environment in stabilization and enabling
operations. As McFate explains elegantly, the model
“is predicated on looking at society as a holistic entity and the view that all parts are all elements of the
society at some function” but importantly, it must be
thought of as “a heuristic model, not as an accurate
description. Some way in which to capture a bit of social reality and make it explicable to people who do
not know what these words mean, it is not such a bad
approach.”12 Compromise and collaboration are the
first steps in enabling the conversation between the
academy and military. Academic verbiage would uncouple the synthesis. Incorporating abstract concepts
such as “postmodernism” would lead the military to
reject the modelling out of hand.13
Already, we have visited the fundamental challenge: social scientists had to relate their granular research to a military customer and integrate it into the
military decisionmaking process. This required subtle
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attenuation of academic style. The product had to be
of immediate value and not something limited to the
work done by the HTTs: every cell in the brigade had
to produce coherent products from complex counterinsurgency (COIN) data and present it at a speed that
it could influence the planning process. It was difficult to prepare for that tempo at Fort Leavenworth because conflict creates its own norms, and each region
at each time was unique. Indeed, this gets to a larger
issue in academia in the 21st century; that there is an
accelerated need for research to resonate beyond the
academy, that knowledge exchange activities are fundamental to the work of the academic.
Underpinning research with theoretical context,
for example, complicated the message of the product. Ultimately, it is the “so what” that matters—as
much with academic knowledge in general, as with
academic research conducted for a nonacademic audience. All knowledge requires that “so what?” element. Here was a paradox of the training, because
it necessarily taught theory in order to proceed onto
facts, but the theory muddied research products when
embedded in brigades. Products had to be direct, balanced, and objective, showing research methods up
front and identifying limitations. Embedded teams
encountered problems when they delivered a product
without research context. As Ryan Evans notes, in that
circumstance, the research became “social science as
sorcery” and thus difficult to convince the brigade of
its utility.14 There was a delicate balance to be struck
that would be successful only with extremely adept
HTTs that depended largely on the research ability of
the social scientists. Research had to be transparent in
terms of how it was created, but the operational tempo did not allow for deep examination of peripheral
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theoretical concepts which offered little or no added
value. Deeply complex information had to be presented clearly and concisely, with the very minimum of
qualifications to the findings.
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
IN THE FIELD
Compromise between academic complexity and
military clarity was only one distinct aspect of the process of negotiation which was evolving between HTTs
and their parent brigades. The debate seeking to clarify the program as an intelligence or information asset
lay at the heart of the efficacy of leveraging academic
research methodologies in Iraq and Afghanistan for a
military customer. In its earliest iterations, the debate
was a heated one; one writer, Nathan Hodge, argued
that because HTS worked for a unit commander, it was
an intelligence asset because any information could be
used to improve lethal targeting, and moreover, HTTs
were co-located with intelligence cells.15
That assertion from Hodge is demonstrably false;
most information cannot be used to improve lethal
targeting because it fails to capture any atmospherics
regarding the insurgents. The certainty of his claim
loops back to the entrenched positions of proponents
and critics; that it was often difficult to commence and
retain a calibrated debate. Ethics were what the individual and, by extension the team, made of them. Information control and personal motivation regarding
targeting insurgencies were sui generis. In the beginning, the HTS management was uncertain as to where
to place HTTs—either in the intelligence cell or in the
nonlethal effects cell (the latter composed primarily
of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units),
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and in late-2008 ascertained that the effects cell was
the best place for the HTT.16 This made Hodge’s argument a moot point. The permanent separation may
have been done to preserve the academic profile of
the HTS in order to retain appeal among the scholarly
community.
The HTT products could be subject to grey pathways which potentially criss-crossed the channels of
intelligence and information.17 Under the direction of
McFate, therefore, training stressed information over
intelligence, which was one of the “big classroom discussions” for HTS recruits.18 Instructive in the differing mentalities, from the military-trained presence in
the classes, there were arguments that, if information
gathered could save lives, it should be used in any
way necessary. Ultimately, the academic and military
approaches which clashed in training were symptomatic of the character of research conducted in the field.
As one social scientist explains:
that I think was both the most productive and the most
impactful parts of the training; the very culture-conflict in class is the same as you experience in the real
world, which is not the culture conflict with Afghans
it is the military versus the researcher conflict which is
like—how to do a research project, the slowness, the
care that you take about, you know, privacy or about
taking time to understand what somebody says, and
none of that fits well with the military pace.19

The importance of intelligence versus information was amplified by the population-centric COIN
tactics enabled by General David H. Petraeus in Iraq
and later endorsed by General Stanley A. McChrystal
in Afghanistan. COIN tactics made cooperation and
support from the host population “at least as impor-
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tant to our success as combat operations.”20 COIN
environments where emphasis is in understanding
the population invert the conventional intelligence
pyramid, generating the need for a “bubble-up”
framework where knowledge gleaned at the tactical
level ought to influence operational character and
policy direction. Tactical collection of sociocultural
information can be amplified by embedded academic
experts, whose research methods are outside army
capabilities and:
include classic anthropological and sociological
methods such as semi-structured and open-ended
interviews, polling and surveys, text analysis, and
participant observation. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies are used, based on the research
required.21

Those methodologies, now implemented in Iraq
and Afghanistan, were subject to scrutiny. Application of models to convey cultural information of the
area of operations (AO) is problematic and contributes
to the reticence of the military to engage actively and
continually the “soft” sciences.22 For example, PMESII,
the most widely used sociological model for warfighting generally, originated from a 2000 wargame, Unified Quest, conducted jointly by the U.S. Department
of the Army and U.S. Joint Forces Command. It was
developed “as a means of enabling kinetic targeting
tangible nodes in a network.”23 Unified Quest was a
year-long annual wargame, the capstone wargame in
the U.S. military enterprise, and examined military
adaptation in the face of several international crises.
Thus the wargame looked at evolution and concepts
and models which would most facilitate holistic examination of the changing, complex environment.
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Instructively, therefore, PMESII was an analytic subcomponent of a concept known as Operational Net
Assessment and “meant to provide a holistic view
of the environment in which military forces will be
operating.”24
Highlighting the compromise between academy
and military, and the limitations of existing models,
the PMESII model suffers three principal shortfalls.
First, it is over-simplistic, failing to incorporate informal political systems. It is therefore less accurate in
modeling weak states where illicit economies are a
substantial feature of the societal system. Second, the
model is incompatible with social science literature in
its definition of government, which implicitly spoke
at how far behind the academy the military enterprise
was in 2007-13 in their conceptualization of the social
domain. Third, it only evaluates physical tangibles,
leaving no room for belief systems or other important
intangible aspects of human systems.25 McFate, Britt
Damon, and Robert Holliday sum up the COIN environment thus: “Unfortunately, the tail wags the dog
far too often in the military-industrial-contractor complex, and systems designed at the joint level rarely aid
in the company fight.”26
This fundamental disconnect between the rarefied
doctrinal atmosphere of joint publications and the
“company fight” was exacerbated by the unforeseen,
sui generis character of the insurgencies. Inevitably, the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) methods, models,
and taxonomies spoke to a more regular adversary that
competed on a battlefield and used standard munitions. The existing models thus had “limited reference
to the lived experience of commanders on the ground
that actually used this information in day-to-day planning and execution of operations.”27 In addition, the
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input to develop the concepts had come from the top
level, with little input from the “lowest possible level
of the command structure.”28 What this means is that,
for instance, culture courses at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the “multi-million
dollar simulations” at the Joint Training Counter Improvised Explosive Device Center were not responding accurately to the important lessons derived from
on-the-ground experience.29
HTTs thus offer a rare glimpse into expert experience of the utility of such models at the lowest level in
the conflict zone. HTS follows doctrine codified in FM
2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, in additionally using ASCOPE to define civil considerations
in an AO. The ASCOPE model is broad enough that it
has been used by HTTs, most especially as an initial
baseline assessment. According to the Human Terrain
Team Handbook, examination of ASCOPE begins with
analysis of available data, including from Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Psychological Operations, and information networks.30 The model is
codified into the 2006 Counterinsurgency field manual,
which was extremely useful for highlighting to BCTs
what it was that embedded teams could provide to the
staff in terms of sociocultural awareness.31 The HTT
social scientist Marcus Griffin, writing about what
he did when embedded in a BCT in Baghdad, noted
that he used the ASCOPE model and populated the
six categories by visiting the Joint Security Stations,
staying several days.32 The method allowed him to understand better the exact needs of the brigade in terms
of knowledge gaps, and research necessary in order to
fill them.
While that model was used extensively by HTTs to
create baseline assessments, use of the method hints
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at a particular and paradoxical problem. The HTS was
created and developed in order to fill a need which
was nonresident in DoD. This particular need was for
sociocultural awareness brought in from social scientists who could conduct research in areas of operations to a depth beyond existing military capabilities.
Using existing military methods, however, particularly ASCOPE and PMESII, meant that the embedded
teams became in effect an integrated part of the existing military intellectual architecture. Given the fluidity of conflict and the sui generis nature of the spectrum
of challenges facing embedded teams, this preoccupation with existing structural models and taxonomies
obfuscates the dynamic character of insurgencies.
The existing models afford a static structure to
something which is by definition subject to change
over time. How can HTTs expect to replicate research
products across sui generis operating environments? Is
there enough similarity between the city and the village; the key leader engagement in Iraq and the Jirga
in Afghanistan; the oil refineries and the agricultural
fields; Arabic and Pashto? The social scientist in the
HTT should be relied upon to develop sui generis research products which can speak to all levels of the
brigade and relate to their experiences. Abstract models could miss granularity identified by the social scientist. Structural functionalism, ASCOPE, and PMESII
were all used by the military already when AF1 embedded in February 2007. Using such models was not
new. We are thus left to investigate the research modalities of the social scientists in order to understand
if they were merely filling these models or conducting
investigations using methodologies which were novel
in the military enterprise.
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ATTACHÉ AND RESEARCHER
Integration of theory was entwined with a more
practical, physical integration. The military enterprise
in Iraq and Afghanistan was far from uniform and
HTTs largely depended upon any individual brigade
commander regarding the level of importance placed
on the team and their research. For example, there exists between the Marine Corps and the Army subtly
differing group mentalities.33 This variation in institutional character led to differences in how the two
components perceived HTTs.
As early as 2008, Marine Corps feedback on HTTs
that had been provided by the Army noted that as individual members these embedded teams had been
useful, but that the teams in their entirety could have
a net deleterious effect. The Marine Corps “has a lot of
experience with bringing on individual augments, and
knows how to do that; I think I probably would have
been happier with that rather than being saddled with
this whole team.”34 Additionally, as Clark explains, in
the Marine Corps culture:
You have 5 minutes to prove yourself. If you are no
longer valuable in 5 minutes, you are not value added, and they get you out. You have to have a certain
level of toughness, you have to be willing to stand
your ground, but also be willing to say when you are
wrong.35

The difference is not only cultural but organizational. As McFate explains, Marine Corps Regimental
Combat Teams operate, and are organized, differently
than that of BCTs:
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Marines are like a tribal society with their own norms
and rules, so we had to select people pretty carefully
for those teams. The first team that goes into a unit, the
first unit receiving a team, it is always an uphill climb
to prove your worth, show what you can do, integrate
into their battle rhythm.36

Implicit in McFate’s statement, and telling from
the point of view of the HTS management, is that
there was less care in selecting the HTT members for
other teams which would not embed with the Marine
Corps and goes back to the mutual missteps in hiring between the management and BAE Systems. Interestingly, this comment would suggest that the HTS
management did not carefully select embeds for the
U.S. Army, and thus apportions at least some of the
missteps to the management, rather than the contracting recruiter.
One of the first social scientists to embed with
the Marine Corps noted that it is “a whole different
animal from the Army” and that:
they are very small, and therefore they do a better job
of leveraging whatever resources are available. And so
if they have an enabler come in, if that enabler proves
that they can be useful then the Marines will leverage
them and act upon their information.37

Another social scientist found the Marine Corps
“very insular” and:
so it really took a lot of effort to prove that you are
useful, but the Catch-22 is, in order to get resources
in order to conduct missions so that you can produce
work, you have to prove you are useful; it’s kind of
like requiring job experience before you can get a job
type-thing.38
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This was part of the practical problem with the remit of the HTS. It had to plug a sociocultural knowledge gap. That knowledge when the team embedded,
by definition, did not exist. To get the requisite knowledge, there was a requirement to get out into the area
of operation, but gaining convoy support could be difficult. The ease of gaining convoy support varied according to the unique experiences of the HTT, but byand-large was proportional both to the resources of
the brigade and the perceived value of the research of
the team. In the first instance, gaining convoy support
required networking, which required interpersonal
skills. It also meant researching any or all aspects of
the bases on which the teams found themselves. These
bases could be petri dishes containing the elements of
the wider environment.
To prove worth, one social scientist integrated Marine Corps requirements directly into the questions
used for initial team surveys, “getting what the Marines needed but also getting what [the] State department needed, so it was two birds with one stone.”39
It also necessitated an inexhaustible ability to share
that information between the Department of State
and the Marine Corps, facilitating conversation and
collaboration because “there was a surprizing lack of
coordination between those two.”40 Absence of coordination between service components was far greater,
however:
The Marines and Army do not communicate in theatre. They even have two different networks which
they use. So the Army had TIGR [Tactical Ground
Reporting System], CIDNE [Combined Information
Data Network Exchange], and the Marines had [other
systems].41
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In practice, this meant that embedded teams across
Army and Marine components possessed a horizontal character that the Armed Services lacked at the
official level. HTTs could thus communicate between
brigades, across different areas of operations, while
the Army and Marine Corps “didn’t talk to each
other and although some of the Marine and Army
counterparts would talk to each other, they did not
do it frequently and their mission objectives were
different.”42
Organizational and cultural discrepancies were
complicated by sui generis attitudes to the teams at the
brigade staff level. Like other social scientists, Clark
worked by integrating her research with information
operations and civil affairs, the closest groups resembling her team, networking at every opportunity with
teams such as the Iraqi Advisor Task Force, and leveraging language expertise to assist in messaging. The
Iraqi Advisor Task Force was created in 2006 and was
comprised of former U.S. Army Special Operations
Forces (SOF) personnel, host population and Iraqi
expatriates, charged with analyzing host media and
conducting polls in order to assist the COIN campaign
through knowledge of Iraqi society.
Networking was critical to getting the team noticed. Clark went to every command meeting that
she was able to, with the result that “more and more
people wanted us to do working groups, more people
coming in saying, ‘Hey, I just want to read through
your database, how do I get to it?’” That led to the
task force, working on a full assessment of the hospital
system in the area requesting assistance with cultural
information, specifically asking for Clark.43 Working
on the hospitals explains why that individual, if not
the team, became useful; Clark was able to leverage
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research from the hospital system, including information on gender relations and the nursing college
training system, which hinted at larger problems in
the community, trading that information with other
assets in the brigade and requesting convoy space for
further missions.44
Differences also existed not just between services,
but between nations. This was granular nuance that
could not be taught in training because not only could
combat unit configuration be amended in theater, but
U.S. Army trainers would lack specific knowledge of
coalition partner brigade structures, especially their
function and arrangement in theater. As a consequence, HTT members were flying blind when initially embedded. For example, Evans noted that British
brigade headquarters were ordered differently than
U.S. brigades, which, in turn, were similar to the Danish battalion. Having embedded with both coalition
partners, Evans observed a lack of communication
within the Danish battalion, finding that “the right
hand often didn’t know what the left hand was doing,
and how much information they already knew,” and
so they had to interview Danes as they would Afghans
to develop the information the HTT required in order
to perform as per the requirements of the customer.45
Interestingly, then, such were the unique identities of
combat brigades that the first ethnographies necessary to be undertaken were of the coalition forces. War
truly recreates societies anew on every level.
Special Operations Forces Augments.
Gathering information at the tactical level, the remit of the HTS meant that some social scientists embedded in smaller units than brigades. Indeed, Lamb
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et al. in their seminal study of HTTs have argued that
the program would be best situated within the U.S.
Army’s Special Operations Command. They note
the command’s familiarity with small cross-cultural
units and the continuing centrality of special operations to irregular warfare.46 Reinforcing this assessment, according to intelligence officials at the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),
the Joint Special Operations Command has expressed
interest in HTS assets, but by the end of 2013, there
was no formal collaboration between the HTS and the
command.
In practice between 2007 and 2014, official HTS
collaboration with special operations units was largely limited to Afghanistan, primarily to support Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces when the
Village Stability Operations program began in early-2010. For these operations, it was of special import
that the social scientists sent were physically capable
of performing the role due to the remote locations,
lacking infrastructure and engaged in arduous work
as part of a daily routine.47
As well as official embeds, there were individual
augments to SOF units based on entrepreneurial activity from HTT and Human Terrain Analysis Team
members. For instance, Clark worked with SOF in
Iraq though she found them “more insular, even than
Marines.”48 Clark had originally embedded with II
Marine Expeditionary Force division as a Human Terrain Analysis Team social scientist before attaching
to Regimental Combat Team 8 in the North of Iraq to
concentrate on Sinjar. Indicative of the variety of social scientist experiences, to conduct research, Clark
was given convoys that would also deliver supplies.49
The resources had been provided after a Fragmentary
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Order from the II MEF G-2 to fill the sociocultural gap
for the division.50 Approximately half of the locations
visited during the work were chosen specifically by
Clark and her Human Terrain Analysis Team. During
the course of her work with II Marine Expeditionary
Force, Clark worked with SOF. It is the insular identity of the SOF and the rigorous physical demands of
special operations that may limit HTS integration in
the future.
One unnamed social scientist that deployed officially to a SOF unit in Afghanistan found the relationship with the unit they worked with to be much more
dynamic than with regular Army units, in terms of
the size of the team itself—there were 12 members of
the unit—and the demanding character of the tasks.
Those tasks included involvement in the Community Defense Initiative (which would migrate to Village Stability Operations and Afghan National Police
[ANP]), which both ensured and required constant
access to the population. As two other former HTT social scientists and an Army Civil Affairs Officer note
of their work with those platforms:
Stability practitioners that reside at a more local level,
such as USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command] teams, may live in a village their entire tour,
with near total access to the nonverbal behaviors required to make more substantive judgments of norms
and group identity.51

The research was of a similar modality to their previous work with the regular Army unit but the scope
was reduced because the resources were more limited
by the size of the team. As the social scientist explains,
it “was a pretty unique setting” camped out in a village, living in an Afghan house, “right on a main road,
with mud walls around us.”52
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The austere living conditions and rudimentary
security were positive in that:
You would get folks who would come by and knock
on your door each day, so you would get access to
a lot more people; but me being by myself was certainly challenging. Being an outsider on those [Special
Operations Forces] teams is exceptionally hard, to be
accepted within the units themselves.53

Integration was achieved by earning the trust and
respect of the small unit, and the social scientist recalls
an important rule made by one member of the unit
for them: “There was a good line when I got there,
‘You don’t have to do guard duty because you’re a
civilian, but I want to let you know you cannot stay
here unless you help us out with guard duty’.”54 To
that end, the social scientist’s experience was a wide
spectrum of involvement from “hooking a local up to
an IV [intravenous drip], filling sandbags, shoveling
dirt, constructing houses, to digging holes.55 The social scientist also found value in their Arabic language
skills, translating some of the religious verses for the
population. With SOF, reputation and rapport with
the population were critical:
It is a force-multiplier for them when they have that
capability to count upon, locals for intelligence, development projects—they need the support of the local
community. So, bringing a different, random skill set
is not only important for them, because you’re capable
of doing something that is a little bit unique, a little bit
different and in turn you can go into a town and talk
and having a language skill set like that which is totally different, but you get into a setting where you’re
in a mosque, or wherever it may be, and you can talk
to Quranic verses [sic]; rapport building; not a lot of
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substance behind it but it could be a huge advantage
because you are perceived as someone who can understand the community; that can understand the culture a lot better. They are not just seeing someone who
is stopping through their villages.56

Integration into the unit was critical, because of the
small size—there was a central question, as an outsider, but also as a civilian, will the social scientist be a liability? The difference between SOF and regular units
was pronounced, as the social scientist explained:
If you are in a battalion or a company, there are plenty
of guys that pick up the slack; but if there are 12 guys,
you are out on patrol with six people, they have got to
know that you are going to be able to hold your own.57

Other social scientists reinforce this view. Two other
social scientists that worked on village stability observed: “On some of the most remote combat outposts,
civilian social scientists can be quickly labeled ‘dead
weight’ if they fail to participate in camp cleanup,
solidify defensive positions, or participate in guard
duty.”58
Ultimately, the social scientist interviewed judged
his or her efforts and those of the unit as a success,
based on the observation that the area had the first
successful Afghan Local Police (ALP) team in the
country.59 As “the human terrain guy” attached to
the SOF unit, the social scientist had reach-back support from the HTS which was of utility. In addition,
“coming from the civilian side you do have that flexibility. However, it is very difficult to integrate with
those guys, it has to be the right personality, and you
just have to be really flexible with the teams.”60 This
distinct skill set meant that social science expertise, is
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“something that is a little bit vague in lots of ways”
you can still influence outcomes, such as shuras, relationships with locals, which is the human terrain, and
is “enormously beneficial” because “most of the time,
we don’t know what the hell is going on out there. You
can chip away at that a little bit, and have a positive
impact.”61 Although that was a plus, problematic elements existed because of the team size, perhaps five or
six people on a tactical mission—key leader meetings
with the governor or the mayor were logistically challenging. But a larger team would be a double-edged
sword, which is “too big; it requires too much red tape
and bureaucracy” to do flexible engagement with the
population.62
With the Special Operations units:
you get a really short proposal and you can get buy-in
from your company commander or the team leader or
whoever it is and they say, ‘okay if that’s your call,
make the call, go for it.’ Being on the tactical level like
that is a pretty beautiful thing to see.63

HTS in areas where the incumbent exercises hegemonic or complete control would thus most likely
operate in a similar manner but without the SOF character because of the arduous process of integration.
HTS in this iteration, therefore, would be small teams
in the field, a section of which operate close to local
populations, ensuring integration and collaboration
at the societal level; while the military team leader
would operate in an advisory role, in the “hip pocket”
of a combatant commander. Working for the small
unit will bring with it the inevitable cost of detached
objectivity; however, social scientists “should be an
integral part of the team but at the same time maintain a level of autonomy and independence to conduct
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substantive fieldwork. These two prerequisites are not
easily met.”64
OPERATIONALLY RELEVANT REPORTING
In practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, the highly
contested character of the spaces in which HTTs operated gave them an entrepreneurial character. This
was because of the unique requirements facing each
team that led to sui generis research agendas. Nicholas
Krohley embedded with a BCT managed overall by
the 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in southeastern Baghdad in February 2008. As the social scientist,
Krohley was broadly responsible within the HTT for
research design, the overall management of fieldwork,
and the analysis and presentation of collected data.
From the early program training cycle, Krohley drew
the impression that the social scientist’s role would be
part of the staff element, possessing a research team
of other analysts to fill information requirements as
needed; attend meetings and, facilitate reconstruction
talks.
But arriving in the eastern edge of Baghdad at the
beginning of 2008 and embedded with a brigade which
had three districts of the city within its responsibility,
the brigade found one of the districts, Tissa Nissan,
“in chaos basically—the local government didn’t really meet, and when it did meet, nothing really did
happen of any use, efforts to develop local relationships weren’t going anywhere.”65 Absence of physical
security meant that:
people were getting killed—both Iraqis killing Iraqis,
people killing the Iraqi police, and also American soldiers were getting killed, in roadside bombings, par-
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ticularly the EFPs [explosively formed penetrators]
that were coming in . . . Those were a big deal, in our
neck of the woods.66

From the classroom at Fort Leavenworth to the
combat zone in Baghdad was a sizeable transition. On
the ground, instructively, Krohley notes that:
there was no mission, clearly-defined, beyond being
‘useful’—in quotes, for Human Terrain Teams at the
outset. There was a purpose to fill, but it wasn’t clear
how you were supposed to do that. It was a case of
‘you have these skills, go out and make yourselves
useful’.67

Because there was only one district which required
deciphering at the societal level, the “traditional model of being sort of a meeting-driven, staff-driven asset, wasn’t going to work, just because we didn’t have
answers to the questions that were being asked.”68
Knowledge of complex Iraqi history such as that the
social scientist possessed was inadequate in meetings
where the problem set was specific, fluid, and contemporary. Put succinctly, the question was why was this
one particular neighborhood in conflict, when around
it there was relative calm? The team structure was
organized to generate an answer; the team leader remaining at the brigade staff level and the remainder of
the team dispersing and embedding at the company
level; going “neighbourhood to neighbourhood, often alone, but sometimes in pairs, and language ability was the real determinant there” where the “really
good Arabic speakers we [Krohley’s team] had were
effectively turned loose.”69
How had this arrangement of the team, different
from that of the function and roles envisaged in the
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training cycle, occurred? The military structure is by
design a kinetic machine which leverages overwhelming physically destructive assets to compel, coerce, or
defeat an adversary by killing. Even within a COIN
framework, there may still be present an overwhelming predisposition—through training, belief, and experience—to triumph in combat through kinetic means
against an identifiable enemy through that preferred
mode. As such, for there to be an appreciation for sociocultural awareness in the high levels of the brigade
structure, the “commander has to truly value diversity of ideas, through his actions as well as his words,
and he has to truly value the criticality of cultural
knowledge and the importance of non-lethal effects in
general.”70 Arrangement of the HTT in the command
structure, as befitted the operational tempo, pertinent
problems, intrateam and interteam relationships and
perceptions of mission were therefore fundamental to
the character of the research conducted.71 As Krohley
explains generally of leveraging sociocultural experts:
“You are told why you were being sent, and why the
job existed, and there is a general understanding of
the utility of this service, but there were no specific instructions regarding, ‘Well, when you get there, what
the hell you do’.”72
Part of the problem was the sui generis character
of operating environments. As a consequence, there
arose different identities which a team could assume
when conducting research for the BCT staff, crystallizing around two forms: first, the investigator operating
among the population; second, the staff-centered advisor who advised on the base. These identities were
mostly shaped by the goal of the commander; an investigator would go out and find answers as part of
a field-situated unit—a collection platform—whereas
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the staff-centered advisory team would influence the
hierarchy of the military to ask the right questions, and
“seed in” social science thinking of academic character to as many staff functions as possible.73 In the staffcentered approach, social science thinking would filter downward into the field, through the generation
of hypotheses to allow for specific research, through
social science elements to written orders, and the tasks
given to units in the field.74 Ultimately, in the early iterations of the program, with teams sent to crisis environments, these heterogeneous characters of embedded teams were not resolved and suggest an inherent
difficulty in generating a uniform template for team
models across areas of operation or across time.
Despite this core problem, there were broad similarities in research methods between teams, based on
the operating environment and the necessity of integration into the brigade structure. In order to enhance
the reputation of their HTT and capture information
about the operating environment, Krohley’s team began by interviewing U.S. Soldiers in the AO, many of
whom had been in the AO for nearly 2 years because
of the extended surge deployments. There was value
in gaining understanding of the customers and their
mindset:
some had insights, many had impressions mostly; it
was very interesting. It was essential to view how different aspects of the military viewed the place they
were operating in because you had to speak to that
when you have answers, when you gave insight and
guidance.75

Processing and analyzing the impressions and observations of the soldiers allowed the construction of
4-page neighborhood profiles (see Appendix P); sim258

plistic representations intended to clarify the problem
faced in the neighborhood.
From that base, more detailed research plans could
be compiled which filled gaps in the data: What’s
wrong? What’s missing? Where are the conflicts of
opinion? Where do people see different things? Different question sets were thus constructed which formed
the research plan tasked ultimately with answering
the question as to why the conflict was persisting in
Tissa Nissan, which then allowed research to proceed.
This account provides a fascinating insight into the
construction of a research agenda to answer a question where the baseline of knowledge upon first examination of the human terrain was negligible (see
Appendix M). The basic landscape was mapped from
initial reconnaissance by the brigade and research
on what the Army was doing there—how they were
operating—was ascertained. From that, the venues
in which it might be reasonable to assume data could
be collected were mapped: Were there useful government meetings? Were there civil society groups asking coalition forces for money? Were there locally recruited policeman who are part of the national Iraqi
police force that could be engaged? Were there lots of
door-to-door searches ongoing, which would allow an
avenue for interviewing the population?
This methodology was a binary dynamic between
collection requirements and collection opportunities,
with a plan built around executing both. Krohley:
built this out in more detail, probably in more detail
than was used. Because in the end reality intercedes
and you end up making the most of your opportunities, but it was a useful mental exercise and planning
exercise to build this plan; basically to turn a research
plan into a collection plan.76
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Colleagues within the team were only contacted
periodically, as little as once a month, via telephone
or a SIPRNet email connection, and meetings with the
team leader were of a similar frequency—the reason
was not a personal one, rather “logistics were challenging enough” without having to take an additional ride in a convoy to sit down in an approximately
30-minute meeting where nothing necessarily might
be learned.77 The structured research plan, even if not
strictly adhered to, was specific guidance on what was
to be done and how it was to be done, enabling the
dispersal of the team to achieve the research goals.
In relatively secure sections of the area, language
skills allowed the possibility of deep social research. In
2008 in Baghdad, Arabic language skills afforded the
opportunity for those proficient team members in IZ4
to develop substantive, long-term relationships with
people, to go into different meetings, sitting down in a
room in a chair, sitting across the table from someone,
or on the phone, allowing collection from the same
source repeatedly over a period of time, cultivating a
relationship. At the other end of the spectrum were
deeply insecure areas, where the local neighborhood
council either would not collaborate because they
were overtly hostile to the American presence there,
or were dubious research partners in that their information provided would be compromised; mostly
because of their desire in “milking the U.S. Defense
budget, or whatever the State Department budget was
for reconstruction, to feed money to their buddies.”78
Those “dead ends” meant collection opportunities
were limited to street-level encounters, dictated by the
contemporary, evolving character of mission activities
and conducted on an ad hoc basis.
In practice, the character of missions determined
the modality of the research. Krohley notes that an
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important development for him occurred over the
summer of 2008 when weapon ownership in residences became illegal for Iraqis as part of the terms of
a decree which initiated large numbers of search and
seizure missions across Baghdad. Sections of neighborhoods would be cordoned off:
and you would have a few dozen Iraqi national police,
a platoon or two, going to house to house, you know
soft knock, ‘Hello sir. How are you? Are you aware of
the new law? We need your rifle’.79

Searching the house allowed an approximately
10-minute conversation—a one off—but over the
course of that day, perhaps 30 or 40 conversations in
total. Instructively, the research method changed dramatically, first letting the interviewee lead the conversation, which inevitably focused on lack of electricity,
or explaining who the social scientist was, which meant
that the social scientist would “effectively spend the 10
minutes doing PR [Public Relations] for the Army, and
they would say: ‘Ah, that’s an interesting programme,
it’s great that they are doing this’.”80
The absence of structured methods in this situation accomplished little of operational relevance, so
the methods developed rapidly to incorporate various
lines of questioning routed in specifics which were
known about a particular neighborhood and patterns of movement and migration. In this scenario,
understanding the chronological context of the place
did matter; knowledge of the historical trajectory at
the granular level, which expert social scientists possessed, helped frame the research questions, allowing
the outsider to relate to the local area (see Appendix
O). As Krohley explains, eastern Baghdad:
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had been created in the second half of the 20th century
in the migration which had occurred of mixing the
populations, and knowing something about local history and the dynamics of local settlement was a very
useful frame of reference for questioning; for talking
to people.81

Why was this valuable? Iraq was in the grip of a
civil war, and Baghdad was in the middle of a war
which had split along sectarian lines. It was fast-moving and complex, requiring deep understanding of the
historical fractures and the identities which had crystallized as a result. It also required integrating that expert historical knowledge into understanding of how
the demographics of the city had changed as a result of
the U.S.-led invasion, for which there was no existing
census data as a result of the insecurity (see Appendix
M). Capturing the changing character of the districts
could only be possible through interviews. These interviews also shed light on the problems and concerns
of the citizens and the groups with which they identified. Understanding the units of identity which were
forming during the conflict allowed the staff to understand the best way to combat the insurgency.
Personal Choice.
The laissez-faire approach to guidance concerning
HTT conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan engendered different approaches to ethics. The permissive protocol
for team members allowed them to adopt their own
idiosyncratic methods. Clark conducted ethically-rigorous research but observes bluntly that there were
“plenty of teams that went to the dark side.”82 Clark
was brought into the Social Science Directorate on her
return from Iraq to recalibrate the ethical modalities of
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research. Another social scientist stated that it was always possible to pass on information regarding insurgents to the intelligence cell, suggesting that, at times
at the discretion of the individual and team, the line
between information and intelligence could become
blurred.83
The truth of ethics in the program in Iraq and Afghanistan is that, in its design and execution, it was
perfectly feasible to conduct ethical research from
which the resulting information would not compromise the safety of those members of the population
they engaged. For example, in gaining information
“atmospherics” of eastern Afghanistan, AF1 in 2008
used a broad semi-structured interview template for
the population (see Appendix N). In no way do the
question sets compromise those interviewed or enable
information gleaned to be used for kinetic targeting.
Informed consent for research conducted on medical
care in Iraq highlights the calibrated character of the
research modes used by social scientists in teams and
also shows the quasi-nongovernmental organization
(NGO) character of the program and a way forward for
the HTS should it transition into a more strategically
oriented asset; to assist the Department of the Army
in sociocultural planning concerns such as healthcare,
agriculture, or commerce. As source protection could
be ensured, if it was not at any time that was a misstep
in the recruitment and training cycles, exacerbated by
the psychological burden of conflict which stressed
that the primary duty of the HTT social scientist was
to the military unit in which they were embedded.
Concerns that the HTS was a clandestine intelligence asset are demonstrably false. Krohley offers a
balanced assessment of the program and its activities:
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The program itself was not the Phoenix programme—
we were not there to target and kill people, but that
being said there are ethical challenges to doing work
in this kind of environment because you’re not impartial: we are on a side, we are not unbiased, neutral
academic researchers looking at conflict; we are paid
servants of the U.S. Army, there to help win a war,
as corny as that may sound. It creates a tension but it
does not, I think, create an impossible contradiction. I
feel very comfortable that I did ethical work.84

There is nothing “corny” in that assessment. The
only point of the HTS was to help the U.S. Department
of the Army win a war. The improvised explosive device (IED) crisis had ushered in the program to help
win a war that was being lost, and now in that “anything goes” environment, there was the possibility of
either protecting a source or not.
Bluntly, source protection—which was the core
ethical concern of social scientists in HTTs—could be
accomplished if there was a desire to achieve it. For
instance, in Iraq, individuals in HTTs cultivated longterm relationships with Iraqis who were typically
already well known to the Army: local government
leaders; prominent civilians, with names and telephone numbers already listed.85 Generally, the ethical
dimension of the encounter could be controlled by
calibration of the research method which, in practice,
meant the material discussed with the population and
the character of the questions asked of them.86 Effective team members, possessing good language skills
and rapport with the population, might be sought out
by locals with intelligence information. Such a scenario is “inevitable” without it being “an ethical catastrophe” because the individual could be referred to
an intelligence officer.87 In terms of targeting, the character of the information gleaned was largely inappli264

cable. HTS was not about identification and naming of
insurgents. Instead, the program was concerned with
tribal dynamics and the social conditions of a particular community, truly a complete transition to a COIN
tool rather than a counter-IED asset.
HTS as a COIN tool therefore created a modus operandi of teams of nonkinetic information gathering. In
one-off “house collection,” Krohley, for example, never asked for people’s names nor did the notes made
in the notepads constitute intelligence and helping
the military customer in this manner, but with ethical
limitations, meant that the relationship with the Army
structure was not contested or adversarial:
The notes we had—when it came time to write these
neighbourhood profiles—I had various colleagues
email me their field notes that were typed up. Even
those that had established long-term relations, they
didn’t send names with it; it would just have their
(the team member’s) initials (at the top) and “Source
Number 1.” There would be a little bit of contextual
information of the person insomuch as that helped me
understand the background to the information insofar
as they were a policeman for example or a government
official or a displaced person or whatever. That was
that. The military never asked for us for anything that
they shouldn’t have asked for, and frankly we didn’t
have much to give them in that respect, in terms of
targeting information.88

The same conclusion is drawn by the West Point
study which observed that the line of demarcation
seems to be “running a source”; which is the point
where the HTT should hand over the collection to
intelligence agents should the team inadvertently
uncover a “likely intelligence source.”89 Given the
research questions from AF1 in 2008 and the Iraqi hospital research, it is unlikely that, in conducting that
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research, information on the insurgency allowing targeting would arise. It has become, in essence, a quasiNGO.
Developing explicit limits regarding the possibility of targeting is a core theme for social scientists
concerned with the ethical character of their research.
Clark notes that, in her work with a SOF unit, each
night they would go through mission objectives, because even though they often aligned, occasionally
they were not the same. According to Clark, while
there was an implicit understanding that there was a
broad need to identify insurgents because that would
reduce coalition casualties in the long term, that was
not the job the HTT and to do so would thus ethically
compromise her as a social scientist.90 Both Clark and
Krohley had the ostensible motivation for their work
to facilitate their unit to make more informed choices at
the tactical and operational levels in a COIN environment. This mandate allowed ethical research. Ethics,
however, are a black and white issue; either a source
was protected or it was not. HTS, as a program for
COIN, allowed ethical research; if ethical research was
not done, that was the compromised ethical stance of
the HTT individual or whole team, which could be exacerbated by pressure applied by a unit commander.
Embedding with a unit, particularly a small unit
such as many of those used in operations by SOF, in
which rapport and obvious, immediate utility were
critical to value, meant that loyalty to the customer
might come first and outweigh other considerations.
In this environment, strength of character could be a
critical factor in determining the ethical content of interactions with the population. This is an inevitable
occurrence of embedding with a group in a highly
contested space prone to violence. As one social scien-
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tist in Afghanistan made clear of work with SOF, their
primary import was in supporting the unit. The ethical boundary could easily be crossed, in which case
you could side with the military or, according to the
social scientist:
say ‘I’m just not comfortable with this.’ I was lucky in
that I had two really great SF (Special Forces) teams,
and they would say ‘are you okay with this?’ ‘I’d say
I’m not on board with this’ And they were very generous and gracious with me backing off, and they’d say
‘okay, no problem’.91

Despite indications of teams going to the “dark
side,” in the course of this research, there emerged
few indications that any team did so. There is probably a professional reluctance to identify teams that
did, or identify that they themselves conducted unethical research. One social scientist that worked in
Afghanistan admits that they “ended up doing a lot
of intelligence” because of the nature of the questions,
which yielded information on Taliban movements,
which they passed along to the military, “very quietly
and discretely; I would tell them, ‘I am not the right
person, I will get you in touch with right person’.”92
If intelligence personnel were in close proximity, this
referral could be done quickly, but if not, because it
was difficult for intelligence personnel to gain convoy
support, then contact information would be taken.
The questions often yielded intelligence, not something social scientists could easily walk away from,
as to do so would be putting American lives at risk,
“even though it doesn’t go with what we were professionally supposed to be doing.”93
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Function and Acceptance.
The value of embedded teams in stabilization and
enabling operations was to provide an understand
function which existed outside the traditional bounds
of military hierarchy. The team was plugged directly
into the brigade staff and could thus facilitate military
comprehension. This was an operational need, evidenced by multiple Joint Urgent Operational Needs
Statements (see Appendices C-H). The resulting untested proof-of-concept plan developed in 2006 which
went operational in 2007 immediately experienced a
high operational tempo.
The high operational tempo required a strong ability of any HTT social scientist to communicate granular research in a concise manner with clear, actionable
insights attached. As one social scientist observed:
the military is very focused on succinct, strong communication. Statements must be backed up with solid
evidence. If you don’t know, admit it. Assumptions
are deadly. Using qualifiers such as ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’ will get you eaten alive in a briefing.94

To that end, early iterations of training marginalized
cross-cultural training between academia and the military, but one social scientist notes that by 2011, a large
component of training:
focused on giving briefings to commanders. Retired
colonels and generals would tear us apart during presentations, trying to pull us down rabbit holes where
a bad presenter would start to conjecture and only dig
himself deeper.95
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This is an example of training evolution bringing
important value to the classroom. What had obviously
occurred—implicit in this training revision—was a
broad inability of HTTs to convey academic knowledge to the military staff in a manner which was
coherent, balanced, authoritative, and actionable. This
speaks to the problems of academic complexity in that
the military encouraged actionable insights based on
balanced and nuanced analysis shaped into easily
presentable forms. It is implicitly a robust critique of
academic presentation rather than a concern about the
character of military thought. In conflict zones, there
was no room for the “narcissism of minor differences”
or “hollow verbiage masquerading as profundity”
resident in the academy and academic texts.96 The HTS
thus refined academic expertise into packages which
entered the operating cycle and could plug into the
military decisionmaking process of the brigade.
In answering the crux question of the book, therefore, the military wanted social scientists for academic research which attached actionable outcomes.
Compilation of taxonomies and theoretical context
complicated the military decisionmaking cycle. Qualified assessments had utility, if relevant to operational
planning. HTS was an ambitious Department of the
Army enterprise to integrate academics into that process, funded through the U.S. Government to wed
academic praxis to the military cycle. The onus was
on the social scientists to make their research relevant.
That their research was relevant shows the structural
possibility of developing these refined academic research modalities in conflict zones.
Team failure was a result of the inability of the HTT
to refine their research to integrate into the operating
tempo. As the social scientists with the SOF in Village
Stability Operations observed, the burden was on the
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academic to adapt and prove utility; that was their
remit, and they were paid to produce demonstrable
utility. If the social scientists failed to recalibrate their
expert modality, either through choice or an inability
to refine their work, then that was a recruitment and
training misstep. The gap requiring an asset which
conducted deep sociocultural research existed; it was
a question of filling it effectively. Given the laissez-faire
recruitment and the demands of a conflict zone, some
teams failed to fill that gap.
Adapting to demands of the military unit was
arduous in the conflict zone. Social scientists found
that in order to function effectively and add value,
it was necessary to integrate, “becoming much more
direct.”97 This speaks to both the challenges of the
academic in the conflict zone and the broader direction of academia more generally, as it seeks to ensure
relevance in the social sciences in the 21st century.
The military was a culture, in the words of one social
scientist, “weird and totally antithetical to how I’d
grown up—in order to bond, I had to tease and ridicule.”98 This affords insight into the lack of training
which the program gave to academics. The carefully
delineated boundaries of individuals in academia are
unrepresentative of team relationships in the civilian
sector more broadly, and the military even more so.
There is a question here regarding the core challenges
posed in training sets to integrate, both physically and
psychologically, from the isolated academic environment to the team environment of the military unit.
To be accepted was to be functional and to be functional was to be accepted; this required an acceptance
of military values. At the granular level of the soldiers
in the company or platoon, this included respecting a
fallen comrade and partaking of menial chores, such
as filling sandbags or observation in a Mine Resistant
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Ambush Protected vehicle while on a mission. Team
members were earning wages much higher than the
soldiers and enjoyed more freedom, which could
breed tension if not held in check by communal participation in menial work and adoption of the lifestyle;
small things such as eating the same food; wearing the
same fatigues; and not be seen killing time in relaxing
environments such as “the base Green Beans” (U.S.
coffee house company with a contract with the U.S.
military). “Then maybe you’ll get enough goodwill to
be able to request convoy support.”99 Deaths of fallen
comrades were particularly hard if team members
were embedded in small Forward Operating Bases,
affecting everyone on the base.
These events could be made harder by the remit of
the teams, as explained by a social scientist regarding
his or her experience in Afghanistan, because:
then the next day I went and had to interview the family of the Afghan policeman who had shot the soldier
at point blank range. I quickly learned that every commander is going to prioritize the lives of his men over
everything—and rightly so. But I had to show that I
was factoring it into my mission requests.100

The customer was the unit leader, and successful
teams were those that contributed to successful missions. To that end, missions or projects developed by
the teams had to be conveyed to the commander in a
way that showed the social scientist was considering
the risk versus the reward, and that assigning soldiers
or being granted convoy space were going to be worth
the returns. In developing requests, especially in the
early stages, the military language was critical because that culture is “so acronym heavy and, just like
provincial dialects, every service, every unit, every
tiny little team has its own language.”101 Each deploy271

ment came with a radically new language set as units
moved in and out of a brigade, and the HTT had to
adapt to those. Teams were timed to enter the theater
of operations during brigade tours so that they could
assist in unit transitions. The problem was that they
then had to learn the new unit’s structure and prove
value over again. Certain commonalities existed but
even as much as the language is a hurdle, so, too, was
adopting the correct mentality.
“A Street Fight They Couldn’t Quite Understand.”
Part of the remit of the 4th Brigade in which Krohley embedded in 2008 was to re-establish robust governance in Rusafa, Karrada, and Tissa Nissan districts
and to that end worked with Iraqi security forces,
neighborhood and district councils, the technical and
administrative offices of the Baghdad municipality,
and civil society in order to accomplish the strategic
goal of a transfer of authority for the area to the Iraqi
government across 2008 and 2009. Initial assessment
highlighted that Tissa Nissan, and particularly its area
beyond the Army Canal, possessed much higher levels of insecurity for coalition forces than its neighboring districts, and this district was thus the subject of
focus for the team. Juxtaposition to Sadr City meant
substantial activity of the Jaysh al-Mahdi and other
Shia groups in the district. In the Saddam Husseinera, it was almost entirely a Shia area of the city, poorto-working class, with pockets of middle-class and
minority settlements.
The 2003 U.S.-led invasion and subsequent stabilization efforts fractured the human urban structure in
Baghdad which had previously exhibited a degree of
structural stability. This is an important point for social science work in conflict zones; qualitative research
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conducted before a war, no matter how recent, will be
rendered largely outdated by forced mobilization of
the population induced by systematic acts of violence.
If the conflict is characterized by a highly insecure environment, the fluidity of these structural changes to
the social fabric makes any deep analysis of the area
a cultural relic. By the time the analysis has been rendered into a product, the tempo of violence has reduced the research to an examination of the past. The
current of change in eastern Baghdad was pronounced
after the invasion, which disrupted and then resulted
in the disbandment of the Iraqi Army. The Jaysh alMahdi formed in an attempt to guarantee the security
of Shia populations in the midst of sectarian violence,
conducted a campaign of forced displacements such
that the population of Tissa Nissan by 2008 was principally Shia, and the insurgency was being countered
by Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, begun on February 13, 2007, as part of the surge.
In September 2008, the incoming team leader described the three districts, Rusafa, Karada, and Tissa
Nissan as highly heterogeneous and intricate; the
team answered operationally relevant questions and
the “key is that the research must be operationally relevant. While general in nature, the guidance must be
clear enough to allow the team to construct a sound
research design.”102 The research conducted by the
embedded team in eastern Baghdad had augmented
the operational picture of the sociocultural environment (see Appendices O, M, and P). At the higher level, however, the influence and impact of this research
was constrained by the strategic picture of the surge
in 2008, with plans for the drawdown of forces having
already been developed and major operations having
already been planned. In addition, the surge of forces
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was a strategic push which had a distinctly political
character and a set narrative: COIN, tribal engagement, and the transitioning of security control to the
Iraqi government.103
The political dimensions of the COIN mode constrained the HTTs effect in 2008 in Baghdad. U.S. forces
had developed a strategic mandate which emphasized
the central role of the Sons of Iraq and district councils in developing high enough levels of security that
there could be an effective transition. With these plans
pinned at the political level, IZ4’s (Krohley’s team) research on the likely failure of the Sons of Iraq program
in Tissa Nissan and the limitations of the district councils was unable to influence the strategic direction of
operations. Within these political dimensions, IZ4
could only assist the brigade in understanding why
events were unfolding in a particular manner; that understanding could not change the strategic direction
of the brigade or the configuration of operations.104
Those research methodologies conducted by IZ4
were dictated by the needs of the customer. The problem set as Krohley explained it:
wasn’t Machiavellian politics among competing
elites—it was a street fight that they couldn’t quite
understand and the only way to fix a street fight is to
get on the street and figure it out. So it was a different
approach, which stemmed a lot from the difference of
circumstance.105

Research was situational, dictated by the operating environment. If the customer’s problem dictated
that the street was the answer, then that also avoided
lot of the interpersonal issues and intrateam problems
which were exacerbated by people in close proximity
on base. HTTs were sui generis but success—augment274

ing the brigade’s sociocultural picture—was achieved
through a combination of adaptive research, team
configuration, and a receptive brigade staff. Team configuration was fundamental to success: for instance,
to respond to the challenges of Tissa Nissan, IZ4 split
the team into deep research components, and only the
team leader remained on staff. This suited the expert
field research skills of the team members.
Team configuration was an element which could
have been better analyzed in the training cycle. A
central problem of the HTS had been that it went operational without a proper development phase that
would have evolved optimum selection and training procedures for embedded teams. The original
Human Terrain System model wove into the design
a 24-month proof-of-concept phase based around a
handful of teams. Under Fondacaro, bureaucracy was
sidestepped, despite the fact that the military itself
places enormous emphasis on intrateam compatibility and harmony, selecting teams, pairing individuals
and paring certain personality types, as one former
HTT social scientist presents it, “focusing a great deal
on the team elements of work, particularly when you
get into small units doing ambiguous missions.”106
A small group given an intellectually challenging and ambiguous mission that they are meant to
resolve without a particular and explicit reliance on
the hierarchical structure around it required detailed
planning by the HTS management. Put simply, “HTS
didn’t do that” and “a lot of it traces back to problems
in the hiring places.”107 Krohley once had a colleague
offer the opinion that:
the hardest part of HTS is HTS. The war and the Iraqis
are the least of our troubles most days, it’s the pro-
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gramme management or it’s our teammates, and that
all stems back to hiring issues and the crafting of the
teams, both of which could have been a lot better.108

There were limits to the requirement for deep qualitative analysis of the kind offered by HTTs and their
bespoke toolkits. In Baghdad during 2008, the IED
was among the most pernicious of weapons utilized
by the insurgents. IEDs were on the two arterial routes
that bisected the AO, and the main access roads to U.S.
Army outposts, which was not a complex observation
requiring the compilation of social data. IEDs were
placed on the major highway which ran north/northeast through Diyala province to Iran, which splits just
before Sadr City; and on the other, which ran into the
heart of Tissa Nissan. These were obvious sites for insurgent action, due to the volume of traffic, making it
a target-rich environment. That analysis was purely
qualitative, providing the necessary explanation of
the environment.
The centrality of the IED to the military problemset in Iraq had brought the MAP-HT toolkit into existence, because of an “aspiration to build this programme that somehow combined IED incidents with
sociocultural demographic information” to enable
patterns to emerge, against which to allow the military
to predict and plan.109 Krohley argues that the theory
was unlikely to be workable in practice.110 Instructive
for the IED crisis which brought HTS into existence,
Krohley suggests that visualizing sociocultural data
for the Department of the Army would not impact the
IED problem in any discernible way.
In practice, MAP-HT could not augment the qualitative analysis of the operating environment. For
example, Krohley notes the investigation of indirect
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fire sites. These were sites where munitions were
launched even though the U.S. targets could not be
seen directly. Many of these sites were not located in
the militia strongholds themselves but in other areas
of the districts with high concentrations of displaced
people. Such areas provided an:
atmosphere of chaos where people didn’t really know
one another, there was no atmosphere of community,
there was no one in charge and there were always a lot
of people coming and going, so if a team came in, in a
couple of trucks or a pickup, they could come in, shoot
a few mortars, and leave.111

An understanding of demographics combined
with “just a basic idea of line of sight in a district” allows mapping with a great deal of certainty of the locations of indirect fire sites.112 This comprehension of
the sociocultural layer combined with military knowledge was being done well before the entry of the HTS.
While the Army may not have appreciated every aspect of the social environment on the ground, they did
capture the point of origins for mortar attacks with a
great deal of specificity, and they knew where the IED
hotspots were, with a great deal of detail.113
Instructively for the limitations of populationcentered COIN doctrine in practice, the response is
limited by the necessity to mitigate collateral damage.
The U.S. Army can launch countermortar strikes; firing mortars into uninhabited areas of the city at night,
acting on probabilities that there may be a mortar being set up; but that could not be done in a residential
dwelling or an internally displaced persons’ camp.114
Kinetic response limited not by ability but by a necessity of responsibility is of import for any wider investigation of responsible parameters when employing
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COIN tactics. Here is the dichotomy of the military
enterprise conducting population-centered activities,
because in preventing mortar strikes, to neutralize a
key aspect of the insurgency would require an atrocity; the destruction of the internally displaced persons’
camp. Low-intensity conflict expert Thomas Adams
has observed that “unless a military force is willing to
commit something close to genocide, it cannot destroy
the opposing force.”115 Disproportionate use of force
beneath the auspices of a narrative which foregrounded justice and humanitarian ideals was never a realistic response. Without a kinetic response approaching
something close to genocide, then the military, despite
augmented sociocultural knowledge, can only employ
tactics which attenuate insurgent activities, lessening
the effects, rather than confronting and neutralizing
the insurgents themselves, often indistinguishable
from the section of the population that has not taken
up arms.
A Different Country.
War reshapes societies, fashioning new, warped
demographics and propagating fluid shifts in groupings, narratives, and identities. Social layers shift; transitioning more quickly in more environments where
selective violence is higher. After the U.S.-led invasion
and occupation of Iraq, the power vacuum left by the
collapse of the Ba’athist regime and the unpopularity
of the incumbent Shia-dominated government generated intense sectarian violence. Religiously centered
conflict caused large numbers of Iraqi Christians to
flee the country, and by 2008, artificially induced by
conflict, the Yezidis, a sect following a pre-Islamic
tradition, became the de facto largest non-Muslim
minority in Iraq.116
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Historically, the Yezidis dispersed across various
borders when political and administrative boundaries
were redrawn in the Middle East as a consequence of
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath
of World War I. By the time of the U.S.-led invasion
in 2003, the largest number of Yezidis was in Iraq,
some 400,000, concentrated around the Sinjar region
of Nineveh governorate. In Nineveh the Yezidis were
outside the jurisdiction of the three Kurdish provinces,
but subject to pressures from both the Iraq state and
Kurdish political actors, the latter seeing the group
as practicing anathema of religion, centered on their
worship of a deity with the same name as a Satanic
figure in Muslim theology.117
The Yezidi belief system draws from both Islam and
Christianity, with a central deity being an archangel
most closely resembling a peacock. English-language
literature on the group is limited, made rarer by the
insecurity for researchers during the Ba’ath-era in Iraq
and which continued, if not increased, after the fall of
the regime. Apparent heretical practices represented
apostasy and in the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet,
heretics can be punished with death for abandoning
their religion. In 2007, the Islamic State of Iraq issued
a fatwa for the killing of all Yezidis, which accelerated
a refugee crisis. By October 2007, it was estimated that
70,000 Yezidis had left the country.118 The majority of
these were from the cities, leaving many in remote
regions of Nineveh still exposed.
In this period of intense population movement
centered on identity, Clark was a social scientist researching the Sinjar during 2008. Kurds were pressing
for autonomous regions in the north, but the boundary lines were disputed by the Iraqi government, and
tense diplomatic negotiations were exacerbated by
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the presence of oil in the region of Mosul. The Yezidis
straddled the Sinjar mountain range, a single ridge,
which, according to another social scientist working
in the area, was “basically in the zone of conflict of
where that line was going to go if they had autonomy
and therefore control the oil revenues.”119 Therefore,
there was a question regarding the identity of the
Yezidis about their inclusion in Iraqi or Kurdish territory and which may have had implications for oil
resource allocation. While studying the issue, Clark
understood that there was friction in the area, without
comprehending the particular granularity, an absence
of understanding compounded by the lack of military
presence in the Sinjar range.
Clark immediately focused on Sinjar, attaching
to convoys which were conducting stabilization missions in the Yezidi area, allowing the team to conduct
interviews in towns where the demarcation was under dispute. Through interviews, a picture emerged
of the Yezidis pressured by both the Kurds and Iraqi
local political structure, which included economic incentives (payment to improve schools and infrastructure) but also coercion through violence in instances,
explaining, at least in part, the victimization of the
Yezidis during this period.
The Yezidis are clan-oriented and thus insular,
rarely marrying outside of their culture, making them
an easy, identifiable, and homogeneous group to target. To protect themselves, the Yezidis set up checkpoints around the towns, but physical coercion from
both Iraqis and Kurds meant that other military forces
were in the area; most particularly the Iraqi Army,
Kurdish peshmurga, and other paramilitary groups.
Research allowed the social scientists to tease apart the
details of that conflict. From that research, the Marines
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deployed additional presence there and may have
been responsible for a reduction in violence.120
The pace of population change meant that products produced by HTTs were often relics in the sense
that the maps or other types of qualitative data captured spoke of a moment in the trajectory of the region which was already in the past. Back-filled team
members would often have to conduct research on
areas which had already been mapped previously, in
order to understand the character of the changed societal environment. In Paktika, Afghanistan, one social
scientist’s early study was undertaken at the behest of
a team leader, to have each district of Paktika province mapped at the socio-economic level, to include
information on agriculture and urban settlements.
On September 14, 2008, AF2 had requested from the
Research Reachback Center a comparison of Iraqi and
Afghan tribal structures, because the team had noted
that many military units in Afghanistan were trying
to transpose Iraqi cultures and tribes into the new AO.
The report included a detailed social network analysis
of tribal presence in Paktika’s government.
This report drew on seminal research conducted
by HTTs, including Michael Bhatia with AF1, but
was confined to 2007. This 2007 research had been
catalyzed and facilitated by Operations ATTAL and
SHAM SHAD in the last 2 months of the year, where
convoy support allowed the teams to interview the
population to map the terrain. In addition, another
team member in AF1, Audrey Roberts, based at Forward Operating Base Salerno had contributed to preliminary research and integrated that into the much
broader area of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika combined,
which was the area of operation for the 4th BCT of the
101st Airborne Division.
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The rate of change coupled to the large area under
the geographical remit of the team meant that there
was continual need for further investigation, often of
the same issues. It was the role of the HTT to plug
the sociocultural capability gap by repairing holes
in military understanding, making abstract complex
concepts comprehensible, and integrating information into actionable planning scenarios. A later social
scientist in Paktika assessing the needs of the military
customer observed broadly the central role of irrigation in the agricultural system. Integrating understanding of the complex role of irrigation in exacerbating situational insecurity was one of the many roles of
the HTT. The military staff at that point understood
that “water is a very complicated concept” but lacked
the tools to explore the issue further and concentrated
on other more tangible and understandable aspects of
the operating environment.121
As the research proceeded, it emerged that the societal structure for co-managing resources had broken
down as a result of chronic conflict in the area, and
there were no longer governance mechanisms for resource allocation. Government and tribal leaders had
been killed, and the small underground well system
(kariz) had been damaged by both physical movement
and ordnance. In addition, ad hoc well digging, to offset the problem, had exacerbated the scope of the issue by lowering the water table, making the kariz less
functional. Interviews with stakeholders on the canal,
principally agriculturalists, allowed the social scientist to brief the military and the Department of State,
who had previously been apathetic toward regulation
of the kariz, seeing it as a problem principally for the
local population, with minimal impact on livelihoods.
After this research, the Department of State could
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increase water management projects to improve agriculture and give greater chances of employment for
the vulnerable male population who could join the
insurgencies.122
Granularity was as relevant in this instance for
the Department of State as for the principal customer,
which was the military unit. This shows the absence
of deep sociocultural research across all components
of the U.S. Government in conflict zones. While overall, the social scientist knew that the primary customer
was the unit in which they were embedded, and that,
if the customer was not satisfied, they could “go home
now,” their embedded team also stressed the need to
network extensively with all organizations in the theater of operations.123 Networking was necessary because of the entrenched stove-piping of organizations:
United States Agency for International Development,
Department of State, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Forces, Marines, and Army are stovepipe systems; groups which have the potential to share
data with each other but choose not to do so. Despite
different systems being located on the same base, even
in the same building, even in the same room, “they
are not sharing their information at the level of fidelity
that needs to happen in order to say ‘so what?’”124
As a broad example of the problem, there is intelligence and information collation required to assess the
impact of IED events in an area. If one intelligence cell
is collating IED events while another cell is calculating
the number of cars crossing roads into the area, unless some entity in the unit is pooling the information,
it is largely irrelevant individually. Systems, such as
Intellipedia and the Tactical Ground Reporting System, serve to collate information at the ground level,
but, in practice, there is nobody designated to pool
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the data in order to aggregate it into information of
value. These disconnected pools of data and knowledge made the research process of embedded social
scientists more arduous. Lack of sharing is a common
theme in the recollections of social scientists; between
armed service components; and between units, cells,
and individuals. As such, in order to show value, the
social scientists would share team products with any
pertinent organizations with presence in the AO.125
Granular investigation at the local level had a
number of customers who were more receptive to
such findings than the military unit in which teams
were embedded. As well as the Department of State,
HTTs often worked with PRTs in Afghanistan. The
creation of the PRTs centralized the role of development organizations in Afghanistan. HTTs could often
engage in collaborative research processes, such as
that outlined by an HTT member embedded in Ghazni in 2010. At that time, because of the physical scope
of the AO, there were multiple districts for which the
Research Reachback Center possessed no written material, because no one had been there to write reports
previously. The team could use secondary source material—reports written by NGOs and historical documents such as academic articles—but contemporary
knowledge of the region did not exist. The first mission of the HTT located there partnered with the PRT
in that the governor had residence in the center of the
district but would sometimes stay in his home village
on the border of an area experiencing violent instability. Effective stabilization operations would require
comprehension of these districts as yet unknown;
the HTT leased vehicles from the Afghan Police and
engaged in ad hoc reporting.

284

The area of the district was prohibitive to deep
analysis, being about half the size of Rhode Island, but
the team tried to cover as much as possible in 2 days
before returning to the district center.126 This research
was conducted during the September 2010 parliamentary elections; fortuitous as the team analyzed the
campaign posters in each village, as a proxy for identifying which candidates could mobilize people and
possessed resources. This investigation highlighted
key individuals, many of them already known from
previous research done before the team deployed.
During the 2-day investigation, the team identified a dam which was cracking, requiring reinforcement. In order to start this process, the team returned
to the district center and organized a key leader engagement with the governor. Earlier networking from
team members who had been in the HTS for several
years facilitated subsequent leveraging of resources
required from the PRT. The team met with a local
business leader in order to glean a history of the dam
project, and a personal history of the individual, and:
that was one of those moments where you realize,
‘Yes, this is so different. This is so different from anything I will have ever been taught as an intelligence
officer, that I ever would have been capable of doing,
this is valuable, this is important on so many levels,
God I wish we could do this more often’.127

During the talks, the Afghan related that he had
heard of significant flooding in a remote area of the
district that the team had not visited, and that those
floods were having a significant humanitarian impact.
Identification of this secondary, deep problem led to
a change of mission, in which the team was broken
into two groups, with one group of the HTT taking
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unarmored civilian vehicles into the mountains, with
the governor, a driver, and a small private security detachment, and an engineer. This group examined the
impact of the floods from a humanitarian perspective.
Resources were going to Pakistan to respond to the
floods there, meaning that the United States had no
presence in this area, highlighting that:
not only do we ignore the people that are in need to
some degree because of national interests, which are
often driven by the fact that people are trying to blow
us up, but our inability to direct assets to areas—to
be informed—was shocking. No one knew that there
were tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of people
in these upper valley areas whose lives—who were
already living on the edge—but their lifestyles had
been decimated, simply because no assets were ever
applied there. And it points to a failing of the military
intelligence process as well as its capacity. If it is not
deliberately looking for something, it will never see
it. And it simply does not look for things like this humanitarian crisis that was going on.128

Identification of the unfolding crisis meant that the
HTT coordinated with the World Food Program for
the delivery of food aid delivered to that district.
During that period of research, the HTT also visited archaeological sites to attempt to catalogue archaeological theft; they had a Polish archaeologist embedded with the Polish PRT. Archaeological theft was
a major source of funding for insurgencies and criminality, though poorly understood by people on the
ground and to date in literature: “the military simply
overlooks it, because they don’t look for it, they don’t
understand how it works and they don’t respond to
it.”129 In this area of low operational tempo, when
there is not day-in and day-out fighting, civil-military
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partnerships can make a difference and meaningfully
impact societies outside of incredibly violent insurgencies and general warfare.130
This is at the heart of the HTS. Meaningful impacts
on societies can be made when there is low operational tempo. What would it take? While there is joint
planning at the strategic level, this joint execution on
the ground in countries would require a complete reconceptualization of the conduct of foreign policy and
“some very powerful things would come from it.”131
The U.S. military enterprise has been engaged in a
de facto stabilization project since the demise of the
Soviet Union. It, however, has been slow to acknowledge that fact or understand how to develop a posture
which is optimized for stabilization. While the HTS
was a small program, the lessons from it are that civilmilitary partnerships which stabilize societies in areas
of low operational tempo are possible.
Where violence enforced displacement, HTTs were
the obvious tool for assessing the novel societal structures, allowing the decoding of both urban and rural
environments. This was a common theme across Iraq
and Afghanistan; for example, while embedded with
a Danish battalion, Evans conducted research on Gereshk, the second largest city in Helmand and poorly
understood at the time, which stood out as being particularly valuable to the Danish military structure in
which he was embedded. Interviews with various
members of the city afforded analysis of the societal
structure of the city: From those initial conversations,
it was deduced that the urban framework was composed of a number of villages which had bled into
each other. Each neighborhood had a malik, such that
understanding this, it became possible to understand
the different populations within the city, geographi-
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cally, and their adherence to each malik. The boundaries also aided understanding:
the fluid nature of what was going on in the city, in
terms of who was moving and who was moving out,
and understanding the influence of poppy networks
and the narcotics trade on the city, and how the politics of the mujahideen era were still very much relevant to what was happening to current day power
struggles in the city.132

Fluidity of urban population patterns catalyzed
by conflict required and still requires comprehension. The absence of deep knowledge of urban centers
was not limited to Gereshk; it is a constant of conflict.
Krohley noted the requirement for knowledge of the
urban planning history of Baghdad proved critical
to understanding insurgency activity; Pavlovic notes
that “in a period of 10 years, Kabul grew from about
one million, to over five million people; knowing
where ethnic boundaries are and how they fit into
the stability and security and development was very
important to us.”133 War occasions the redrawing of
national, regional, and local boundaries, both formal
and informal, and the understanding of transformed
demographics requires comprehension which recurs
in interviews with social scientists that embedded and
attempted to decode the alien human terrain.
Deciphering of the social environment on the
ground was of a modality characterized by reporting
rather than ethnography. Evans explains that the standard mode through which the team members gained
access to the population was to walk through villages
and fields and enter into conversation:
there was no sophisticated sampling method, the environment didn’t allow for that. We would up and talk
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to people, sit down and have a conversation. I would
know what data points I wanted to get to and I would
try to structure a conversation around that.134

While the population was mostly receptive to the
team members, Evans sort of “got a sense about when
they were holding back about sensitive security issues; that wasn’t most of what we were asking about
so that was not a big issue.”135 The population was
not receptive to the team members if there had been a
security issue, which highlights that, with increasing
insecurity for incumbent forces, there is an inversely
proportional relationship to the fidelity of the data
acquired.
Perhaps more than Iraq, Afghanistan presented
a series of granular differences: Languages, dialects,
and heterogeneity of cultures and identities rendered
the human terrain particularly opaque. Ghazni alone
had over a thousand villages, each with its own structure of leadership. Blanket generalizations would obscure granular nuance, but that nuance would obscure
effective blanket planning. In the midst of this paradox, many effective research projects in Afghanistan
were conducted at the atomic level of the village, as
explained by one social scientist who worked with
SOF in volatile areas where there was an emphasis on
establishing the ALP.
The ALP had been created as a stop-gap measure
in 2010 to hold security at the level of the village long
enough to give the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
ANP time to build up capabilities and expand into
that area; the U.S. elements of the program were coordinated by the Combined Forces Special Operations
Component Command—Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union had tried similar programs, as had the Inter-
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national Security Assistance Force previously, but all
programs eventually failed, with varying degrees of
interim success.136
The ALP had the most high profile of several
pseudo-militias created by the International Security
Assistance Force where the official Afghan National
Security Forces were unlikely to permeate for some
time. By the middle of 2012, the force was 13,000 in
number, with plans to increase to 30,000 by the end of
2014. That surge of ALP is similar to the effort of the
Soviets who had raised militias based on the Afghan
tribal system to stabilize the country to the extent that
they could conduct a phased withdrawal. After the
U.S.-led invasion, pseudo-militias such as the Afghan
Auxiliary Police, the Afghan Public Protection Program, and the Community Defense Initiative had all
been attempted in the regions now occupied by the
ALP but Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Senior Fellow with
the Brookings Institution indicates that the outcomes
of these militias was “cumulatively negative.”137 Given
the historical legacy of failure, the social scientist was
tasked with examining what was happening in the
communities where the ALP was being established;
what had happened to it and its history according to
academic papers, military histories, and the memories
of the local people.
The project conducted by the social scientist was
necessary because, given the historical legacy of similar programs, if there were no nuanced corrections
offered, then the ALP project was set up for failure before it had commenced.138 The research was from both
secondary (existing literature on previous analogical
programs) and primary sources; understanding what
the locals remembered of the previous programs. This
research was undertaken in combination with analy-
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sis of factors in the villages that would cause them to
support the ALP and, conversely, factors which might
lead to loss of support for the police, as well as examining what was said regarding alleged abuses committed by the police and other security forces.
ACTIONABLE AND INFORMATIVE
Research was only the raw dimensions of the work
of embedded social scientists. The research needed
to be packaged into a project which was comprehensible and thus actionable. Teams were undoubtedly
hampered in their efforts by this lag within the military enterprise in sociological knowledge, and, as a
consequence, fell back on rigid frameworks such as
ASCOPE and PMESII. Given the flexibility of the successful social scientists, however, I ask exactly how
the HTTs produced their research and what effect this
research had on the BCT staffs. HTT products:
are developed through analysing and synthesizing
human terrain data gathered in the field and through
debriefs/interviews. Products are the documentation
of the team’s human terrain knowledge of specific topics that are of particular concern to the unit, or should
be. Together with input to working groups, this is the
primary input to the human terrain team portion of
the commander’s Common Operating Picture.139

An Institute for Defense Analyses study on the
HTS observed that human society:
does not yield to the same type of empirical methods
as experimentation that is common in the physical
and biological sciences. There is no way to quickly
measure changes that take effect over a generation—
researchers just don’t live that long.140
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The onus was on the social scientists to conduct
research which would then be of value to the commander, rather than having the character of their studies dictated by the commander. Because of the low
priority of embedded teams until they proved their
worth, they would often have to use transport assets
that were used for missions other than their own, and
would have to conduct research which fit around the
tactical tempo. From that point onward, there was no
research plan; no doctrine; no template for fieldwork.
Instead, it is called a mission statement “in the corporate sense”: go out and be useful, socioculturally:
“You know, what the hell does that mean?” Even
though procedures and guidelines were incrementally
developed by program management, “there were not
a set of procedures and guidelines that would have fit
every particular experience, you know every type of
place that was encountered.”141
What did social science research in the conflict
zone look like? Krohley gives insight into the initial
stage of the process:
to build a rapport with the soldiers—you want to get
out and talk to as many of them as possible, particularly those who have been there a long time, to get their
perceptions, their thoughts on what is happening, because that is actually the base line for everything.142

The methodology was to visit the joint security
stations and combat outposts and the forward operating bases to conduct interviews, spending 2 to 3 days
there attending ongoing missions, enabling a constant
stream of ad hoc interviews with Iraqis. This broad
introduction was focused on assessing the tone and
lasted for the first 6 weeks. A core limiting factor was
the logistics:
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The work itself could have been done in three weeks,
but you can’t always get from one place to the next,
you know. That was the biggest operational challenge
throughout—it wasn’t getting the Iraqis to talk to you,
it wasn’t finding the right missions to go out on, it was
actually getting to the facility you needed to get to in
order to get out on the mission that was happening the
next day.143

The team integrated into existing convoys, rather
than attempting to gain their own car service or private security detachment. Integrating into the military
structure was important in order to gain acceptance
which would optimize the relationship and facilitate
research opportunities. As Krohley explains:
for every other hour of the day we weren’t doing human terrain work, we would try and contribute, to be
soldiers basically. I think that worked very well for us,
in terms of the buy-in we got from the Army, people
liked us, people liked having us around, we weren’t a
burden that needed to be looked after.144

Initial research conducted by social scientists often
simply was broad survey work. This was necessary
because team members arrived in the areas of operation with a baseline of knowledge limited to secondary sources and information provided by the Research
Reachback Center prior to departure for the relevant
theater. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, this departure
from a baseline of knowledge to more valuable information was often made in the same manner. As one
social scientist embedded in Afghanistan explains,
acute insecurity for coalition forces outside the base—
a flare in violence—confined the team to interviewing Afghan nationals that were working on the same
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forward operating base for the first 3 weeks after the
individual embedded.
This survey was comprised of 20-30 interviews to
get a better understanding of what respondents’ attitudes and perceptions were toward the people that
were there, but also toward “fear,” “threats,” “insults.”145 Questions asked were: “When was the last
time you felt threatened?” and “Can you describe it?”
The team transcribed each interview and coded it by
the frequency of the words that were being used. This
was a rudimentary approach, but allowed the construction of a product which could highlight common
themes such as how the local nationals perceived the
coalition forces operating there. This allowed comprehension of the perception of how the Afghans were being treated by the military forces; answers placed into
the categories “‘good,” “bad,” “neutral,” “mixed.”
This in turn facilitated the commander’s understanding of how he could engender better relationships with
the population. The scope of the survey also assessed
perceptions of the Taliban, criminal networks, the extent to which they felt threatened by each, and how
the population dealt with grievances. That product
was presented, with an executive summary and recommendations, as a PowerPoint presentation “which
was a pretty common way of delivering that sort of
stuff, to the battalion commander.”146 Ultimately, of
that particular product, the executive officer “was not
too receptive of it” because:
a lot of it was quite critical of how they (the Afghan
population) were being treated, disrespected, those
types of things. The battalion commander saw the
utility of it; the XO [executive officer] was providing
justification as to why they were wrong, which was
certainly kind of troubling.147
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Such was the broad, diffuse forum of sociocultural
knowledge and sociocultural concerns that myriad research methodologies could be developed by teams in
Iraq and Afghanistan. For Evans, while every product
was different, he made a conscious decision to examine
thematic issues developed through interviews, some
recorded with audio equipment, others documented
by note-taking before returning to base to produce the
reports. Evans’ team designed interview grids listing
a person’s name and basic demographic data, such as
occupation, gender, age bracket, tribe, grid location,
and birthplace, and interviewed each on a variety of
topics from agriculture to politics. In the product, that
data would be in the appendix of the report so that the
customers could check the provenance of the information. This transparency was noted as being useful
from at least one customer of the HTT products.148
The depth of material offered in the report offered
the chance to check the HTT homework, basically so
that the military was not under the illusion that the
team was “just using social science as sorcery.”149 The
British brigade was structured differently than U.S.
brigades, with staff groupings under the command of
lieutenant colonels designated SO1s. Evans’ team was
situated within the intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, reconnaissance (ISTAR) group. The
J-2, the intelligence cell, was embedded within that,
because they own what the British call the “understand function” and the HTT was tasked with comprehension of the population, situated there but not
integrated into the personnel structures tasked with
targeting insurgents.150 Moreover, targeting cells were
in a compound that the HTT lacked clearance for,
despite being situated in the same command structure,
but the team did develop close relations with some of
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the groups, including Psychological Operations and
reported up through that ISTAR unit. The first tier
above was the J-2 cell, to which the report would go
for review and then subsequently brigade-wide release. During the period that Evans was embedded
with Task Force Helmand, he was with two different
British brigades, each functioning differently; with
the first brigade there could be a brief to the brigadier
from the team leader. In the second brigade, with the
Royal Marines, there was a more open communication system, in which the embedded could communicate more directly to the chief of staff, the brigadier,
and the colonels.151
The first several reports conducted were for different battalions, five in total in the AO. In order to
assume relevance, the HTT visited each battle group,
stating broadly:
Here are our capabilities, here is what we can do, here
is what we can offer. What do you want to know about
the population in your Area of Operations?” And we
would look at the CCIRs, which are the Commander’s
Critical Information Requirements and PIRs, Priority
Information Requirements, basically their intelligence
gaps, what they wanted to know about their AO. And
we would look at the ones that had to do with the
population. And we would say, “according to your records you wanted to know this, is there anything else
you wanted to communicate to me?”152

From this identified gap in the brigade knowledge
architecture, it was possible to construct a research
design. The HTT went into the British systems to examine the institutional information they had collated
regarding the AO, and incorporated that information
as background into the research design. With objec-
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tives and resources required, this request was sent to
the battle group for approval and, at this point, the
battle group could modify the design if required. As
Evans explains:
that was already a product in and of itself; it was basically a literature review. And then we would go out
and execute it in the field; anywhere from a few days
to 2 weeks; foot and vehicle patrols where we would
conduct semi-structured interviews.153

To expand the baseline of knowledge, HTTs would
often out of pragmatic necessity conduct surveys as
a way to capture a wide range of opinions in a structured manner. HTT IZ9 conducted deep research in
2008, generating one of the first products in which its
team was engaged, based around a survey of the Sons
of Iraq, the bureaucratic embodiment of the Anbar
Awakening which spread through the Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq. The Sons of Iraq was a local community policing initiative paid for by the U.S. military
and credited with ushering in stability to al-Anbar
and subsequently the rest of Iraq.154 Because of the
militia character of the force, the Sons of Iraq, led by
tribal sheikhs, endured a frictional relationship with
the Iraqi government. The government, however, was
in the process of assuming responsibility for the Sons
of Iraq program as part of ongoing integration. The
purpose of the survey was to identify their expectations for post-insurgency employment; to ascertain if
they were going to be transitioned successfully from
militia into the police force or other fields of work. The
research was carried out from September 14, 2008, to
October 25, 2008, and consisted of 503 interviews carried out in Salah al-Din province and examined the
character of the transition of the Sons of Iraq into the
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elected government. Survey data was recorded at Sons
of Iraq checkpoints and salary payment locations, with
approximately 100 interviews in five different sections
of the BCT’s AO, and of the 503 people interviewed,
471 were Sunni.
The research was conducted because the brigade
was attempting to transition nearly 3,000 Sons of Iraq
from the militia structure into the Iraqi Police. It was
thus invaluable that IZ9 work through social science
research methods to understand what would happen
to the Sons of Iraq that were not integrated into the police force, because there was an assumption that those
not transitioned would accept more menial work,
rather than take up arms against U.S. forces. Followup research was conducted in and around Samarra
from December 12 to 16, 2008. The research analysis
concluded that the programs offering employment to
the Sons of Iraq were imperfect, and some individuals had unrealistic expectations of the positions they
could attain because of the Iraqi government’s position on reintegrating such individuals. There was a
likelihood that a minority for which it was an issue
would return to criminal activity or the ongoing multifaceted insurgency if the program was completely
stood down.155 This transition was of primary import
to the military customer, and this research proved the
value of an HTT in that area. Indicative of the extent of
the Sons of Iraq issue, IZ11 also examined the implications of the transition.
The frequency of products was dictated by the frequency of missions. As one team member embedded
with U.S. brigades noted, each product from every
mission would be emailed out to personnel in the unit
as well as posted to SharePoint. Research considered of
pertinence to a wider audience would be entered into
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the Combined Information Data Network Exchange
database. Echoing other units whose expertise grew
over time, as the tour ended, there was the ability to
write major reports, summaries of everything undertaken and achieved, and what was then known about
the area. Such was the knowledge gained by the last
months of the embedded tour that the content of interviews done previously were then linked to broader
themes which were trying to be addressed in these
major reports; these were again emailed and added to
the SharePoint. As well as this, networking was crucial to ensure the dispersion of the product, such that 2
hours a day were spent walking the base, networking:
“Although it was time consuming, it was the way you
know it was going to get used.”156 The team member
applied a grounded theory approach, using a by-area
breakdown of selected sampling based on a stratification of who they believed was in the area, to try and
identify key themes and, from that, build a better picture of the human terrain: “a quasi-anthropological approach.”157 Because of the limitations of logistics, this
approach was “driven sampling-wise more by targets
of opportunity rather than targets of choice in a lot of
cases.”158 Largely obscured from existing literature are
the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan at both
the national and local levels. For instance, in Afghanistan, the same team member found that surveys were
unrealistic because there was no way to get access to
the sampling size necessary with reliable sampling to
do a survey approach.
There were also discrepancies in research dictated
by the character of the unit in which the social scientist
embedded. Products generated for conventional units
were often of a better quality than those produced
for SOF because of the greater resources available in
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the former, more downtime and greater connectivity
with information technology. With the regular unit,
a product could be produced every 3 weeks while
with the SOF team, there would be blending of previously produced products into “teaching lessons” to
give them a better understanding of the human terrain.159 The delivery with SOF was, in one account in
Afghanistan, in the form of “fireside chats” given once
or twice a week to afford the SOF personnel information on the regional or district issues concerning them
and their operations. This could include a breakdown
of mosque structure, and key players and important
people in the population. Much of this knowledge
was drawn from previous research conducted when
the social scientist had previously embedded with a
conventional unit.
The social scientist identified one problem describing a nomadic people who were removed from the
village structure in which they were located. The misnomer for them prevalent among the SOF was kochi;
which described a large, pre-existing group of mostly
ethnically Pashtun nomads. The social scientist, in interviewing them as part of extended research, realized
that these people were not nomadic kochi, which was
in fact used in a derogatory sense, rather they were
recently internally displaced peoples. Writing this research up as a product generated valuable information
on the chain of events that led to their displacement,
including landownership issues and blood feuds.160
To be of value, the products had to be tailored to
the client’s requirements. For the military customer, brevity of content and speed of delivery were of
critical importance. One social scientist describes a
detailed report which was produced prior to
Operation MOSHTARAK. The research had entailed:
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trying to get the atmospherics without being there, so
we did a lot of atmospherics on reports, and we went
to Lashkar Gah, and we tried to interview people
there, and we interviewed actual Afghans who had
supposedly interacted with the players there.161

The report was considered of value from the perspective of the HTT because there were missteps in
the planning which were highlighted in the report;
but ultimately for the customer “in the end, it was too
long.”162 Generating and presenting valuable products
on sociocultural analysis absent detailed oversight
from the command structure involved a degree of entrepreneurial ability. The HTTs were given “task and
purpose”—these were not orders, rather it was a description of a requirement on which to focus, “and the
military had no expectation on what we would do or
what we were going to give them and how, so we had
to figure that out on the fly as well.”163
The products themselves could be differentiated
precisely into two types. The products were unclassified, but their delivery and presentation in the duration
of Krohley’s deployment were on classified networks,
mainly SIPRNet. The first type of product was neighborhood profiles, necessary because of the absence of
knowledge of existing demographics (see Appendix
M). There was a first version of these profiles which
would be mainly for internal consumption, analysis
of all the different neighborhoods within Tissa Nissan.
These were not shared widely—because it was what
the military already knew—and were checked with a
number of people in the military and the brigade specifically in order to gain “affirmation effectively” that
the teams “were on the right track.”164 Demonstrating
how knowledge could increase over time, at the end
of the deployment, Krohley:
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rewrote those neighbourhood profiles to become 7- to8-page narratives with maps and pictures, and they
were meant to be a legacy document. So the brigade
that we had supported left right around the time I left,
I think the end of 2008.165

These legacy documents allowed the incoming brigade to gain understanding of the neighborhood in a
brief, accessible 6- to 8-page document.
Legacy documents were unclassified and did not
name individuals in militias or among the general
population. These documents, however, did identify
government officials, analyzing some of the complexities of those persons: “Public figures are fair game for
an unclass(ified) paper, and we weren’t making wild
allegations, we were just talking about reality.”166
Through the tour, the social scientist conducted a
series of briefings, both for brigade staff and for the
brigade commanders. It was unnecessary to brief at
the company level because this was the level at which
they were embedded day-to-day, and therefore talked through the material informally on a daily basis.
The second type of product was thematic, produced
across the duration of the tour—1-, or at most 2-page
write-ups of a particular issue which had relevance to
the broad problems seen in the district (see Appendix
O). In the thematic products, it was possible to identify and disentangle complex trajectories of issues not
readily seen as relevant to the security situation. For
example, in the familiar vein of urban planning, there
was an investigation of the creation of eastern Baghdad, which became an assessment of city demographics. Rather than growing organically, it evolved as a
series of planned communities, grouped around identities and organized by the state, entirely by profes302

sions, meaning that pronounced demographic divides
were evident from one neighborhood to the next. This
result of urban planning resulted in heterogeneous
levels of violence across the neighborhoods as well as
radically divergent social atmospheres.167
This product was the first piece of research presented at the staff level and won goodwill, affording
understanding of why there was such variance in
violence, discrete by neighborhood. Previous Army
understanding of the neighborhoods in eastern Baghdad had characterized them simply as mixed. Other
thematic products considered the Sadr family and the
Sadrist ideology. There was a concerted effort in the
military to look at Iraq as a tribal place; “tribalism”
became fashionable in the wake of the Anbar Awakening and the evident successes that were witnessed
in western Iraq, where according to the dominant narrative, the U.S. military worked through local tribal
groups to turn the tide against al-Qaeda in Iraq, turning the locals away from the foreigners.
If there was any paradigm in the COIN mode
dominant in Iraq and later Afghanistan during the
period, it was the perceived need to work with the
tribes in order to restore stability. This tribal paradigm
evolved because of the apparent success of U.S.-sponsored sheikhs in countering complex insurgencies. As
Krohley notes:
The extent to which that (the Anbar Awakening narrative) is true, I don’t know, but what came out of that
effectively was standing orders for everyone in the
U.S. Army to go and find the local tribal sheikh and
work with them.168

That modeling of the environment as a tribal system
had severe limitations, however, and broke down in
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several geographical sites. In Tissa Nissan, for example, there was no evident tribalism, no sheikh, which
was symptomatic of why the U.S. forces were experiencing such problems. Civil society had unraveled;
degraded by migration and movement and by Saddam Hussein’s government of the area in which he
had killed or co-opted key communal leaders.169
Krohley thus pushed back against the tribal lens
and briefed two papers which attempted to make the
Army understand what the community looked like,
what had happened to tribes in eastern Baghdad, and
their broad interactions over the past 4 to 5 years and
also the longer trajectory of the past 50 years. These
products “were tricky to write and tricky to brief because you don’t want to go too academic, but at the
same time these are very smart guys you are talking
to; you cannot dumb down.”170 Presentations had to
be tailored to the venue, and briefers usually would be
afforded 5 minutes (pushed to 7 minutes by the team)
at the nightly shift change briefings with the brigade
commander and senior staff sitting in the operations
center. There would be an audience of 50 people and
perhaps seven or eight cared about the research; senior
operational commanders, intelligence personnel, and
civil affairs personnel. A 1-page narrative was placed
in the brigade server for download, and a PowerPoint
presentation which would be a maximum of five slides
focused on the core issues (see Appendix P). After the
presentation, questions would be taken, and then the
presenter, usually the team leader, departed, with a
target of one such presentation at the night briefing
every 2 weeks.171
War is entropic; armed conflict increases the disorder of a dynamic system. As such, the problems in
identifying the urban plan were exacerbated by the
post-invasion movements, where people scattered
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to avoid communal violence. There remained cohesive elements in Iraq which were identified, such as
the tribal sheikhs that led the Anbar Awakening. At
worst, however, in the cities, there were no obvious
authority figures. Moreover, because of the culture of
largesse propagated by profligate coalition forces in
the “anything goes” atmosphere of that period, the
monies led to various figures identifying themselves
dubiously as key leaders at this time. Each area was
sui generis, possessing its own possibilities for leader
engagement.
Because Krohley had rejected the tribal model as
irrelevant to his AO, it posed a critical problem. There
was minimal social order in any of these neighborhoods that anyone could tap into: “you had a sort of
chaos where no one is really in charge and there isn’t
anyone obvious to work with, and it was a major issue
in our work, why this one district wasn’t responding
to treatment.”172 On the one hand, it had heavy militia
activity by virtue of demographics—it had been left
after the violence an overwhelmingly poor Shia area,
so it was naturally receptive to the security offered
by the Mahdi Army. There was excellent connectivity through highways to Iran and to Baqubah in the
north, so it was very easy to get explosively formed
penetrators and militants in and out of the area. Unlike Sadr City which had the same connectivity, there
were Americans to kill in Tissa Nissan.
An upsurge in violence in March 2008 in Sadr City,
including rockets fired on coalition forces’ positions,
had been met with a response from U.S. forces and
implementation of a wall building operation in the
southern quarter of Sadr City. A ceasefire on May 11
crystallized a May 12 agreement under which U.S.
forces would have a presence limited to a southern
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quadrant of Sadr City, defined by the erected wall. As
a result of that agreement, there were no U.S. forces
in the northern section of Sadr City and, as a consequence, violent attacks migrated to Tissa Nissan because insurgents from Sadr City could travel to the
area, erect an explosively formed penetrator array
and leave.
Because of the absence of civil society in Tissa Nissan, winning over the population in order to detract
from the insurgency was problematic. Krohley and his
team elucidated the chaotic political structure through
conversations which were:
quite mundane and quite simple, talking about community and family, you know: where do you come
from? How did you get here? Who are your neighbours?—not who are your neighbours by name—
you know, talk to me about your neighbourhood
effectively.173

Reporting in this environment using key interviews led the team to ascertain that the high level of
physical insecurity meant families were taking cover
in their houses, which reduced the level and function
of civil society. As a corollary, there were no obvious
community leaders to engage with for the purposes
of COIN, or indeed conversely for the Jaysh al-Mahdi
to rally a substantive, grass roots campaign. This was
the essence of the effective social scientist in the HTT;
qualitative analysis through operationally relevant reporting at the company level such that:
a very simple series of sitting-in-the-living-room 10
minute conversations with people, eventually built
into a substantive insight into why certain things
were happening. And you could piece all these things
together over time based on a lot of data.
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Instructively, Krohley also notes the spectrum of approaches possible, based on the security of the AO:
It goes back to the contrasting approaches I guess, if
you are going to be in a more stable area where there
are lots of sources you can repeatedly meet with and
develop, you can get a depth of information, but that
is not achievable in areas of greater insecurity. Instead
of having four or five really good sources, you have
70 or 80 or 100 short-term encounters with people,
who you weren’t going to follow-up with and whose
names you didn’t know and who were protected by
anonymity in their encounters with you. And that
works; frankly, I think that works pretty well.174

Insecurity for incumbent forces on the ground affecting the ability to report effectively suggests that
there were limitations in the field which transformed
ethnography into reporting.
CONCLUSIONS
Research was conducted in order to be valuable
to the customer, but identification of the particular
modes of investigation and subjects of study were the
preserve of the HTTs themselves. Methodologies varied by unit, emphatically when the variation was between general purpose and SOF, by place, and by circumstance. Insecurity, or security, meant employment
of different methods often based around the ability to
get convoy space. The products had to be created in
order to fit with the clarity of planning necessary to
the customer and, indeed, in harmony with the operational tempo of the unit in the AO.
The sociological requirements of the 2006 FM
Counterinsurgency entrusted a unique responsibility to
the HTTs. As the custodians of academic social science
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research skills and experience, they were tasked with
identifying the sociological dimensions of the battle
space. The particular requirements depended on the
needs of the commander, but in general, the HTT was
tasked with identifying cause or effect in the social domain. Krohley, for example, was tasked with finding
the cause of the effect that had left one district, Tissa
Nissan, extremely disordered and insecure, while the
two other districts were relatively calm. When understanding the causes for known effects were required,
this type of research facilitated social science expertise
which could test research against several hypotheses.
It was these complex causes and effects in disordered
societies in conflict zones which necessitated the introduction of HTTs. Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations both were encumbered of limitations on
their research abilities.
Beneath the remit of deciphering sociological
cause or effect, the product had to be attenuated to
the requirements of the operational tempo. In practice
that meant theoretical elements of the research were
omitted, and the conclusions were stated simply. If
the social scientist could not communicate properly
the research for the customer, this was the fault of the
social scientist, not the military staff. The product also
had to fit existing U.S. Department of the Army thinking. The Army is an adaptive enterprise, but the ability to learn current sociological expertise takes years,
requiring integration into the training of junior officers who then progress through the ranks.
The cause and effect research explains the remit
of the HTTs. The academic bridge to the military customer explains how the research was produced. The
“why” and the “how” have thus been investigated,
but it leaves us with a further problem. HTTs have
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delivered research which demonstrates their utility in
COIN environments, but after Iraq and Afghanistan,
the HTS parent organization, TRADOC, planned to
transition the program into a long-range strategic asset in areas where the incumbent exercises complete
or hegemonic control, and where, correspondingly,
there are relatively low levels of insurgent-initiated
violence. If the HTTs were successful in COIN operations, why is such a transition necessary?
The initial concept plan for the HTS included theoretical arrangement for a spectrum of operations in
areas where the incumbent exercises are full to negligible control of the environment. However, ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated focus
upon these operations characterized by high levels
of insurgent and incumbent violence.175 According to
TRADOC, when the HTS was developed, it was argued that the program’s greatest benefit was in the
conduct of theater security cooperation at the strategic
level, where attempts are made to avoid escalation and
where teams would work with combatant commands.
When tasked with developing an enduring concept,
therefore, TRADOC had to consider what a strategically postured program would look like, post-Iraq
and Afghanistan. There would be smaller numbers
of teams due to declining resources. But questions
also had to be answered about where those teams
most likely achieve the greatest benefit in both staff
planning but also the ability to deploy forward with
Regionally Aligned Forces.176
The U.S. Army Concept for Regionally Aligned
Forces calls for a division or a brigade or a corps in the
Army to be aligned regionally to a specific Army service component command. An HTS pilot took place in
2011 with support to U.S. Army elements in Africa.177
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Army forces were available to the theater security operation plans, which constituted the team oriented to
a strategic posture intended to influence long-range
planning rather than brigades at the tactical level. It
is in this strategic posture that TRADOC considered
the HTS:
could bring a maximum benefit of not just understanding our partners and how they operate and their
professionalism, but also providing further understanding of the operational environment where our
partners are operating.178

At the end of 2013, the HTS had pilots at four locations that were supporting Army commands for
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S.
Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command
(South America and Central America, absent Mexico)
at the strategic level. In that iteration of the HTS, social
scientists serve at the command and support the planning effort for long-range theater campaign planning.
If required, the social scientist could also deploy to the
field to support the collection of social science-type information to inform the combatant commander’s decisionmaking. To that end, TRADOC has focused on
recruiting social scientists with deep regional expertise, a requirement when fulfilling regional-alignment
requirements. TRADOC concedes that continent-wide
expertise is problematic but recruiting, for example,
French speakers, Swahili speakers, or Arabic speakers who have spent a lifetime studying that continent
as well as possessing social science expertise, fulfills
the mandate of the human capital element of the
combatant command concept plan.179

310

Environments where the incumbent exercises full
or near complete control with correspondingly high
levels of security for aligned forces were noted to be
those in which HTTs would be most effective, concluded the authors of the West Point study. In this ideal
landscape, teams “help prevent conflict while providing creative tools and ideas to the commander to help
build governmental capacity and legitimacy.”180 The
authors, with foresight, argued that placing a team
at the level of the combatant command level, while
violating the currently successful “bubble-up” methodology of HTS at the tactical level in a COIN environment, “would be more effective in this role and environment.”181 HTTs could still contribute at the lower
levels within Army service component commands
such as U.S. Army Africa, but they must be considered
primarily in locations such as U.S. embassies, working
with defense attachés and army attachés, only embedding with subsequent deploying ground elements if
required by the brigade.182
The perceived increased effect of teams at the strategic level means that their effects in COIN operations
were deemed to be of a lesser magnitude than the possible benefits to broader theater security. As a corollary
of this chapter, therefore, it is necessary to go beyond
assessment of the research remits and products. It is a
requirement that I examine the limitations of HTTs in
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The generic conflict zone is both a permissive and a limiting environment for social science research. Conflict legitimates
the presence of the social science researcher working
as part of the U.S. Department of the Army; it also
enables teams to gain convoy support because of the
frequency of convoys as part of ongoing operations.
Conflict makes a critical need to understand cause and
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effect in these operations, making the requirement for
teams to fill the sociocultural knowledge gap. At the
same time, there are inherent limitations in the ability
of a human to research society in inherently insecure
environments.
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CHAPTER 6
AT THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
Babaji, Central Helmand, had been under the
control of the Taliban in the winter of 2010, but company-level counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in
early-2011 had driven the Taliban from the region.
The area had been an insurgent stronghold, resisting a
significant combined Afghan and British offensive in
the summer of 2009. When the COIN initiative proved
successful in late-2010 despite other areas remaining insecure, the Human Terrain Team (HTT) social
scientist Ryan Evans was tasked by the 2 Scots commander with discovering why those company-level
COIN operations had been successful in Babaji over
the past 6 months. It was hoped as a consequence of
the research in and among the population that Evans
would “hit on some lessons or a model that could be
learned elsewhere.”1 Evans’ hypotheses to be tested
were three-fold: first, that operational-level COIN had
won hearts and minds; second, that COIN operations
had killed, detained, or driven out the insurgents; and
third, that COIN operations had changed the decisionmaking calculus of the population to side with the
Afghan National Security Forces and the British Task
Force. In the study, Evans conducted over 30 semistructured interviews with residents in Babaji.2 The
result was confirmation of the third hypothesis, that
the “main factor determining local behavior was the
population’s perception of who was in control of the
area, which drove their decision-making calculi more
than other variables.”3
Societies disordered by conflict require continued
assessment in order to understand the character of the
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change over time which has been catalyzed by physical insecurity. In more secure environments where
the incumbent exercises near full control, more permissive than Afghanistan or Iraq between 2007 and
2014, there is the opportunity for even deeper research
which does not just investigate cause but also anticipates effect. It is that ability to examine effect which
will allow the Human Terrain System (HTS) to influence planning at the strategic level. Societies must be
relatively ordered to do so. Given the Training and
Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) preferred application of HTTs to these pre-deployment environments
where the program would work at the broad level
of theater-wide security, I investigate limitations to
those teams that worked in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
draw on the experiences of social scientists in both
Iraq and Afghanistan to assess the problems encountered. I examine limitations in the field and problems
with developing institutional memory of the human
terrain. I investigate the dynamic between qualitative
and quantitative research in Iraq and Afghanistan,
with reference to the spatial turn in the social sciences.
LANGUAGE
When Montgomery McFate wrote eloquently upon
the anthropological dimensions of the British COIN
experience in Northern Ireland for her doctoral dissertation in 1994, she was considering a conflict in which
antagonists and population were united by a common
denominating language. Moreover, cultural variation between insurgent and counterinsurgent was
minimal. Two decades later, the differences in culture
and language which would confront United States
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were, by
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contrast, deeply problematic obstacles to overcome
in conducting operationally relevant research. Interpreters that accompanied the social scientists were a
necessity for conducting valuable research with the
population both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
HTTs travel with interpreters, employed independent to HTS but who are “nevertheless vital for successful interactions with the local population.”4 Evans
had undergone language training which made him
proficient at the basic level, but argued that he could
not have accomplished his qualitative research without his interpreter. The interpreter allowed him to hold
a sophisticated conversation. As the tour progressed,
his understanding of the languages encountered increased, but not so in his speaking, consequently, he
relied heavily on the interpreter dedicated to the embedded team. The interpreter for that team was native to the country and had been working with British
forces in Helmand for 4 years. While Evans observed
that many other interpreters were translating inaccurately, or would summarize too rapidly, he believed
that his own specialist, fluent in Dari and Pashto and
who fit the physical Army mold as he was in his early30s, was invaluable.
There was a pool of interpreters on every forward
operating base, and it “is sort of a mixed bag whether
you get a good one or a bad one—one who is just there
for the money.”5 In interviews, it was unanimously
observed that the quality of the interpreter helped to
define the quality of research in terms of what information could be leveraged from the population. Interpreters could also be used to refine social scientists’
research methodology. After the social scientist had
formulated a list of questions, the interpreter could
be asked about phraseology and formulation, and the
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questions could then be reconfigured according to the
feedback received.
The importance of the interpreter was common to
all teams. In Iraq, Jennifer Clark developed a robust
professional relationship with one of her interpreters. This enabled the interpreter to know what Clark
wanted from her research, the character of the research
problems, and the methodology she was employing.
Moreover, it allowed the interpreter to know Clark’s
ethical stance so that research could be conducted
appropriately. A second interpreter, female, allowed
greater access to Iraqi people in homes because of the
ability to talk openly without a foreign male presence,
and this atmosphere facilitated deeper information
gathering.
After conducting research which spanned both
Iraq and Afghanistan, one social scientist found that:
it is a myth that these cultures won’t talk to a women.
You have to have a good interpreter, but more so than
that, they are just eager to have a voice. They don’t
care what the venue is for that voice; they just want to
be heard.6

Clark notes a situation that arose where the women
in a village told her about smuggling operations; the
information was nonkinetic in nature, because they
learned that the reason for the smuggling was to earn
money (approximately U.S.$10 a day) to buy clothes
for villagers. According to Clark, this was a smuggling
culture which was rooted in history and not peculiar
to the post-invasion landscape.7 In lifting this information from the environment, the military gained greater
understanding of the illicit networks and the motivations behind peoples’ contributions.
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Interpreters were not included in the training rotation at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, so it was a “pick and
mix” for the HTTs when they were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. This had both positive and negative effects.
Positively, picking up an interpreter that has been in
the field for months, if not years, to then leverage gives
the HTT an expert in the dynamics of the local population.8 Negatively, it means the embedded team cannot
train with the interpreter to build up robust team relationships before entering the area in which the combat
brigade operates. Moreover, once embedded after the
brigade has already deployed and because they are
augments to units, the teams often found they were
given the interpreters nobody else wanted.9 Often,
the situation regarding interpreters was political in
character; as one social scientist explains: the military
had first choice, followed by the Department of State.
Even when interpreters are rejected by multiple units,
the contracting company wants to keep them hired
and so goes to lengths to ensure they have an application, which often meant work with an HTT. Finding
interpreters who added value to the HTT, enhancing
research, and keeping them in the competitive environment was very much a potentially limiting factor
in the work of the team.
One social scientist explains the potential pitfalls.
In Iraq, a Kurdish interpreter was taken out to assist in
the conduct of research with the Yezidi, during which
time he told the social scientists that in the Yezidi dialect, the word for “angel’—shaytan—is the Arabic word
in the Qu’ran for Lucifer and which formed part of his
prejudices against the sect. The interpreter’s body language was aggressive to the locals, and, as a result of
his personal prejudices, the research conducted during his time with the HTT was so tainted that it was
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rejected.10 Effective research which could be treated as
objective to a workable degree was based on efficient
relationships, key among them being that of the interpreter with the research subject. In Afghanistan, there
was a different problem for the same social scientist
working in the south of the country: the HTT would
enlist the assistance of young men from northern Afghanistan, Kabul, many estimated by the team member to be no older than 18 years of age. These young
men spoke fluent Dari but only enough Pashto to pass
a very simplistic language test. To add to the complexity, regional dialects are extremely heterogeneous, so
that “unless you have an interpreter from that area, he
is not going to be able to grasp what is being said. And
I say ‘he’ because 99 percent are men, it is impossible
to get women.”11
The problematic character of the youthful interpreter in this environment was exacerbated by challenging perceived cultural norms. The Afghan culture
respects age, particularly, in the words of the social
scientist considering a meeting with tribal elders:
If you don’t have facial hair, you can’t even sit in the
room with the guys. And so here are these super clean
shaven young guys, they are with the Americans so
they have adopted wearing shiny clothes and sunglasses, hair slicked back and cut short, no beard. And
then you expect them to sit down with this tribal elder
and be able to convey information appropriately and
accurately? No way.12

Moreover, Afghans used many proverbs in conversation to illustrate any particular point, and the lack
of deep language skills resident in the interpretation
rendered the meanings lost in translation. In addition, as with all augments, in insecure environments,
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interpreters could be scared such that they did not do
“enough to build rapport.”13
ZERO NINE LIMAS
Given the character of the operations conducted
in Iraq and Afghanistan and the nature of the human
terrain, the military necessarily began to emphasize
language capabilities as early as 2004. There is in
foregrounding that solution an inherent difficulty in
terms of time and expense in building up significant
language capability among specific military personnel, for nations and regions which may only possess
ephemeral import. One attempt to circumvent this
problem was the March 8, 2006, establishment of Lima
Company, 111th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona. This company was unique in design and character, being the single unit dedicated to
culture and language in the Department of Defense
(DoD).14 The company was created to recruit nonAmerican citizens into the U.S. military because of an
advantageous cultural background and language proficiency, to then go through training and deployment.
On June 1, 2007, the company was renamed the U.S.
Army Translator-Aide Detachment, with the army
designation of their function being termed Zero Nine
Limas. The unit was short lived and was terminated in
October 2008 when the members transitioned into the
51st Company at Fort Irwin, California, where the U.S.
Army houses its National Training Center.
During the period in which the unit was active,
its members were received by HTS, often serving as
Human Terrain Analysts, a role which demanded language skills.15 Zero Nine Limas were assigned to their
primary unit and then attached to HTS for a year for
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their specific mission. The short-lived nature of the
unit suggests that it met with as many difficulties as
successes, and this is borne out by testimony of team
members in the field. One key member of HTS who
deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq was “very impressed with them.”16 This impression was received
because they already possessed a degree of U.S. military discipline which facilitates their integration, although there were exceptions which detracted from
the overall view of the unit. Problematic were Zero
Nine Limas who had no experience of the American
system (education and social) to begin with and thus
were starting from a disadvantaged point from which
it was difficult to make headway.
One research manager observed that the Zero Nine
Lima assigned to their team “was the most intelligent,
best qualified” he had worked with, “was absolutely
amazing in several ways” and “just an absolutely outstanding individual, both in his professional reactions
as well as his military behavior. Some of the others
were okay, but experiences varied.”17 The Zero Nine
Lima that Nicholas Krohley worked with, the only one
during his tour, was a brilliant addition to his team;
ethnically Sudanese, and had been raised in Egypt,
so spoke fluent Egyptian Arabic and had done one or
two tours with the Army previously, so was already
inculcated into the U.S. military culture.
Institutionalizing language capabilities as nonorganic additions is a difficult process, however. At the
brigade and battalion level, when Zero Nine Limas
were working for senior staff, there were a number
of these translators “who were not all that tactically
proficient.”18 U.S. interest in geographies, and therefore languages, is “ephemeral and episodic” (a phrase
I have borrowed here from Dr. Kerry Fosher, Direc-
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tor of the Translational Research Group, Center for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning, U.S. Marine
Corps) such that it becomes problematic to maintain
a permanent reservoir of translators when the next
threat to face the Department of the Army is so uncertain. Reaching proficiency in a non-native language
takes years of work, while military crises can arise in
weeks or months. HTTs were often as good as their
language skills because, in short, how else does one listen to the population? Outside the scope of this book,
but important for future policy-directed research, institutionalization of language skills is an important
problematic for the Department of the Army.
MOBILITY
In order to conduct research outside the bases, it
was necessary to utilize transport mechanisms: “a
commander isn’t willing to give up a dismount—
which is essentially places we were taking—which
is a guy with a gun who can provide protection, because convoys are so limited.”19 For instance, in eastern Baghdad, Krohley observed that he and the Zero
Nine Lima conducted research independent of the
rest of the team, and, in their area of research in Tissa
Nissan, there was no obvious structure to tap into to
collect information; there was no obvious set of meetings, events, or government institutions which could
be worked through to undertake research. In this
environment:
it was more a case of getting out on the streets and
turning over some stones and seeing what we could
find and have lots of shorter conversations with people in their houses and on the streets. So we had more
of an expeditionary feel to what we were doing.20
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The method was knocking on doors by Iraqi National Police to interview householders, with U.S.
forces present in oversight capacity. The house clearances offered opportunities for research. These environments were calm, uncontested, part of the “mundane realities of occupation and war. It wasn’t unusual
for an American with a rifle to be in your living room,
as weird as that sounds.”21
These searches for illegal weapons in households—part of Nouri al-Maliki’s plan of limiting legal
firearms possession to registered guns or those belonging to security forces—that were unfolding across
Baghdad were ideal opportunities for research, thus
the opportunity was present if transport could be
negotiated. The answer for Krohley in this situation
was to ride the logistics convoys which would resupply food and water to the various outposts between
2-week intervals and every 10 days. Problematic was
the speed of the convoy; it moved extremely slowly
and would stop to unload for up to an hour at a time,
such that it was:
a cumbersome, inefficient way to get around. If you
were in point A and you wanted to get to point B,
point B wasn’t necessarily the first stop that the resupply convoy was going to make, so you could be on that
thing all day trying to get around.22

The other solution was the route clearance convoys; mechanical transport dedicated to improvised
explosive device (IED) identification and disposal,
particularly focused on the significant explosively
formed penetrator threat on the main roads. The two
arterial routes in the district were swept for IEDs. The
work by nature was dangerous, detecting and neutralizing the main threat to U.S. forces directly, and so
space on the convoys was often available, such that:
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it was an easy solution to what could have been a big
problem of logistics, and they were always happy
to have someone ride along and dismount and walk
around a lot, talking to people. It wasn’t a great collection opportunity but it wasn’t a bad one.23

When a possible device was spotted, the convoy
stopped, and dismounts could further investigate. As
Krohley explains:
if you are stopped long enough, Iraqis will start popping out of their shops provided they don’t think there
is a bomb there and you could talk to people. And that
was, you know, a conversation of opportunity every
now and then. But it goes to the broader point of our
team, as taking a basic philosophy: we were there to be
useful at all times.24

The mobility was a limiting factor to the most efficient way to conduct the HTS mission, which was
to be out on the streets at every possible opportunity,
because there can arise spontaneous opportunities to
talk to members of the population. The list of people
who can be engaged on the forward operating bases
or even smaller combat outposts which are in theory
embedded in the terrain is limited. All of the myriad
land building brigade activities were appropriate
times to get outside the forward operating base, but
with convoy space as a limiting factor.
Anthropologist Ted Callahan, in his candid
account of research in Khost with AF1, observed the
difficulty in getting support for research in the province. Moreover, its size meant that to get to a location,
it may take as much as 3 hours driving. In all, with
preparations accounted for, Callahan calculated that
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there could be a “ratio of 1 hour of interviews for 10
to 12 hours of effort,” and that as a consequence, operationally relevant research was going to be an arduous task.25 Travel time in large areas had a deleterious impact on the ratio of interviews to effort. As a
consequence, and empirically observed, social science
in dense urban environments may produce greater
volumes of interview data in less time, given the reduced requirement for transport time beyond the
military bases.
As a new HTT or new personnel transitioned into
a brigade, their worth to the commander had not yet
been observed which meant that mobility assets could
not be freed up for them, generating a “Catch-22” situation. As one social scientist explains of the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq, there was no initial convoy support
available, therefore it was necessary in such handicapped circumstances to conduct interviews with the
local population entering the bases, in this case, hundreds of Iraqi construction workers coming onto the
base every day. Each worker had biometric information taken, at which point, in the queue of 5-20 people
sitting waiting for this process, it was possible to conduct population surveys, with informed consent and
the option not to participate. This survey, designed to
prove value, was conducted with both Department of
State and U.S. Marine Corps input.
As the social scientist recalls, for a brigade constructing a post-Ba’ath party economic system, information such as traditional money movements, the
distribution of farm equipment, and other resource allocation amounted to “bubble up” information of potential worth. Interviewing the population as opposed
to the key leader engagements favored at that time
through the tribal system model gave the HTT infor-
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mation on what was happening in the actual population.26 After demonstrating baseline value to both the
Department of State and U.S. Marine Corps entities,
the brigade could make available space on convoys
in order to conduct wider research among the population. From there, the U.S. Marine Corps emphasizing key leader engagements and the Department of
State and the United States Agency for International
Development emphasizing humanitarian work, convoy support with both necessitated incorporating key
concerns into the research structure, to justify convoy
support. This was, as all interviewees have suggested,
about serving the customer.
Proving initial worth on the base was common
across areas of operations and across time. One social
scientist in Afghanistan began with a project interviewing all the Afghan drivers coming onto the base.
Whilst security procedures were in place to check the
vehicles, some of these drivers could be interviewed
at length. From this research, which included analysis
of tensions between the drivers and those conducting
the security checks, the knowledge could be leveraged
to gain permissions and resources for off-base projects, and the social scientist argued that the Marine
Corps was adept at this, that HTTs:
were never side-lined, if we figured out how to do it
we were on. And you know getting on convoys, going
from patrol base to patrol base, a lot of times battalions,
when they knew who we were, sort of ‘we’ll radio in
to get you guys.’ We were never stranded anywhere.27

Any deterioration in relationships between members of the HTT and the brigade would commonly
lead to blacklisting in the unit, and, as a consequence,
convoy space would be more difficult to obtain. Also,
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the conduct of one team member reflected on the team
as a whole, meaning that the group was compromised
by any single underperforming individual. Ultimately, across teams, “movement was one of the biggest
challenges.”28
TEAM FUNCTION
Team composition and function could create obvious limitations on the efficacy of research conducted,
as noted comprehensively by Lamb et al. in their 2013
study.29 Moreover, a team rarely embedded and left as
a complete entity. Typical instead was the experience
of one social scientist in Afghanistan in 2009 where
the team was composed of a team leader, two social
scientists, a research manager, and a Human Terrain Analyst who also worked as the linguist on the
team. The team had recently suffered a fatality, and
was “in a rebuilding process” when the social scientist
arrived.30 According to the social scientist, this was a
“funky setting,” where there were problems with personnel integrating within the team, the specific roles
of team members within the program, and some issues about where capabilities were best utilized. Over
time, the team was able to put different people into
research situations for which they were suited.31 Team
size and content fluctuated in all cases; in one example
where a team was stood up for the first time, the team
leader arrived in Ghazni prior to the rest of the team,
followed by a social scientist 2 months later and two
further team members, from where the team continued to fluctuate between three and four members.32
In addition, as noted by one academic expert familiar
with the program, it is difficult to communicate to the
combat unit the capabilities of the incoming team, giv-
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en that the teams were so highly variable in terms of
peoples’ educational and experiential backgrounds.33
The team leader was often integral to the success
of the team because, possessing military experience,
he was a bridge between the two cultures. Evans suggests his own team leader was “vital” because of his
military background and his “force of will.”34 The
Lamb et al. study found that the main strength of the
HTT was in its ability to gel as a team.35 This could be
the ability to gel as a whole team, or as split teams. In
the case of a well-documented iteration of AF4, Don
Ayala, Clint Cooper, and Paula Loyd functioned as a
small team, distinct from the rest of that HTT.36 One
social scientist in Afghanistan observed that, while
nine members of their team were indicated before deployment, they numbered less upon arrival. Two Human Terrain Analysts, often labelled “interpreters,”
were Dari speakers from the north of the country, and
when they found out they were to be sent to Helmand,
they felt unsafe going to a Pashto-speaking area.37 The
social scientist recalls the other team social scientist
as having a doctorate in anthropology, and treated
the second social scientist as junior, which negatively
influenced the team dynamic.
LEADERSHIP
Lamb et al. concluded that leadership of the HTT
was among the more vital variables that helped to
determine the effectiveness of a team internally. Interviews as part of the research conducted in this
book with former HTT members reinforce that view
of the team leader being vital to the overall efficacy
of the team. One social scientist that was embedded
in Afghanistan noted that the team leader, a former
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Marine, was instrumental in leveraging resources
when the team were embedded with the Marines.
Because the Marine Corps was more insular than the
Army, team leaders were often much more important
in a Marine Corps unit than an Army unit, and the
ability of embedded teams to be able to work across
the spectrum of conventional ground forces was paramount to the concept, such that the team leader was
told by the HTS management prior to embedding that
“this means a lot, our reputation is staked on our team
doing okay.”38
Another social scientist transitioning into Iraq
found a team already in place for nearly a year, which
meant that “they had already kind of built their relationships” but that to navigate the integration, the
“team leader was very effective at building the relationships, and so that was great.”39 That team had split
in two because of a major intrateam conflict before the
social scientist arrived; the team leader, one social
scientist, and one Human Terrain Analyst conducted
research in Fallujah, while one research manager and
a Human Terrain Analyst who had decided to break
away went to Ramadi. This was made possible because
the unit was transitioning from the former to the latter
site. The team leader developed a concept for the split,
such that the research manager and Human Terrain
Analyst would act as a “scout team; get some research
going so that when the team arrived, we already had a
presence and an understanding of the area.”40
While that team leader was considered a success by
the social scientist after the leader departed, a young
Army captain who was originally the research manager became the team leader, and his inexperience led to
a deterioration in team cohesion, coupled to two former Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel joining
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that were simply there for the remuneration, as was a
broader problem with HTS.41 Leadership quality was
even more pronounced toward the end of that social
scientist’s tour when they joined a team where the two
social scientists had left after a dispute. The team as a
whole had developed a robust relationship with the
brigade command, but there were no longer social scientists to design or conduct studies. In that team, the
social scientist who transitioned in praised the team
leader, a former Marine and current reservist; he was
a colonel, allowing him to approach the colonel of the
unit on an equal footing which facilitated procuring
resources and transport.42 Linked to team efficacy was
another aspect of successful engagement with the unit
in which the team were embedded, the question of acceptable aesthetics: integration was not simply a case
of professional expertise.
With the HTTs, integration into that military structure was assisted by “superficial things”; such as
“appearance and attitude,” levels of fitness, and character.43 As Krohley asserts of his experiences, many
of the team were in their late-20s, and at a physical
level similar to the military unit “and that helped—we
could talk the talk.”44 Howard Clark, who observed
AF7 closely at Camp Dwyer, Garmsir district in 2011,
noted that the HTT leader, a reservist major, was an
enabler of the rest of the team, facilitating its research
by procuring logistical support.45 Clark has experience of the work of HTTs and thus offers a valuable
perspective on the products they produced. As a civilian working for U.S. Special Operations Command in
2009 and 2010, he saw HTT products. When he later
embedded with a U.S. Marine Corps regiment conducting research in Southern Helmand, he was working at Camp Dwyer, Garmsir district, based with AF7
from April to September 2011.
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“DOTS ON FOREHEADS”
“Culture” is a broad term. In Iraq and Afghanistan, sociocultural research is an amorphous and indistinct concept which has required, and will require,
investigation.46 Beneath its umbrella, specific research
could focus on a spectrum of issues, from agriculture
to medical aid, all of which influenced, or were influenced by, the cultural environment. The military is a
kinetic instrument which is necessarily focused on defeating the enemy through the application of superior
strength, despite the COIN tactics which emphasized
interaction with the population. In practice, this meant
that in Iraq and Afghanistan data which was relevant
to kinetic operations was dominant in the concern of
the commanders on the ground. In addition, comparative to abstract ideas of culture, kinetic-focused metrics are more easily collected, making them dominant
planning modalities.
Familiar with both kinetic and nonkinetic metrics,
Richard Heimann, adjunct faculty at the University
of Maryland, Baltimore Campus, has worked in Iraq
and Afghanistan, most recently returning from a
3-month deployment in Kandahar province where he
had worked in a brigade which had an HTT. Heimann
argues that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the data:
that was easy to measure was being measured. That
was the data that was being analyzed as a consequence
of measurement being so easy. Anything that wasn’t
easy to measure in these operations was considered
not important.47

This data was commonly the size, strength, and
whereabouts of enemy personnel. As a consequence,
societal aspects of the area of operations were elimi340

nated. It is hard to unhinge measurement from data
analysis, and little thought was given to what was being measured, and conversely what was not being analyzed as a consequence of not measuring it. Abstract
sociocultural analysis with indistinct indicators which
did not afford uniform time series was difficult data to
prove of value in the kinetic environment.
In a COIN environment where measurement of
both kinetic and nonkinetic metrics is considered necessary for successful planning. There is a lot of potential data in the environment, but it is often abstract
and consequently difficult to analyze. Moreover, with
qualitative analysis, there is a precarious veracity in
the conduct of short interviews with members of the
populace with which there has been no previous contact by the HTT, when somebody in the vicinity “has
an M16, however many feet away from your social
scientist they may be, who might be there ambivalently.”48 Problematic security environments were noted
by Jennifer Clark in her research in Sinjar after promises were made to military members of units she was
attached to, to become a valuable asset:
The Marines would not let us go further than one boot
away from them, so we had to maintain boot contact
with a Marine, while interviewing. Essentially, that
first mission, I scratched. Although I wrote a report, I
put a heavy disclaimer on the report, that this was the
security situation, it was extreme, and I am positive
that the Iraqis were not being honest with us, apart
from the Yezidi, who were open and excited to talk to
us, they loved the Marines.49

Despite extensive interaction with members of
the population who could give detailed accounts of
the social terrain and cultural history of the immedi-
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ate environment, the presence of coalition forces in
the vicinity lent an element of doubt to all interview
material, while the very interaction between both created a degree of subjectivity. This negatively impacted
the fidelity of the data obtained and could be severely
compromised in highly insecure environments. As
Krohley explains from his research in Baghdad, a
pertinent question is: “Can a research team that is an
integral part of one of the main parties to a conflict
conduct objective research on the roots and dynamics of that violence?”50 Heimann sums up the problem
more generally:
the goal is non-deterministic interaction with the human terrain with external validity yet at the tactical
level HTTs interact and hence impact with the objects
they are trying to study; the goal is honest signals and
surveys are tenuous at best.51

In 2011, HTT AF7 attempted rigorous approaches
to their surveys, including random sampling and
methodologies which highlighted uncertainties in
the data. The team members wore side-arms and
noted that:
firstly, the population are going to be very intimidated,
secondly, they are sometimes going to tell you what
they want you to hear, thirdly, if somebody wants
something out of it, they realise ‘hey, the way I answer
this question, I may get a project or money.’52

This prejudiced the content of the report and Howard Clark, familiar with the products, suggested there
was great value in having stated this up front. However, this uncertainty, while it was rigorous social science conducted in highly insecure environments, was
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very difficult to factor into a high operational tempo
in which clarity of judgement would facilitate planning. Condensing rigorous social science research into
the battle rhythm is a deep skill. Clark notes that AF7
was able to condense large volumes of data into a 2- to
4-page paper in a manner that the rest of the Marines
could use and actually had time to read.53 This compromise between detail and clarity lies at the heart of
the frictional interplay between social sciences and
military planning in COIN operations.
OPERATIONAL TEMPO
Operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan varied proportionally with the level of insecurity and remained arduous even at brigade headquarters. In Iraq,
Jennifer Clark suggested it “was easily an 18-hour
work day sometimes less, but, mostly for me, I worked
18-hours a day, 7 days a week, and you were constantly moving.”54 In headquarters, operational tempo was
less—12-hour days—but with added leeway in activities, for instance, down time could involve a movie or
a Burger King meal, a work out, or retail purchases,
but a 12-hour day was the minimum.55 Even on base,
the operational tempo was frenetic. If not attending
working groups, HTT members would create research
groups based on the commander’s critical information
requirements which were produced and disseminated
daily.56 These were reports that were coming back
from the field with high frequency because those involved had to complete operation reports after they
came back from the missions, but which, according
to Jennifer Clark, were “redundant’ as sociocultural
analysis because they lacked methodology or depth.57
Indeed, as Howard Clark, who worked with HTT
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assets in Afghanistan has noted, the research generated by HTTs was of value for one reason—because the
methodology was foregrounded, allowing the readers
to assess value from the outset.58
But robust methodology, creating a research plan,
and obtaining a feasible transport arrangement meant
that actual ethnographic work was not a continual
process. One social scientist in Afghanistan went off
base for 2 weeks, before returning to write the report
for 2 weeks, which generated substantial products
but of a frequency of one every month and noted that
other factors, such as rest and recuperation rotations
similarly “affected the battle rhythm too, whether or
not you were back or not, when you were going to do
your next research project.”59
As the end of the deployment neared in early-2010,
the social scientist observed that the monthly duration
outside of the base increased. In part, this was because
the value of the team had been proved, and the knowledge of the social scientists was reaching its deployed
peak. In part, this was dictated by the operations: the
Afghan and International Security Assistance Force
offensive Operation MOSHTARAK to recapture the
strategically important town of Marjah in Helmand
from the Taliban was beginning, which increased the
number of convoys outside of the base and increased
the possible value of all information in the formation
of strategy and tactics. As the social scientist explains
of the operation: “it was one of the biggest operations
that the Marines did while they were in Helmand and
so we were out thinking we may help get the ground
level information before they even went into Marjah”
but ultimately, the HTT spent a protracted period
“waiting for them to finish the kinetic stuff” and then
the battalion they assumed would ask for the team
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did not call for them, so their presence in the other
battalion was largely superficial.60 In total, during the
9-month deployment, there were five research periods
outside of the base, which generated 20-page reports,
but these reports were a compromise between clarity
and detail, as the social scientist makes clear:
we always tried to make it so it was readable from a
battalion commander’s point of view, which meant
that it was difficult though, that kind of research was
difficult to sum up. So you could have given a lot
more detail that would have made it stronger but you
couldn’t because you wanted to make it readable.61

As the operational tempo increases, the requirement for a deep understanding of the social dimensions of the environment to develop precise planning
increases proportionally, but the research capability
of the HTT asset is increasingly complicated by the
expanding degree of insecurity for incumbent forces
on the ground.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
As noted in a variety of existing literature, there
is a geographic limitation to the work of HTTs in that
a small group cannot cover the entirety of an area of
operation. Lamb et al. build on interviews with brigade commanders to conclude that for the HTTs in
their periods of deployment: “There is simply too
much human terrain in a brigade area of responsibility for HTTs to build a comprehensive and current
picture.”62 Indeed, even the most able teams could not
cover the human terrain in the area of operations “sufficiently well to make a major difference for a brigade
commander.”63
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The efficiency gained when splitting a team to
cover more ground was confirmed by the first AF1
team from the Foreign Military Studies Office during
Operation MAIWAND in Ghazni province in May
and June 2007 which was led by the Afghan National
Army with Task Force Fury, part of the International
Security Assistance Force, in support. The Task Force
Fury commander had tasked AF1 with gaining a sociocultural snapshot of the environment to assist maneuver elements and the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). To cover as much of the area as possible,
AF1 split, with three members of the team assisting
the PRT, while two members worked with Civil Affairs, A Company, 2/508th. During Operation MAIWAND, AF1 tested Rapid Ethnographic Assessment
Procedure as a technique. The value of that procedure
was in the central role of semi-structured interviews,
no formal sampling of participants, and the involvement of a multidisciplinary team allowing different
elements of the research to unfold simultaneously, allowing access to more of the population than a single
researcher could gain alone.64
The Human Terrain Rapid Ethnographic Assessment Procedure was based on this standard applied
anthropological methodology and was valuable because it was developed where there was a limited
time to conduct research but still allowing a rapid assessment of the sociocultural environment. The AF1
team modified the procedure to the demands of the
combat environment and structured the interviews
based on Afghan regional-specific taxonomy. During
Operation MAIWAND, the part of the HTT with the
PRT participated in 16 missions, and the team with
Civil Affairs deployed to the area of operations for 16
days and conducted eight missions. These missions
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included village assessments, participation in organized councils (Shuras) and random encounter unstructured interviews with the population.
The rigorous social science research conducted by
AF1 during Operation MAIWAND allowed the HTT
to reach its full potential. However, more generally,
there is an inherent inability to access large volumes
of the area of operation which impacted the ability of
HTTs to support certain programs. In Afghanistan,
this was a tangible limitation of the program; for example, the Village Stability Operations were in remote
regions where only local law enforcement and national jurisdiction were weakened by physical distance.
For remote areas where HTTs had not travelled, their
only products were often summaries of existing literature, focusing broadly on clans and the largest urban
centers.65
Exacerbating this problem is one of connectivity.
In the physical structure of the brigade staff, the S-6
component is tasked with developing and maintaining
communications infrastructure and data flows. Given
that the broad character of research is interviews with
additional secondary source research conducted using
the Internet, HTTs with access to the physically positioned brigade structure can produce these qualitative
reports with important secondary research which provides valuable context. However, in remote rural regions deployed with, for example, SOFs in support of
Village Stability Operations, without access to S-6 resources located on bases, the information highway is
absent, and the reports must be produced without the
secondary source context. This is a further reason why
HTS is so suitable for long-range research in relatively
secure environments; absent high operational tempo,
interviews can be conducted in remote rural locations,
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and then the secondary source research can be conducted upon returning to command centers, written
up and integrated into long-range planning strategies
aimed at conflict mitigation.
ONE YEAR AT A TIME
Across the duration of deployment, the knowledge
of an individual, a team, or a unit inevitably increased
over time. Part of the problem as social scientist Jennifer Clark explained was in the retention of information in unit transition and exacerbated by absence of
synchronicity between service arms and the HTTs
themselves; Marine Corps personnel deploy for 7
months; HTT members for approximately 9 months;
and Army personnel for 12 months. As noted, for the
HTS, at least this was intentional, that team rotations
are scheduled not to coincide with the:
relief in place so that team members on the ground can
help new units understand the human terrain in their
areas. The team maintains the human terrain databases on separate systems so that information collected
year after year is not lost as units transfer and depart.66

The result, however, was myriad transfers of authority between units taking place across multiple areas of operation at different times with no structured
matrix for the retention and dissemination of information, making the development of homogeneous institutional memory across the entire theater a complex
and daunting task. The subsequent absence of social
knowledge in the early stages of a rotation could lead
to significant missteps. As Fondacaro noted, from the
view of a transfer of authority, the loss of engagement
with the population was significant: “All the relation348

ships and agreements and tacit understandings you
had with those individuals are out of the window.”67
Ultimately, the poor state of the war was “being fed
by the unit rotation policy” because “the higher headquarters were rotating on the same schedule. We
weren’t learning anything.”68
The results at the tactical level can be explored
through teams’ insights of their experiences. An HTT
member with the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq demurred on an offer to breakfast during Ramadan with
local key Iraqi government officials, which retrospectively was seen to possibly have harmed relationships
with the population. As the team member recalls, it
“was little things like that which I was supposed to
know but I didn’t simply because I didn’t have the
personal experience dealing with that culture and you
cannot learn everything.”69 Put simply, “it was just
very basic human reactions that really require that
personal experience in the area to understand.”70 If
knowledge retention had been improved, greater engagement with the population would have been possible from the outset as team members would have
been better prepared.
Differing team composition, functional character,
and role within a brigade inevitably created heterogeneity of product, both in terms of content and frequency. However, there was a broad template of inquiry
which teams followed, shaped by the character of the
reporting environment. Initial research conducted by
a team would be characterized by rapid mission reporting and “quick turnaround of products’ because
the information base that the team could work from
in the beginning of the deployment was inevitably
limited.”71 In these situations, the value-added was often engineered by contacts rather than research skills;
occasionally this was from personal relationships with
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team members who had already embedded in a particular region. Personal relationships, as much with
the brigade as with the host community, were critical
in that initial period to forging a niche value in the
military enterprise.
The goal was to generate a baseline level of knowledge which would allow the construction of deep research plans to be conducted. As such, each product
can be modeled as a dissertation; first, constructing
a broad literature review to grasp the field and identify gaps in the existing knowledge structure; second,
generating a research question and methodology;
third, conducting research based around the plan;
and finally, completing the dissertation which shows
a significant contribution to knowledge thereby demonstrating value to the brigade. Only at the end of the
deployment were the dissertations of a depth of understanding that lent themselves to deep research:
The first part was building a rapport, developing a
basic understanding of key personalities, and that is
where you see that stuff. It was towards the end where
you can build into those long-term products that synchronize everything together.72

Such was the evolution of knowledge within the
team over the course of even a single deployment that
the character of the products could change profoundly. One social scientist noted that from initial iterations
of products which were largely generic, eventually his
expertise allowed focus on thematic products, such as
the problem of corruption across the area of operations
and the effect of the counternarcotics programs on the
population in the area of operations. This thematic
research across a broad geography was only possible
through a combination of specific research and data
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that the team had collected throughout the duration of
the period conducting research. In the final iterations
of research, it was a sizeable advantage to be able to
draw on organized data that had been collated. It was
only possible to conduct thematic reports “later in the
tour”; battalion-level generic reports may have stayed
at the same level of analysis as the tour progresses,
but generally “it got better just in terms of every time
you do it, you become a little more familiar with local dynamics.”73 Social scientists gathering data in the
fluid environment of stabilization operations where
information was quickly out of date meant that according to one HTT member who deployed in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, “we were so far in the weeds
dealing with very specific issues the information that
we wanted simply didn’t exist in writing, there was
nothing that they [the RRC] could use to support us.”74
THE “LOCAL OPTIC”
Increasing depth of knowledge with prolonged
research in the area of operations is inevitable. Therefore, expertise is a function of time. Knowledge and
understanding are proportional to time spent in the
environment. Value to the brigade similarly increases
over time. But, given that conflict zones are, by their
nature, harsh and austere environments, deployments
are necessarily of limited duration. For that reason,
in total an HTT member is deployed for an initial
9-month rotation, with an additional 9 months optional after the first rotation is completed.75
As expertise is proportional to the time spent in the
operating environment and the rotation is of limited
duration, as one social scientist embedded with the
Marine Corps in Afghanistan explained, the result is
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that: “’I finally get it’ and you’re on the plane out of
here.”76 Ultimately:
it contributes to this whole, ’10-year war fought 1 year
at a time’ thing. Part of that is that nobody gets there
understanding what it is the hell they are getting into,
so you always have your 2 months of ‘What is this?
What is going on?’77

That social scientist calculated the discrepancy
between the operationally relevant reporting of the
Human Terrain Team and academic work:
‘Anthropology takes 2 years in the field usually or at
least 1 year in the field, it takes that long to figure out
what is going on, you cannot just leave in 6 months.78

But in areas of high insecurity, there is a paradox
that, with greater time spent in the area, the risks increase. Howard Clark agrees that the ability to look
through the “local optic” cannot be achieved in the
9-month rotation but takes years. However, Clark also
notes in the the Garmsir district where he observed
AF7 between April and September 2011 that it was
one of the most dangerous places on earth, and there
was the risk of significant psychological trauma to individuals should they remain beyond the 9-months rotation.79 The HTS capability arose from that observed
need to develop institutional memory. Fondacaro had
worked on the CPE tool and found that capability gap,
the need for humans in possession of social science
products plugged directly into the brigade staff that
had been in place between rotations, because:
In reality, for a brigade commander, they’d spend the
first three months just finding out where they were,
then they’d spend nine months actually doing operations and the last few months of that trying to get out
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of there and get accountability for their equipment and
without getting anybody else killed or hurt. When you
are doing this for a year at a time, the non-thinking
status quo becomes the norm and you don’t develop
a corporate memory to hand off to the new guy; a rich
corporate memory.80

But the possibility of trauma limits the wide ranging applicability of the program in a conflict zone.
This observation allows two important conclusions.
First, it shows the suitability of the HTS to long-range
planning. The ability to look through the “local optic” takes years, while conflict zones are inherently
dangerous and allow only rotations of up to 1 year.
In long-range research, social scientists can conduct
research for 12-24 months without the risk of psychological trauma. Second, it shows that small size teams
such as SOF working on Village Stability Operations
are better modalities for research than large footprint
units such as brigades. The small units allow researchers that access to the “local optic,” permanently embedded with local forces and in and among the population. That physical intimacy increases exponentially
the exposure to the society which the researchers are
attempting to understand.
The assessment of the social scientist tallies with
the broad academic definition of ethnography. Dr. H.
Russell Bernard suggests that ethnography of other
cultures takes a year or more, and, while focused ethnography study as part of the sub-discipline of applied
anthropology can be done more quickly, it would still
require 3 months of study and conflicted area research
is too broadly focused on the general population to be
defined as such.81 Bernard gives the example of a New
York hostel, which during a 3-month period must be
visited a minimum of four times a week for 3 hours a
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day or more each time.82 However, insecure environments mean that there can be no guarantee that the
location will be safe enough to visit, that each visit will
allow more than 3 hours of constant interaction and
that, finally, the logistics in terms of convoy support
will facilitate travel. In Afghanistan, for example, personal relationships are a key modality of transactions,
and it is these relationships that take years to build.
In Bernard’s reading, good ethnography requires
“trustworthy informants who are observant, reflective, and articulate—who know how to tell good stories” and that ethnographers must stay with the informants for a protracted period; in a conflicted area,
insecurity makes trust and developing prolonged relationships a difficult endeavor.83 Indeed, Paula Loyd
in Afghanistan “harbored doubts about the validity
of the data she and her teammates were gathering.
Interviewing Afghans through an interpreter, surrounded by armed soldiers, was far from ideal, and
she knew it.”84 If it is not ethnography in stabilization
and enabling operations, then what is the research
that social scientists undertook? This is operationally
relevant reporting, and these were rapid assessments
but often ad hoc; after deep research methods were
formulated, given the insecurity on the ground there
was no way of knowing how the relationship with the
as yet undetermined population on the ground would
proceed. Jennifer Clark identifies the character of her
work clearly:
Not only was I not acting like an anthropologist but it
wasn’t research: it was operationally driven reporting.
But the distinct difference is that whilst it is operationally driven, we were not directed by anyone to collect
a certain thing. There was no one but me telling me
what to collect.85
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Developing ethnographic knowledge based on at
least a year in the field and forming longitudinal relationships with the population contrasts with the operational tempo of military operations which requires
frequent research products in order to influence operations. An HTT social scientist relates having spent a
month in Marjah at a critical period leading to Operation MOSHTARAK. Interviews had allowed the social
scientist to gain a greater understanding of the ethnic
groups, drugs economy, and key leaders in Lashkar
Gah, as well as to produce a map of the area to capture sociocultural research. When the social scientist
returned to the Marine Corps regiment, it was anticipated that this information would be of interest at
some levels within the staff. However, it became clear
that this “information was too granular, it wasn’t even
a concern for them [the regiment]; they were ten steps
ahead, five projects away from what I had seen and
from what the information was going to help them
decide.”86
This observation from a social scientist in Afghanistan brings us full circle, tying neatly to Krohley’s observation that, at the operational and strategic levels,
there was an inability to influence those levels of planning because these big decisions had already been
made. HTTs were a tactical asset, connected to the
operations and strategy of the Brigade Combat Team
staff or Regimental Combat Team staff. To implement a strategy takes time; to plan the operations of
a brigade takes time, resources, and planning. These
big cogs in the military machine are maneuvered into
place slowly, and with difficulty. The HTT’s granular
research is unlikely to recalibrate that movement.
In addition, research which plugged the sociocultural capability gap took time to collate, process,
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and disseminate. By the time the work was produced,
it spoke of a snapshot of the area that had already
changed. The social scientist recounting his or her
experiences in Marjah paints the picture bluntly:
They [the brigade staff] had already made the decision
so it wasn’t like my information that the farmers are
going to react badly to that mattered at all, because it
was like ‘sorry it’s already done, we’ll just figure it out
as we go’.87

Away from the high operational tempos in Iraq and
Afghanistan, in environment where strategy is longrange and the necessity for operational planning is
limited by relative security, granular research plugged
into the combatant command level has a greater likelihood of positively affecting strategic direction.
CONCLUSIONS
A conflict does not stand still, an insurgency
changes over time. In consequence, the operational
picture can change quickly. Richard Heimann details
the daily routine in Kandahar during his tour:
They [the operational staff] had Sit Reps [Situation
Reports] in the morning and in the evening and the
commander’s brief after those such that ultimately the
command structure only ‘really care about the last 24
hours.’88

The frequency of data required by the commander means that the ability of the HTT to influence the
operational tempo is complicated by the operational
tempo. Compared to the quantitative work which
would analyze a data set every 24-48 hours and move
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on, the HTT projects were ostensibly long-term and
qualitative—“blink type of assessments”—incorporating large amounts of information (and hence multiple variables) and “trying to reconcile it over time.”89
As such, it was difficult for the HTT to influence the
“battle rhythm.”
When HTS commenced its structural redesign, one
of the central aspects was to leverage the research planning and design tools that HTS had standardized in
its development and planning team working groups.
These were highly structured tools for reporting either
a long-term research process or a short-term research
effort of approximately 2 weeks in duration. The tools
were specifically designed to enable social science
research as part of a bureaucracy to enable tracking,
ethical oversight, and other facets of the research. The
aim here was “to understand this is different from
writing your dissertation, this is about simple, quick,
structured communication of what it is that you are
doing.”90 The aim was to jettison academic theory in
order to parse the value of the research for the military
customer:
We didn’t actually use social network analysis for it.
What we used was just a general survey methodology,
one you would see in political science or something
like that. Most of the information we reported was just
basic descriptive statistics, you know we could have
taken it to another level theoretically, but for what we
were trying to achieve it was good enough.91

Social science research had to be adapted to the
battle rhythm: “if it takes 3 months to conduct a study
and the deadline is 2 weeks, that automatically makes
the person conducting the study irrelevant in the eyes
of the commander and in helping the mission.”92 The
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result, as Ben Connable suggests, is that the extent to
which these cultural initiatives had permanence or integral relevance to the day-to-day operations planning
was questionable: “It’s not bad, it’s not irrelevant, it’s
not non-existent, but it’s just questionable.”93
That makes the research goals of primary importance; if HTT research products serve the commander,
then they are tailored to the operational tempo of the
mission and must necessarily be rapid reporting. As
Heimann explains of the operating environment, “the
battle rhythm was important; we were hinged to the
operational pace of things. Human Terrain Teams; I
saw maybe three briefs during the commander briefings, so maybe at a pace of one a month.”94 This problem experienced by HTTs in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan was captured in the unresolved tension of
modeling insurgencies in the 2006 Counterinsurgency
field manual: “It is important not to oversimplify an
insurgency. However, analysts and commanders still
require a means of defining and describing the enemy
that can be commonly understood.”95
The changing character of the human terrain is
also stated explicitly in U.S. Army doctrine: “Societies are not static, but change over time.”96 Capturing
this change with deep qualitative analysis is complicated by the military that “as a customer of social science knowledge, wants to apply whatever they learn
to solve problems in a timely, practical manner.”97
The customer ideally learns at the pace of the most
valuable asset a command has—its data. As the data
evolves, monitoring must capture that evolution in
real time. Qualitative research, however, necessarily
takes time to develop a plan, conduct the research,
write-up the findings, and brief. By that time, what is
the state of the original snapshot of the human terrain
that was researched?
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To model the changing human terrain over time,
Heimann uses IBM data scientist Jeff Jonas’ analogy
of a busy road in a commercial for the company. Jonas
argues that, if “all you can do is take a snapshot of how
the road looked 5 minutes ago, how would you know
when to cross the road?”98 Out-of-date information
can lead to catastrophic decisionmaking. Movement
makes basing operations on previous static snapshots
of the environment a hazardous approach.
The military fashion is for “fast trajectories,” a
series of similar data sets at short intervals that can
give a good indication of trends.99 As such, there is
a preference in the U.S. military writ large for quantitative over qualitative analysis. While social science
expertise is certain to continue to assume a role in the
spectrum of warfighting operations, the question becomes what form of social science will be favored by
the military. As one social scientist explains:
anything with numbers on it is seen by Americans as
sacred, so there was a lot of polling done by the SSRA
[Social Science Research and Analysis], and we saw
how invalid these results were when we came to know
Helmand.100

One social scientist provides an example of an Afghan who is illiterate and received no formal education being polled as to the legitimacy and security of
the national government. “Legitimacy” and “security”
are not innate concepts, but abstract concepts learned
through childhood education, and with increasing sophistication as that education continues; therefore understanding is contingent upon being educated. Asking that Afghan about security, to which they reply
“great” reflects as “good” in the poll. But if you talk
to the Afghan for 30-40 minutes, talking to him for as
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long as you can, you find that the Taliban physically
abused him last week or has stolen his phone; that for
him is security because he is not being killed, and from
an International Security Assistance Force perspective that is not security, and for what the poll is trying to measure, that is also not security.101 The result
is polling data which has emerged from Afghanistan
which, lacking qualitative assessment, can be highly
misleading.
From this perspective, mixed methods would win
out over a purely quantitative understanding of the
tactical and operational pictures.102 In that social scientist’s view, it is dangerous to draw a Link Chart,
and say “we are mapping their telephone calls.” You
also have to understand the social relationships and
personal histories of the people involved, in order to
bring valuable context. This means that you have to
“sit down and have lengthy conversations with people and get to know them; you have to dig deep and
quantitative methods don’t allow for that sort of digging.”103 Thus, while the promise of big data is shifting
the military emphasis toward quantitative analysis, in
the words of data scientist Heimann, “quantitative is
going to take the charge with a lot of the data analysis. It is not really a criticism of qualitative analysis. I
think when done well, both have utility.”104
When done well and with a responsive staff command, HTT research augmented the picture of the
battle space. To satisfy the military consumer, the
social scientist must capture granular detail quickly
and enter the battle rhythm to brief the commander
on its significance. So too, the research itself requires
significant expertise to resolve within its myriad complexities. As Seymour Deitchman noted of the complexities of social science work undertaken during the
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Cold War, “The fact of the study, its subject, and the
presence of the researchers all affect the social system
being studied, in ways that are uncertain and difficult
to assess.”105 As such, HTTs will always fight against
the military preference for kinetic modalities in operations—DoD exists primarily because of a need to
apply force—but it is a fight that is crucial to a more
granular understanding of combat, a more nuanced
comprehension of the links between societies and war.
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CONCLUSIONS
At the height of summer in Baghdad, the temperature can reach upwards of 110 degrees Fahrenheit. In
this environment devoid of rain, waterproof “Rite in
the Rain” notepads were essential to Human Terrain
Teams (HTTs). These notepads, A5-size flipcharts,
were required to be waterproof in Baghdad because
the intensity of the heat meant that sweat soaked
through the cumbersome military fatigues of personnel. Items carried in pockets, including important research aids such as notepads and incidentals such as
cigarettes, would inevitably become saturated in perspiration. The consequences of the drenched fatigues
and soaked cigarettes could be unforeseen and farreaching:
You’d wind up having to smoke the Iraqi menthols,
which are just disgusting. These guys smoked menthol 100s, the big fat ones. I’m going to die in 5 years,
bro. I’m not much of a smoker but I’m sure that stuff
will kill me.1

Seemingly unrelated phenomena such as perspiration and paper notebooks can, in the height of a
Baghdad summer, combine in the disorder of conflict
to form significant hurdles to social science research.
Armed conflict in essence is the disordering of society
and social values. There is unpredictability at every
turn, requiring amendment, revision, and adaptation
across the spectrum of military operations, from policy to operations to tactical maneuvers down to the
waterproofing of a notebook. Observing such cause
and effect in late-18th and early-19th century Europe,
Prussian military practitioner and theorist Carl von
Clausewitz wrote eloquently about the fog of war.2
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The human terrain in war is always shifting in subtle
and sometimes illusory ways. As a consequence, it
requires constant deciphering in order to focus military operations.
At the same time, by virtue of necessity, the unpredictable character of war means that it forges new
alliances. Threats necessitate amendment to the prevailing architecture of knowledge where surmounting such obstacles to progress requires adopting the
peripheral and remarkable which, in turn, becomes
the convention and normal. The crisis which crystalized in the Iraqi adventure fomented an intellectual
insurgency in the military architecture, laying siege to
prevailing military thinking. Uncertain of the threat
faced, the academic was taken from the blackboard
to the battlefield; in the deep weeds of conflict, the
scholar shaped military thought not from the policylevel downward, but from the tactical-level upward;
not from the blackboard, but between rifles in villages and townships, feeding information directly to
brigade staffs, because the language of war requires
the addition of a social grammar before it can be
accurately translated.
In the book, three key findings have been presented. First, the crisis caused by the improvised explosive
device (IED) allowed a competing theory associated
with low-intensity conflict to gain emphasis in planning. The conclusion is that there are myriad military
theories that wax and wane against the backdrop of
ephemeral concerns in the Department of Defense
(DoD). Human Terrain System (HTS) was, in principle, a counter-IED (C-IED) function. Dr. Montgomery
McFate, through her role in the counterinsurgency
(COIN) field manual, was able to create an explicit
doctrinal need for an HTS capability which was thus
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emplaced in the context of countering insurgencies.
McFate’s section of the COIN field manual so plainly
stressed the need for nonorganic additions to the U.S.
intelligence enterprise in order to succeed in countering the Iraqi insurgency that her drafted sections
of chapter 3, “Intelligence,” led to a confrontational
meeting on September 13, 2006. The meeting took
place at the Institute for Defense Analyses where McFate was working, and also included Conrad Crane,
who was the lead author of the drafted field manual;
two personnel from the Army Intelligence Center; a
member of the Joint Staff’s intelligence branch; and
Kyle Teamey, lead author of the “Intelligence” chapter.3 Objections were raised that McFate’s sections took
the job of intelligence gathering away from the intelligence professionals and placed it into the hands of
the Army and Marine units on the ground.4 The controversial nature of this transition shows just how far
McFate was shifting the idea of what the intelligenceand information-gathering tools should be in COIN
operations. It also shows how she used Field Manual
(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, to demonstrate a need
for the HTS. With the COIN field manual ascendant in
DoD planning, the HTS could legitimately obtain significant monies from the Overseas Contingency Fund,
enabling it to expand to meet the requirements of the
dimensions of the surge of forces in Iraq.
The program’s divorce from the C-IED enterprise
was abrupt and decisive. The first embedded teams
in Iraq may have been aware of the origins of the program, but there was no training on aspects of detecting
IED networks. In that regard, therefore, the program
was peculiar in that, while it ushered forth as a C-IED
enterprise, in form and function it was a COIN tool
to understand civilian populations. The prominent
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notion in the literature that the program was formed
solely as a device to understand the population eliminates important aspects of its evolution. The Joint
Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) supplied by Combined Joint Task Force-82 in April 2007
noted the requirement of an embedded team capability to identify IED cells (Appendix D). On the ground,
however, of the hundreds of pages of embedded team
products seen by the author, only one contained any
reference to IEDs. That reference was tangential and
related to a mine-clearing camp. On June 22, 2009,
members of an embedded team north of Lashkar Gah,
Afghanistan, learned from a mine-clearing group that
red rocks denoted that there was danger from unexploded IEDs in the minefield.5
That abrupt divorce is to the detriment of the longevity of the program. In Out of the Mountains published in 2013, David Kilcullen noted that use of the
IED has become a chronic, global problem with particularly important application as a space denial weapon
in urban environments.6 If the HTS had systematically
examined, at least in part, civilian attitudes to IEDs—
the devices often caused civilian casualties—there
would at least have been something concrete that
the program had worked toward. A kernel of knowledge built around the impact of the IED on civilian
populations is something that the program should
contemplate if it transitions into a theater security asset intended to influence strategic-level planning and
activities.
Second, I find that the program training cycle suffered in its initial iterations from a “best guess” process permitted by the laissez-faire attitude of an “anything goes” period in U.S. military affairs. However,
evolution of teaching in the program was rapid after
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the return of embedded members into the program
management. With implications beyond the HTS, it
suggests the value of integrating the experience of
combat veterans in the student curriculum. That said,
there is no evidence to support the notion that teams
in 2012 were of more value than teams in 2008, despite
a gap of 4 years, with all the commensurate improvement in training. The training may have had incremental, limited impact, but the teams appear only as
efficient as the people on them, suggesting that future
attempts to code for knowledge, practicality, physicality, and psychology in recruitment will be at least as
important as the training.
Third, I find that embedded social science research
in Iraq and Afghanistan was hindered by a series of
limiting factors. These factors were the complexity of
embedding civilians into the military unit: the limited
initial knowledge the social scientists embedded with;
the challenge of creating a timely, robust social science
product which influenced the military decisionmaking cycle; and often making abstract and complex
concepts resonate with brigade staff seeking clarity of
information. High operational tempo in deeply insecure environments inhibits social science research capabilities at the tactical level, which, instead, are ideally suited to studies intended to inform and influence
long-term planning in more secure regions of strategic
importance to the U.S. Army.
When embedded, social scientists conducted research using the tools and techniques that they had
learned in academia. This meant that the HTS was not
confined to ethnographies and anthropology, with
implications for the scholarly debate which focused
on that element of the program. Nor did the program
militarize anthropology. The high operational tempo
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of brigades necessarily hastened research processes
and created something new; a social science reporting platform which was never standardized through
2007-14 because of the difficulty of integrating sui generis experiences at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under
a program management engaged in an ad hoc working pattern. A baseline research template for applied
social science may facilitate future integration of the
research into staff planning.
Success was defined by the militarization of the
civilian, by personality and adaptability. Integrating
personnel into the unit was pivotal if they were to be
considered a valuable addition to the array of personnel and could contribute not just research capabilities
but a number of functions from erecting HESCO barriers to guard duty when attached to Special Operations Forces (SOF) units. Academics therefore had to
become military personnel, in function if not in form.
As Bob Reuss notes, probably the most prominent
item of training and from lessons learned:
was that you had to spend more time on militarising
those folks that we took from all the civilian walks of
life and bringing them into an organisation that is not
necessarily one you have down on Main Street.7

The cross-cultural divide is pronounced, complicating
uniformly robust value-added social science capability to brigades in stabilization operations, as seen by
the heterogeneous performance of embedded teams
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Effective social scientists all
successfully made the transition.
Neither is the long-term training of military personnel, as suggested by Ben Connable, a particularly
viable route. True, the military researcher could “speak
the same language [as the Brigade Combat Team staff],
have the assets, the procedures; and lines of authority
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are already established.”8 But the high turnover rate of
young officers in the U.S. Armed Services and the difficulty and length of a doctoral studentship in the best
social science departments in United States universities means that there is no guarantee that social science research expertise will be resident in the military
enterprise when the next crisis unfolds. Ben Connable,
a brilliant thinker and decorated U.S. Marine Corps
officer, is now retired from the military and working
at the RAND Corporation. As a consequence, the civilian sector will again in times of crises be sought out
and recruited into the military enterprise. The continuation of the program after Iraq and Afghanistan will
allow a crucial line of sight between academia and the
DoD to remain open.
Problematic is that the program between 2007 and
2014 gained such negative media attention. The U.S.
Army is a results-focused enterprise that rewards success, whether at the individual, unit, or organization
level. In the HTS, successful individuals could often be
rendered impotent by a badly functioning team. Each
embedded member was different; team social scientists possessed dissimilar academic skills and various
favored modalities of research. There could be no true
uniform training blueprint because in the heat of the
battle rhythm, these academics conducted research in
the ways in which they had been trained to do so by
the academy. Reverting to type thus did not allow formulation of a one-size-fits-all training program. Nor
was it a case that the post-doctoral embeds made the
best researchers; because they had been trained to the
highest degree by the academy, they were often the
most difficult to transition to a military mindset and
their writing style could be verging on the unintelligible to the military customer. In addition, personalities
were not coded nor was it known which personality
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would function well in areas exposed to high levels
of selective violence against the incumbent forces. It
could be guessed, but the transition from Fort Leavenworth to combat conditions on different continents
carried with it various unknowns. As a suggestion
of the author, future research could include examination of each team’s feedback on every individual
within the team allowing construction of a matrix
determining positive and negative attributes against
frequency cited.
One of the many unknowable variations was in
individuals’ approaches to the ethical dimension of
their research which was simply a binary outcome
where ethical research was conducted, or it was not.
Often the broad array of social science expertise meant
that ethics carried more or less emphasis, depending
on the social scientist’s own discipline’s proximity
to anthropology. In addition, conflict creates its own
rules beneath the blurring of boundaries in insecure
environments. Despite the arguments of the American
Anthropological Association, research profiles and
products seen by the author and interviews conducted strongly suggest that ethical research could be conducted, by calibrating the character of the interaction
with the population. There was a persistent and unresolved dilemma as social scientists were there serving
a military customer, a priority which could obfuscate
ethical requirements in research and engagement with
the population.
This ethical quagmire, which is exacerbated by
increasing incumbent insecurity in an operating environment, would be substantially reduced in strategic
research modalities away from conflict zones. In addition, in more secure environments, the incumbent
exercises hegemonic control allowing for measured,
careful, and protracted dialogue between the acad376

emy and military. It is in the strategically oriented
articulation of the HTS where deep social science research with hypotheses and systematic approaches of
the type envisaged by the program management can
be realized; where experts in disciplines can conduct
deep research and develop a proper social science
platform for the U.S. Army.
However, there is a significant issue with the capability were it to transition to a strategic asset at the
level of theater security. Countering insurgencies in
Iraq and Afghanistan gave embedded teams a reason for being among the population. Researching the
population was necessary to mitigate the cause and effects of pronounced, highly visible insurgencies. Embedded teams were present in COIN roles; that much
was clearly understood. In relatively calm environments in the Philippines, for example, the population
will less likely understand the presence of researchers that identify themselves as a U.S. Department of
the Army asset. This would actually exacerbate concerns as to the ethical function of the program because
long-range research would transition the character of
products from operationally relevant reporting to ethnographies conducted for a military customer. In such
a strategic articulation, therefore, analogies to entities
with covert character such as the Office of Strategic
Services and Central Intelligence Agency gain greater
credence. Dr. Nicholas Krohley, for example, argues
that, in a strategic articulation, U.S. Army social scientists may struggle to do research because of the distrust of the population and the magnified scrutiny of
critical academics.9
Fundamentally, however, the remit of embedded
teams in a theater security role has not changed. It is,
simply, to listen. The U.S. Department of the Army

377

is engaged in a global stabilization operation, which
has as much relevance at the strategic level as tactical planes. In theater security, long-term issues such
as food security, natural hazards, and institutional
capacity building are fundamental to the well-being
of societies. In September 2014, DoD deployed its military to assist in the fight against the spread of Ebola
virus in West Africa under Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE; increasingly, it is a tool to safeguard livelihoods. The HTS would represent a very human face
to this mission.
Greater collaboration between the program and
academia in a rearticulation to the strategic level may
alleviate certain of these problems. To influence longrange planning and macroscopic activities, the Human
Relations Area Files (HRAF) are a historical analogy
worthy of consideration and mentioned by McFate as
being relevant in shaping her ideas on the HTS.10 The
files were created in the late-1940s when behavioral
scientists at Yale University initiated an interuniversity, nonprofit organization which developed into the
HRAF at Yale, becoming the preeminent archive of anthropological research, containing more than a million
pages of ethnographical analysis collated from nearly
8,000 books and articles, assessing approximately 400
different cultural groups.11 The HRAF has developed
categories for archived research with indexing based
on the Outline of Cultural Materials to organize field
research around anthropological taxonomies which
can be subsequently used to research cultural data to
build social science research platforms.12
Developing typologies for data archived from
existing and future research conducted under the
auspices of HTS is therefore a plausible reality. HTT
products would be more easily digested by a combat
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unit over time if they were presented in a standardized template.13 A central database would allow any
military personnel to search by keyword, category, or
area. The problem encountered by Howard Clark in
Afghanistan is instructive: for him it was “like pulling
teeth trying to get HTS products.”14 Products from 1
to 2 years previous to the point of inquiry were often no longer on SIPRNet, suggesting a problem in
the data management of the military regarding the
retention of social science products.15 Neither was
there, to Clark’s knowledge, an HTS portal on any of
the information-sharing systems available to the U.S.
military, instead, in Clark’s experience, getting team
products was personality-dependent based on social
relationships with embedded teams. The problematic
sharing of HTS research permeated all levels of the
coalition effort in Afghanistan. In a 2009 brief with
John Salvatori, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence—which had come at the request of Major
General Michael Flynn—Program Manager ForwardAfghanistan Mike Warren noted that, during the positive reception, the issue of sharing of products was
raised. Instructively, the program manager observed
that despite shortcomings in that area, it was a broader issue, that “complete integration” within the “ISAF
system was imperative.”16
A recommendation of the author as a consequence
is that the U.S. Army convene a panel of experts to
forge a set of recommendations for theater security
research plans. This could develop a new path for
open-access research and propagate new categories
of analysis for social science products, developed
under the auspices of the U.S. military. Public access
to social science research information aggregated in
theater security research would lead by default to
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greater engagement with the academy and deliver
on the broad call of the U.S. Government’s Office of
Science and Technology to make all federal agencies
with research budgets of U.S.$100 million or above
develop plans to make that research open access.17
Increasing the existing level of academic engagement,
principally through the Cultural Knowledge Consortium, would enable an important conversation which
would speak at once to issues such as ethics, civilmilitary relations, and intelligence.
These recommendations would bring it closer in
practice to the original model of the program conceived
by the Foreign Military Studies Office. In that conception, research analysts would collate information to be
categorized in an open-source database. Some of the
best work of the social scientists represents invaluable
contributions to scholarship. Krohley’s research in
Baghdad during the surge of forces in 2008 is likely to
represent the acme of academic understanding of the
Jaysh al-Mahdi during that time. His knowledge has
been gleaned from on the ground interviews, lending
significant authority to his findings. This must be the
ultimate aim of the HTS, and an idealistic one: to inform both military planning and ultimately for that
expertise to inform scholarship. The program, in transitioning to a theater security asset in more stable areas would therefore be part of a valuable suite of tools
which continue to examine critically and to evolve understanding of sociocultural dimensions of irregular
warfighting.18
The HTS was brilliantly conceived but hindered by
rapid expansion and an incongruous home at TRADOC. In addition, bureaucracy may be a necessary
requirement. As one social scientist notes: “Steve Fondacaro and Montgomery McFate were visionaries in
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that they saw the need for this programme; but the
visionary that has the idea and can start it is not always the best person to run it.”19 For his part, and with
legitimacy, Fondacaro can point to the problematic interactions with the parent organization, as he wrote in
a memo:
Mistrust in the HTS leadership extends to the leadership of TRADOC G2 as well. Much, not all, of the
turmoil we are dealing with daily in terms of managing the myriad of pay and administrative personnel issues, and with internal issues and attitudes within the
workforce both team members and staff, result from
frustration over issues not created in HTS.20

Hampered by the contracting issues and in a deeply fractured relationship with TRADOC, management
of the program in retrospect should have been given
more personnel and hence expertise in recruitment,
selection and pay. In the future, social science research
programs should evolve to become a long-range Army
component, integrated into the architecture of the
combatant commands at a strategic level rather than
combat brigades, facilitating deep learning of environments with a more explicit and concerted transfer
of knowledge to military staff, to thus inform foreign
policy.
Ultimately, war reshapes borders and positions
populations in new patterns onto the geographic landscape. The sociocultural domain in stabilization operations is malleable, prone to rapid transformations,
manipulated through violent means for uncertain
ends. Pre-conflict societies are torn, and traditional relations of reciprocity between the government and the
governed are suppressed. Parochial, ideographic interests of combatants literally engaged in life or death
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battles press the population from a state of civility to
one of Hobbesian nature. It is for this reason that sociocultural analysis in conflict will be required in the
future and continue to be identified as a paramount
consideration in U.S. Army requirements. Here, the
greatest hindrance to effective analysis of the rapidly
transforming sociocultural terrain by qualitative field
work will always be the high operational tempo of
commanders in the field.
Ethnographic research requires considerable time
and focus. Quick research, by contrast, can require
only a week and can cover wide areas, but the knowledge gained can be superficial and its production
environment—done in the chaotic environment of a
conflicted area without establishing deep rapport—
inevitably leads to questions regarding the fidelity
of the research findings. The greater the operational
tempo, the lower the security; and the greater the possible error in the research results obtained by the sociocultural moment. Complicated by the “fog of war,”
language barriers, team schisms, and coupled with the
a military preference for quantitative research that can
fit into fast operational tempos that increases physical
risk and is conducted in insecure areas, all complicate
embedded team effectiveness. As McFate observed in
her doctoral dissertation, “Effective war-fighting depends, at the most basic level, on the ability to cope
with disorder.”21 Ethnography in disordered environments has many limitations not least because, in the
words of one embedded team member:
Conflict zones really suck to live in. It’s incredibly
dangerous and it’s incredibly violent and there is no
guarantee that the knowledge and understanding and
capacity that you develop there will carry you on into
your future career. So when a human being takes a
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long perspective, it is very difficult to incentivize developing the type of knowledge that the Army says
that they want.22

On the one hand, conflict zones facilitate the work
of embedded teams because in that disordered environment “anything goes,” and the work of the team
has obvious legitimacy in the eyes of the population,
whether or not they accept their presence. On the other
hand, the caliber of research that the team can achieve
in a conflict zone is open to interpretation. It is a new
form of social science-based research and poorly understood. Compromised by the tensions of conflict,
the level of fidelity of qualitatively derived data must
be questionable.
As a strategic articulation in theater security, there
is the reverse scenario for the program. There is no
overt reason for an embedded team presence, but the
level of security makes prolonged interaction possible. The program would still have to orient even more
toward academia, becoming a tangible link between
the two cultures. Given the lack of immediate insecurity, there would also be no guarantee that the embedded team would not simply be stuck at the combatant
command, unable to get travel room because without crisis, there was no need to embed a team. This
paradoxical formulation of the HTS between strategic
pre-deployment arenas and population-centric COIN
environments is the crux of the problem going forward for applied social science research and worthy
of larger discussion.
As a fundamental requirement, the embedded
team’s job is to satisfy the commander on the ground,
whether that is the battalion, brigade, or the company.
Arguably, it can most satisfy the requirements of the

383

combatant commander in a strategic articulation. The
HTS was designed with the spectrum of arenas under
consideration. To that end, the program experimented
with two pilot projects between 2011 and 2012. The
first deployed a two-person team to U.S. Army Africa elements between June 2011 and September 2011
which generated 28 reports on multiple countries,
focused on long-term planning needs.23 There is no
known record of a possible second two-person team
that embedded with Northern Command in April
2012 for a proposed 6-month pilot program funded by
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.24 In February 2010, the HTS drafted a mission
analysis for Special Operations Command, Pacific,
which would be composed of a 5-person Theater Coordination Element team and a 9-12 person Human
Terrain Analysis Team, which could be split into three
HTTs. The proposed arrangement also included a
dedicated Research Reachback Cell, composed of two
people in Virginia and one person at Special Operations Command (SOCOM).25 These were, in theory if
not in reality, theater security proof-of-concept teams,
which led to subsequent social scientist presence at
the Southern, Northern, Central and African Army
service regional component commands by late-2013.26
COINs are sui generis—painfully so. Iraq and Afghanistan were characterized by heterodox communities and posed significant language hurdles. Each
brigade faced different challenges in areas in which
they operated. Little recent field research existed on
the politics, economics, society, or infrastructure of either country at the time of the U.S.-led invasions. The
language hurdles and risk of cultural miscommunication amplified the possible inaccuracy of information
gathered in the combat environment. There is thus the

384

requirement to relearn, address, and revise military
failures in Iraq and Afghanistan; and to maintain social science approaches to combat operations because
war is a human enterprise, inextricably linked at the
granular level to social dimensions of civilization such
as economics, agriculture, and politics. Ignoring these
complex interrelationships is certain to suppress the
important aspects of the operating environment that
allow an enemy to function.
There is scope for institutionalizing social science
research capabilities if the home for the HTS would
be in the planning phase of military strategy. However, the program envisaged as a strategic articulation
was improperly conceived. Colonel Lee Grubbs at the
TRADOC G-2 notes:
When we talk about phase 0 [theater security], we
are talking about in its current form from four social
scientists at our Army service component commands.
We are talking very small numbers at a headquarters.
And when they deploy for a specific mission, go and
embed with a force, going forward with a force for 3
weeks, 4 weeks, for however long a discrete mission
is and returning. Nothing as permanent or as direct as
what you are talking about what we did in Afghanistan to support the Village Stability concept.27

What Colonel Grubbs is saying is that research at
the strategic level will be more superficial than at the
tactical levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. The opposite
is required. For example, the social scientist in the
Village Stability Operation embedded in a village for
months, and contributed physically to the well-being
of the villagers. Instead of 3 or 4 weeks, the team involved in theater security must go into the field for
several months. The program can function as a quasi-
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nongovernmental organization, supporting capacity
building. Repositioning the capability as a strategic
asset would be prudent. As the sense of the Afghanistan military crisis recedes from memory, there is a
sense of unlearning the conflict. Just as the Office of
Strategic Services, which emerged in the existential
threat faced in World War II, faded in the embers of
peacetime, so too there is the challenge social science
research faces to reformulate and refocus to prolong
relevance, after the last HTTs departed Afghanistan
in 2014. Fondacaro had planned to transition the tool
to the Humanitarian Information Unit at the Department of State; he saw the HTS as a tool for long-term
research and planning. In the “Human Terrain System Information Briefing” from January 2009 given by
Fondacaro and McFate, they include a slide showing
that ideally, instead of in Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the HTS would be used
as a Phase 0 asset; “Where we should be,” in their
assessment.28
Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute, in
supporting a continuation of the program’s capability and function, notes that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff’s 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy includes a requirement for cultural knowledge; for support teams and building partner capacity.29 The global
landscape is one where, more broadly, inequality creates resistance to any established status quo, which in
severe examples can foment armed rebellion. Such insurgencies as they occur, where they coincide with regions or ideologies of interest to the United States, will
require comprehension in order to create intelligent
responses which may utilize political, and economic
tools in collaboration with military efforts.
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Often, our own obvious and understandable positions can elide important observations of phenomena
and in so doing propagate policies and prescriptions
which are at best impotent and at worst deleterious.
When Islamic State captured Mosul, Iraq, in June
2014, this “extreme manifestation” of law and order
and protection from persecution by Shia-dominated
security forces meant the group’s arrival was met with
some semblance of hope, manifest in footage of small
crowds cheering their convoys as they entered the
city.30 As capture and change give way to governance
and stagnation, the inexorable realities of limited civic
duty and a draconian penal code mean that discontent
may burgeon. Yet, this emerging civilian antipathy is
offset by continued popular concern within the urban
center at the possible actions of the Iraqi national security forces should they recapture the city. Islamic
State does not need to create a utopian ideal in Mosul
to ensure relations of reciprocity between itself and
those it governs; the group only needs to continue
to be viewed as a preferential ruling polity to the
national government in a city in which years of war
has created an atomized social structure incapable of
coherent civil dissent.
Military solutions aimed at recapture in such situations are only one element of the answer to U.S. foreign policy questions at both the strategic and tactical levels. Understanding the historical trajectory of a
region through social, economic, and political lenses,
including as much engagement with communities
as security allows, can create powerful platforms for
policy formation. The output of research conducted in
and around Sadr City, Iraq, by HTTs for example, has
afforded a deeper understanding of the position of the
population regarding the violent actors than previ-
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ously existed, by investigating popular sentiment and
the relation of civilians to these actors. As one social
scientist notes of the prevailing tendency to obscure
the host nation in studying the Iraq conflict, there has
been a systematic neglect of any:
detailed examination of the localized dynamics of violence (instead, more commonly dismissing the viability of such exploration by presenting Iraq as hopelessly
divided and impenetrably complex), the country and
its people have received only token attention from authors whose central focus has lain elsewhere.31

The HTS embedded field social scientists throughout 8 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their research
explored these “localized dynamics of violence”
through a myriad of heterogeneous methodologies.
The ongoing effect is an aggregation of research, insights, and experiences borne from a program which,
at its height in 2009, had more than 40 HTTs deployed
and embedded an estimated 700 people between 2007
and 2010.32 The public output of this research is already
considerable, including in its sweep several academic
presses and multiple scholarly journals. The compelling story of the program means that their work receives robust levels of engagement across military
and academic communities upon publication. This
is an important second-order effect of the program; a
long-term result of conducting research in contested
spaces as paid servants of the U.S. Army; and a continuing and aggregating effect which appears to have
outlasted the duration of the HTS itself.
Throughout this book I have recorded the recollected experiences of former HTT social scientists in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS saw a number of social scientists whose professional development and
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subject matter expertise have been accelerated in conflict working for the military enterprise. Many of them
are now dispersed into the broader DoD enterprise.
Those individuals have since qualified the character
of the HTS; critiqued their participation in it, and assessed the possibilities and limitations of social science research during military operations. Former
program members now weigh both academia and the
military from the vantage point of invaluable experience, understanding the structure and limitations of
each discipline, speaking both languages. Regardless
of the future of social science research in the military,
in possession of esoteric knowledge, robust credibility
and legitimacy from their work in Iraq and Afghanistan affords immense value to the expertise of these
individuals that embedded as part of the program. In
conclusion, it suggests that an enduring legacy of the
U.S. Army’s HTS will be an altogether human one.
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APPENDIX A
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
TO FORMER HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
Recruitment.
 ow did you first learn about the Human Terrain
H
System?
Why did you enlist with the Human Terrain System?
Can you describe the recruitment process?
Training and Pre-Deployment.
Can you describe the training process?
Can you describe your experiences during predeployment?
Team Composition.
Can you describe the team dynamics?
Can you describe the team relationship with the
unit in which you were embedded?
Logistics.
 ow did you gain transport for research projects
H
among the civilian population?
Research.
Did language capabilities matter?
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I n your opinion, which was the best research project you conducted?
Which piece of research did you think had most
effect on the unit in which you were embedded?
What was the frequency of the reports generated
by the team?
Relationship to Continental U.S.-Human
Terrain System.
 id you use the Research Reachback Center durD
ing your time in theater?
Products.
How did you create the product from the research?
How did you disseminate the product to the

embedded unit?
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APPENDIX B
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, 113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESS., H. R. 4435 [REPORT
NO. 113-446], APRIL 9, 2014, AMENDED
MAY 13, 2014, pp. 333-335
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APPENDIX C
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APPENDIX C
CJTF-82 ENDORSEMENT TO JOINT URGENT
OPERATIONAL NEED
FOR HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS
Released as a part of a Freedom of Information Act
request by the author, the endorsement was signed on
April 21, 2007, by Brigadier General Rodney O. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General—Support of
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The memorandum notes that understanding of social, cultural, and
political factors at the local level is critical to success in
counterinsurgency and stability operations, and more
broadly, the war on terror. At this stage in the evolution of the program, it was noted by the commanding
officer that Human Terrain System could “identify Al
Qaida Associated Militants leaders operating among
the population.”
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APPENDIX D
CJTF-82 JOINT URGENT OPERATIONAL
NEED FOR HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS
Released as a part of a Freedom of Information Act
request by the author, the original Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement for Human Terrain System
is dated April 17, 2007. More detailed than the previous endorsement, it notes that an inability to translate
“hard won local cultural social knowledge” to newly
arriving units had operational impact, the breakdown
of which is redacted. Importantly for the supposition
of this thesis, it explicitly links Human Terrain Teams
to analyzing “the complex interaction between tribes,
identify Al Qaida Associated Militants leaders and
Improvised Explosive Device cells operating among
the population.”
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APPENDIX E
MNC-I (MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ)
ENDORSEMENT TO JOINT URGENT
OPERATIONAL NEED
FOR HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS
Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq signed the endorsement for Human Terrain Teams to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-SURGE on April 7, 2007.
“Detailed knowledge of the host populations” in “real
time” is critical to counterinsurgency operations in the
country.
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APPENDIX F
MNC-I (MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ)
JOINT URGENT OPERATIONAL
NEEDS STATEMENT
FOR HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS
The undated Joint Urgent Operational Needs
Statement (JUONS) also signed by Lieutenant General
Odierno gives additional reasoning for the request for
Human Terrain Teams, stressing a need for a “social
science expert” in an Iraqi theater which is “complicated by a number of human factors.” The JUONS notes
that five teams of four personnel each would be in Iraq
by mid-2007 and that, to support the surge, there was
a requirement for an additional 13 Human Terrain
Teams and four Human Terrain Analysis Teams. This
shows the concept of the Human Terrain Analysis
Team existed from at least mid-2007 and before any
Human Terrain Teams had embedded in Iraq. The
teams would increase knowledge of the population
and tribal systems, and institutionalize this knowledge, decreasing “both coalition and local national
casualties.”
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APPENDIX G
MNF-I ENDORSEMENT TO JOINT URGENT
OPERATIONAL NEED
FOR HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS
This short endorsement by Multi-National ForceIraq notes that the teams can supply “real time host
nation intelligence to commanders on the ground.”
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APPENDIX H
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND ENDORSEMENT TO
JOINT URGENT OPERATIONAL NEED CC-0197
Major General Timothy F. Ghormley, U.S. Marine
Corps, signed the memorandum and in doing so,
observes that USCENTCOM views Human Terrain
Teams as not meeting the strict definition of a JUONS,
but is nevertheless “forwarding to Joint Staff to assess and determine the best approach to fulfilling this
capability gap.”
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APPENDIX I
SUPERVISORY SOCIAL SCIENTIST,
TASK LIST, COMPLETE TASK LIST 20090808
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APPENDIX J
FIELD SOCIAL SCIENTIST, TASK LIST,
COMPLETE TASK LIST 20090808
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APPENDIX K
REVISED POSITION DESCRIPTION FOR SOCIAL
SCIENTIST,
JANUARY 14, 2009
Position Description
PD#: ST302454
Replaces PD#: NEW
Sequence#: VARIES
SOCIAL SCIENTIST
GG-0101-15
Servicing CPAC: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
PERS – CENTRALIZED, FORT HUACHUCA, AZ
Agency: VARIES
MACOM: VARIES
Command Code: VARIES
Region: WEST
Citation 1: OPM SERIES DEF., GS-101, AUG 2002		
Citation 2: CIPMS PGS, PART 2 FOR NON-SUPERVISORY POSITIONS, JUN 90			
Citation 3: CIPMS, APP G, GUIDE-SERIES NOT
CVRD BY SPECIFIC AOG, JAN 95			
PD Library PD: NO
COREDOC PD: NO
Classified By: MAXIE L. MCFARLAND
Classified Date: 01/14/2009
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FLSA: EXEMPT Drug Test Required: VARIES
DCIPS PD: YES
This description is to be used for Title 10 Excepted Service, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System positions only.
Career Program: 35
Financial Disclosure Required: NO Acquisition Position: NO
Functional Code: 00
Requires Access to Firearms: VARIES
Interdisciplinary: NO
Competitive Area: VARIES Position Sensitivity:
VARIES
Target Grade/FPL: 15
Competitive Level: VARIES Emergency Essential:
[]
Career Ladder PD: NO
Bus Code: VARIES
Personnel Reliability Position: VARIES Information Assurance: N
PD Status: VERIFIED
Duties:
This is a DCIPS position.
The Social Scientist designs and executes social science research and analysis based on the Commander's
concept of operation. The Social Scientist oversees the
research and analysis process in coordination with the
Team Leader and Research Manager.
Conduct Research:
The Operations Manager supports a Human Terrain System team in all phases and types of sociocultural research and analysis conducted by the team in
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a combat environment. This includes both primary
and secondary source research. Primary source research is data collected directly by a Human Terrain
System team utilizing knowledgeable local sources.
Sociocultural research is not focused primarily on either friendly or enemy actions, instead, it focuses on
people, their perceptions, identities, social organization, and interdependencies, all of which tend to be
dynamic and contextually specific. The conduct of
primary source research includes the movement to
and from research sites in conjunction with military
units and the data collection activities conducted by
teams at unsecured data collection locations in austere
environments.
Research Planning:
The Social Scientist plans and designs research
projects, including long-term and short-term projects. Planning research is a process that includes the
creation of an overarching research plan that guides
the research efforts of the team and research designs
that guide the research effort for discrete issues and
projects. The research design process focuses on specific research objectives that address implicit or explicit requirements of the supported command and
contribute to the expansion of the knowledge base.
Research designs should be nested within the overall research plan. Both research planning and design
are continuous processes and should be reviewed as
requirements and resources change over time. When
successfully executed, research planning and design
provides a framework for collection and analysis that
is driven by supported unit requirements and aids in
the production of sociocultural understanding. Plan-
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ning of research projects includes determining the
methodological feasibility of research efforts, defining
the research objective, formulating the research questions, analyzing knowledge gaps, selecting collection
and analysis methods, and developing appropriate
research instruments such as interview protocols and
surveys.
Data Collection:
The Social Scientist oversees the collection of primary and secondary-source data to develop a common
operating picture of the sociocultural environment.
The conduct of research encompasses all actions necessary to collect primary and secondary sociocultural
information. Research should be conducted to fulfill
the unit’s sociocultural knowledge requirements,
whether that requirement is explicit or implicit. Collected data will be used by supported military units
and Human Terrain System teams to develop common
operating pictures of the sociocultural environment,
which will be aggregated at progressively higher echelons. Data collection must be systematic, empirical,
complete, reliable, and valid. Human Terrain System
collection methodologies include: direct observation,
visual ethnography, key leader engagement, participant observation, depth interviewing, group or focus
group interviewing, surveying, secondary source
research, and mixed methods approaches.
Data Analysis:
The Social Scientist oversees the qualitative or
quantitative analysis of data. Once data is collected, it
is subjected to analysis using a variety of tools. Each
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form of analysis has its own strengths, limitations,
and potential outputs. The type of research question
to be answered will guide the selection of the appropriate analytical tool. Analytical tools include structural analysis, cultural domain analysis, text analysis,
quantitative analysis, and mixed method analysis.
Research Assessment:
The Social Scientist oversees the assessment of
research processes and methods. Assessing research
activities is an ongoing process which includes assessing the relevance and outcomes of the research for the
supported unit. Assessing research activities also includes identifying procedural improvements to facilitate future research, analysis, and products. Process
assessments on research and analysis methodologies
provide input on effective methodologies to improve
future research activities.
Producing Outcomes:
In conjunction with other members of the team, the
Social Scientist produces documents, products, and
briefings for the military unit as required and presents
them at to the supported unit and other audiences.
The Social Scientist provides unit specific sociocultural training as requested. The Social Scientist reviews
products for accuracy, relevance, timeliness, soundness of analysis and adherence to both commander’s
intent and the broad guidelines of national policy.
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Support to Military Decisiomaking.
In conjunction with other members of the team,
the Social Scientist provides support to unit decisionmaking in the operations and the military decisionmaking process. Throughout this process, teams aid
commanders and staff by providing insight into first,
second, and third order effects, providing situational
awareness and developing mitigation strategies. The
Social Scientist assists in identifying known supported unit sociocultural information requirements, the
most effective way to integrate into the military decisionmaking process and the most effective products
to communicate research findings and recommendations. The Social Scientist participates during working groups and mission planning. The Social Scientist
coordinates within the command and with staffs at all
applicable levels as guided by the Team Leader.
Performs other duties as assigned.
Job Qualifications (Mandatory)
Ability to communicate effectively, both verbally
and in written form, in English.
Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g.,
Microsoft Office).
Possess and maintain a level of physical fitness
which enables them to operate in conditions where
they may have to, at a minimum:
1. Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the
summer and cold or freezing conditions during the
winter.
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2. Traverse rough and uneven terrain.
3. Endure hostile environment to include persons
that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life.
4. Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally
challenging projects.
5. Travel extended distances by foot, military
ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous
or desert regions.
6. Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements and animals.
7. Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day.
8. Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering
and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security
halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.
M.A./M.S. or Ph.D. in Social Science (Anthropology, Political Science, Sociology, Criminology, Economics, Geography, Government), Behavioral Science
(e.g., Psychology), Humanities (e.g., Folklore, History,
Middle Eastern Languages and Literature, Religious
Studies), Regional Studies (e.g., Mediterranean Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Near Eastern Languages
& Cultures, Central Eurasian Studies), Language and
Linguistics (e.g., Arabic, Pashtu, Dari), Public Policy/
International Relations (e.g., International Policy
Studies, Diplomacy, Statecraft and Security Affairs,
International Affairs, Security Policy, Foreign Service,
Strategic Intelligence, Military Studies).
Conducted research design and execution:
•	Designed data collection instruments (e.g. surveys, interview protocols)
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•	Conducted data collection activities (e.g. interviews, focus groups, and participant observation)
•	
Prepared a variety of in-depth reports and
other written material.
Factors.
FACTOR A. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGES
Recognized in the social science community as a
technical subject matter expert on social science (e.g.,
has presented papers at conferences, has written peer
reviewed publications in academic journals and nonpeer reviewed papers in professional journals, and
has presented technical briefings and reports to professional and academic audiences).
MA/MS or Ph.D. in Social Science (Anthropology,
Political Science, Sociology, Criminology, Economics,
Geography, Government), Behavioral Science (e.g.,
Psychology), Humanities (e.g., Folklore, History,
Middle Eastern Languages and Literature, Religious
Studies), Regional Studies (e.g., Mediterranean Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Near Eastern Languages
& Cultures, Central Eurasian Studies), Language and
Linguistics (e.g., Arabic, Pashtu, Dari), Public Policy/
International Relations (e.g., International Policy
Studies, Diplomacy, Statecraft and Security Affairs,
International Affairs, Security Policy, Foreign Service,
Strategic Intelligence, Military Studies).
Conducted research design and execution:
•	Designed data collection instruments (e.g. surveys, interview protocols).
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•	Conducted data collection activities (e.g. interviews, focus groups, participant observation).
•	Prepared a variety of in-depth reports and other written material.
Ability to apply experimental theories and new developments to problems not susceptible to treatment
by accepted methods.
Makes decisions or recommendations significantly
changing, interpreting, or developing important policies and programs.
Comprehensive understanding of applied research
methods and expert knowledge of how to configure
research projects to answer questions related to practical matters.
Record of publications in academic or professional
journals or newspapers.
Extensive field research experience in a cross cultural environment.
Has managed or supervised research projects and
research teams (i.e. principal investigator).
Knowledge of personnel management and administration requirements, procedures, and techniques to
supervise personnel and programs.
FACTOR B. GUIDELINES
The nature of the guidelines available for the conduct of human terrain research and analysis varies
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greatly depending on the research, operational, or
planning mission that is being undertaken. Some of
the tasks performed enter uncharted areas of social
science research and applications. Basic guidance
comes from the commander of the supported unit and
the activity. Often there is limited guidance regarding
how vaguely stated requirements are to be translated
into concrete recommendations for courses of action
in support of military operations. There are recurrent
requirements for supervision of the research portion
of extremely sensitive and creative programs in support of national policy. Judgment, ingenuity, and originality are required to adapt mission to foreign policy
objectives.
FACTOR C. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
AND EFFECT OF DECISIONS
Social Scientist makes authoritative determinations
regarding research findings and advises on technical
social science issues. Decisions and commitments often involve large expenditures of resources and have a
strong impact on important programs. Work consists
of broad functions with enduring requirements and
duration of effort that often requires phasing. Incumbent must plan for multiple lines of operation and
consider multiple courses of action and potential conflict and cooperation with internal elements and external agencies. Developing and supervising research
requires coordination and development of contacts
across a wide range of scientific, academic, commercial and government agencies.
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FACTOR D. WORK RELATIONSHIPS
With respect to research and analysis, incumbent
represents the Activity in all forms and at all levels
as required. Assessment of the Activity's capabilities
in those spheres is authoritative. Once a position is
settled upon internally, incumbent is expected to win
support from outside agencies for the Activity's programs. Regular person-to-person work contacts are
maintained with officials within the Activity and with
staff officers and planners at the theater command, Department of Defense, and National Agency levels. The
last category includes meetings and liaison with officials at the Department of State, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Contacts
with general officers and their civilian equivalents are
not infrequent. When called upon, helps to develop
and present the Activity’s position to bodies as high
as the National Security Council, and to high officials,
both American and foreign, in the United States and
abroad. Maintains regular contact with nationally recognized members of the academic community.
FACTOR E. SUPERVISION RECEIVED
The supervisor (the Team Leader) generally provides only administrative direction, with assignments
only in terms of broadly defined missions or functions.
The Social Scientist has responsibility for planning,
designing, and carrying out programs, projects, studies or other work independently. The Team Leader
is kept informed of significant developments. Completed work is reviewed only from an overall standpoint in terms of feasibility, compatibility, effectiveness or expected results, and for its contribution to the
advancement of the teams’ research objectives.
480

FACTOR F. SUPERVISION EXERCISED
The Social Scientist is responsible for the technical
aspects of research process and products of an independently functioning professional research team. Supervises research functions and sets quality standards
for the research, analysis, and writing of the team. In
conjunction with the Team Leader, recommends approval or returns for revision all studies and other
documents produced by the team for distribution. Incumbent has substantial responsibility for the technical soundness of all studies, which involve specialized
research of an extremely high intellectual level. Has
authority to alter the organization of work within the
team in order to accomplish research objectives, and
guides subordinates in the achievement of assigned
research tasks.
FACTOR G. COMPLEXITY OF WORK
SUPERVISED.
The highest level of nonsupervisory work supervised in subordinate work units is GS-14.
TOTAL POINTS:
POINT RANGE: = GG-15
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities.
KNOWLEDGE
Professional level knowledge in social science
or related discipline. This can be demonstrated by
M.A./M.S. or Ph.D. in Social Science (Anthropology,
Political Science, Sociology, Criminology, Economics,
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Geography, Government), Behavioral Science (e.g.,
Psychology), Humanities (e.g., Folklore, History,
Middle Eastern Languages and Literature, Religious
Studies), Regional Studies (e.g., Mediterranean Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Near Eastern Languages
& Cultures, Central Eurasian Studies), Language and
Linguistics (e.g., Arabic, Pashtu, Dari), Public Policy/
International Relations (e.g., International Policy
Studies, Diplomacy, Statecraft and Security Affairs,
International Affairs, Security Policy, Foreign Service,
Strategic Intelligence, Military Studies).
Knowledge of research design and execution:
•	Data collection instruments (e.g. surveys, interview protocols)
•	Data collection activities (e.g. interviews, focus
groups, participant observation)
•	
Data preparation (e.g., in-depth reports and
other written material).
Comprehensive understanding of applied research
methods and expert knowledge of how to configure
research projects to answer questions related to practical matters.
Knowledge of management practices for supervising research projects and research teams (i.e. principal
investigator).
Knowledge of personnel management and administration requirements, procedures, and techniques to
supervise personnel and programs.
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SKILLS
Software:
Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g.,
Microsoft Office).
ABILITIES
Character and Integrity:
Displays a high standard of ethical conduct and
can be trusted in all work situations; chooses an ethical course of action and does the right thing, even in
the face of opposition; encourages others to behave
accordingly; demonstrates core organizational values
and honesty; acts in a principled manner that instills
trust and confidence; is honest and straightforward
when presenting data, conclusions, and recommendations.
Judgment and Decisionmaking:
Demonstrates good judgment by making sound,
timely, and well-informed decisions without deferring actions when decisions need to be made; considers the impact and implications of decisions; commits
to action and follows through on decisions.
Communication:
Conveys written information and ideas in a clear,
concise, and well-organized manner; written communication is targeted to the level of the audience; uses
correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation when
preparing written materials; conveys oral informa483

tion in a clear, concise, and well-organized manner
taking into account the audience and the nature of
the information (e.g., technical, controversial); speaks
clearly, convincingly, and confidently using proper
grammar, tone, and pace; tracks audience responses
and reacts appropriately to those responses. Receives,
attends to, interprets, understands, and responds appropriately to verbal messages and other cues such as
body language and other nonverbal communication;
pays close attention, listening attentively and seeking
additional clarifying information when necessary.
Initiative and Responsibility:
Sets well-defined and realistic personal goals; displays a high level of initiative, effort, and commitment
towards completing assignments in a timely manner;
works with minimal supervision; is motivated to
achieve; demonstrates responsible behavior and determines responsible behavior; takes the lead in getting tasks done with limited prompting or direction;
seeks opportunities to begin new lines of inquiry or
investigation in order to solve problems; accepts responsibility for one’s own actions and words and/
or those of the group or team; takes responsibility for
accomplishing work goals and meeting deadlines;
reliably completes tasks and assignments in a timely
manner; follows through on commitments and does
what it takes to get the job done; goes beyond the call
of duty to meet deadlines.
Interpersonal Competency:
Demonstrates fairness, professionalism, and
tact when interacting with others; understands and
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interacts effectively with a variety of people to include
those who are difficult, hostile, or distressed; adjusts
interpersonal style, as needed, to interact with differing individuals, new teams, co-workers or customers;
performs effectively in different cultures learning new
languages, values, traditions and politics.
Handling Work Stress:
Remains calm under pressure, handles frustration,
and acts as a calming influence; demonstrates a positive outlook and persistence, even under adverse or
difficult situations; persists at a task or problem despite
interruptions, obstacles, or setbacks; reacts appropriately and decisively to life threatening or dangerous
situations; adjusts and deals with unpredictable situations, shift focus and take reasonable action.
Physical Fitness:
Social Scientists must achieve and maintain a level
of physical fitness which enables them to operate in
conditions where they may have to, at a minimum:
1. Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the
summer and cold or freezing conditions during the
winter.
2. Traverse rough and uneven terrain.
3. Endure hostile environment to include persons
that may cause bodily harm, injury, or loss of life.
4. Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally
challenging projects.
5. Travel extended distances by foot, military
ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous
or desert regions.
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6. Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements and animals.
7. Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day.
8. Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear; this may include: entering and
exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt,
and responding to direct and indirect fire.
Logical Reasoning and Synthesis—Analyzes and
integrates information to identify trends, rules, and
relationships, draw appropriate conclusions, make
recommendations, and address issues or problems;
identifies and uses principles, rules, and relationships
to construct arguments or interpret facts, data, or other
information; dissects problems into meaningful parts
and uses logic and judgment to determine accuracy
and relevance of data; identifies and reconciles gaps,
uncertainties, and key assumptions of data; integrates
information, evaluates and prioritizes alternatives,
and assesses similarities and differences in data to develop findings and conclusions; and understands potential implications of these findings or conclusions.
Service Orientation:
Works with others (i.e., anyone who receives or
uses a product or service that you or your work unit
provides) to understand their needs, set expectations,
and provide timely, flexible, and responsive products
or services; applies knowledge of relevant customer
organizations or operations, including how to translate requirements to provide appropriate output or
response to meet customer needs.
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Team Leadership:
Directs, coordinates, and monitors group activities
to ensure timely and effective completion of work; provides coaching, mentoring, and timely and constructive feedback to staff to develop their full potential;
motivates staff, inspires work ethic and dedication,
and obtains cooperation and commitment toward the
group’s goals; encourages creative tension and differences of opinions; anticipates and takes steps to prevent counterproductive confrontations; manages and
resolves conflicts and disagreements in a constructive
manner; develops and maintains collaborative working relationships with others; works with others to
achieve goals; encourages and facilitates cooperation
and group identity; develops and maintains effective
networks, coalitions, and liaison relationships with
others to create an authentic foundation for developing trust and respect by bridging personal, professional, team, military, and multinational cultures;
respects, understands, and values differences (e.g.,
technical, demographic, occupational or educational
diversity) to achieve the vision and mission of the
HTS and supported unit; utilizes diversity of talents
to achieve goals.
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
1. Must be able to obtain and maintain a Secret security clearance.
2. Performs temporary duty (TDY) travel UP TO
100% of the time.
Evaluation:
Not Listed
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APPENDIX L
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING GROUP,
SESSION 2,
MARCH 16-27, 2009, OUTBRIEF 5, SLIDES 41-42
Slide 41

Slide 42
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APPENDIX M
HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM IZ4,
’PROPORTIONS BRIEF
SECTARIAN BREAKDOWNS,’
POWERPOINT PRESENTATION, 2008, SLIDES 2-5
Slide 2

Source: gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml
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Slide 3

Ethnic-Religious Neighborhoods in Metropolitan
Baghdad, Early-2007

Source: gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Baghdad_Ethnic_2007_
early_sm.jpg

Slide 4

Sectarian Distribution by Muhalla
in Strike AO in 2007
Source: gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml
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Slide 5

Ethnic-Religious Neighborhoods in
Metropolitan Baghdad, 2003
Source: gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Baghdad_Ethnic_2003_
sm.jpg
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APPENDIX N
GOVERNMENT DOMAIN QUESTIONS, AF1, 2008
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APPENDIX O
IZ4 PRODUCT, “ISOLATING SADR CITY,”
4TH BCT, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION, FALL
2008
Isolating Sadr City—Anticipated Cultural and Political Consequences.
In an effort to isolate Jaish Al-Mahdi (JAM) activity and apply pressure to Muqtada al-Sadr’s political
movement, the Government of Iraq and Coalition
Forces (GoI and CF) have erected a series of walls to
cut Sadr City off from the rest of Baghdad. The following paper anticipates likely consequences of this
action in the context of Sadr City’s history and the
growth of the Sadrist political movement therein. CF
can expect extremely negative reactions from both Sadrist leadership and elements of Sadr City’s population, but an understanding of the cultural and political
background from which these protests stem may enable CF to anticipate, understand and possibly mitigate fallout.
The City of the Revolution.
The area now known as Sadr City was built at
the order of General Abdul Karim Qassim in the immediate aftermath of the 1958 revolution. It was the
centerpiece of his widely-heralded national initiative
to bring “social justice” to Iraq and better the lives
of the poor, and was created to replace the sprawling, disease-ridden slums that had developed in East
Baghdad during previous decades of uncontrolled urban migration from the rural South. It was named Madinat ath Thawra, “City of the Revolution,” and was
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intended to stand as a symbol of the new egalitarian
ethic that would characterize Iraq’s future.
The ambitious building project suffered from poor
follow-through and subsequent negligence, however,
and by the mid-sixties it had become an extraordinarily densely populated slum to which Shi’a tribesmen from southern Iraq continued to flock in search
of work. Madinat ath Thawra became a fertile recruiting ground for radical opposition movements like
the Iraqi Communist Party and the Da’wa Islamists,
experiencing continued neglect from the government
while cementing a national reputation as a turbulent,
overcrowded, crime-ridden slum of poorly educated
Shi’a. Referred as “the stronghold of heroes” in Shi’a
Islamist literature, the area developed a localized
pride in response to the hardships (often self-inflicted)
its inhabitants endured.
Saddam City.
Saddam Hussein renamed the area in his own
honor after seizing power, but few benefits were extended to the President’s namesake community thereafter. Despite the Ba’th Party’s impressive nationwide
development of public infrastructure and expansion
of government services (facilitated by the oil-boom
of the 1970s), the entire area lacked paved roads or a
sewage system. Conditions deteriorated as the Iraqi
economy neared collapse during the latter years of
war with Iran, while its well-deserved reputation for
crime, corruption and poverty earned it the continued
scorn and derision of the broader Iraqi population.
The sanctions regime established after the 1991 Gulf
War further crippled the ability of the Iraqi government to extend basic services to its subjects, and the
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residents of Saddam City were largely left to fend for
themselves.
It was in this atmosphere that Mohammed Sadiq
al-Sadr (aka Sadr II, father of MAS) built his constituency in Saddam City. Operating with the blessing of
Saddam Hussein, Sadr II built a network of charities in
the crowded slum which represented the first substantive, organized effort to care for the local population
since General Qassim ordered the city’s construction.
Sadr II was a political figure as much as a religious
one, however, and his radical Islamist-populist rhetoric blamed both Western imperialism and government
negligence for the plight of his followers. He rallied
enormous support among the destitute Shi’a of Saddam City in the process, but his shift from client of
Saddam to critic led to his killing at the order of the
Iraqi president.
Sadr City.
Sadr II’s name lives on—the area was renamed
in his honor after Saddam Hussein’s removal, and
the Office of the Martyr Sadr refers to him as well—
and localized pride has further solidified around his
legacy. The slums of Sadr City now stand in many
ways as a glaring reminder of the failures of successive Iraqi governments to deliver the “social justice”
promised by General Qassim, and the Sadrist movement is now seen by significant elements of Baghdad’s
impoverished Shi’a as the vehicle through which this
downtrodden, ridiculed, and neglected constituency
will finally find its voice in national politics. A sense
of vengeance is evident in the political rhetoric of the
movement as a result, and this has fueled the intensity
of the Sadr-GoI rivalry because the better-educated,
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wealthier Shi’a of Da’wa and Supreme Islamic Iraqi
Council (SIIC) will be the primary targets of Sadrist
retribution.
The Wall and Its Consequences.
The construction of a wall to isolate Sadr City from
the rest of Baghdad has met with approval among
much of the Iraqi population, which despises JAM and
furthermore thinks very little of MAS’s constituents.1
It remains to be seen whether the wall’s continued
presence will enable the Sadrists to breathe renewed
life into the area’s perceived historical legacy of neglect and oppression at the hands of both the West and
the Iraqi government, however, around which Sadr
II originally built his following. These themes interweave seamlessly with traditional Shi’a narratives of
injustice and persecution, and it can be expected that
related propaganda will resonate among the population of Sadr City. The wall will invite comparisons to
Israel’s “security barriers,” and will be depicted in Sadrist propaganda as yet another iteration of the locals’
oppression at the hands of an uncaring central government and malicious Western imperialists. The Sadrists will strive to re-enforce their role as the only organization ever to meet the needs of the people in the
area, and the wall may enable the Sadrist movement
to rebuild support among its traditional constituents.
Historical Comparisons.
The example of the Berlin Wall has been cited in
discussion as a model for the wall that will encircle
Sadr City. The argument posits that the wall will
punish Sadr City’s inhabitants for their facilitation of
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criminal and militia activity in their neighborhoods,
while at the same time enable them to “look over the
wall” to see the benefits of cooperation with GoI. The
problem with the comparison to Cold War Germany,
however, is that, in its application to Sadr City, the
United States takes on the role of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and GoI that of the German Democratic Republic. Historically, the builder of a wall is
the party blamed for its existence and the suffering
that ensues, as anger is typically directed toward the
party directly responsible for a barrier as opposed to
the more abstract concepts used to justify its existence.
ENDNOTE - APPENDIX O
1. The feelings of many Iraqis verge on hatred for the people
of Sadr City. In a recent Human Terrain Team interview, an IA
intelligence officer suggested that CD "seal off Sadr City and [use
chemical weapons to] gas everyone inside" to solve current problems with JAM.
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APPENDIX P
IZ4 4-SLIDE POWERPOINT PRESENTATION,
4TH BCT, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION,
FALL 2008
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ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS,
AND GLOSSARY

AAA

American Anthropological Association

AO

Area of Operations

ASCOPE

Areas, Structures, Capabilities,
Organizations, People, Events

AWG

Asymmetric Warfare Group

CA

Civil Affairs

CALL

Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAOCL

Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning

CENTCOM

United States Central Command

C-IED

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

CIDNE

Combined Information Data Network
Exchange

CKC

Cultural Knowledge Consortium

CNA

Center for Naval Analyses

COIN

Counterinsurgency

CONUS

Continental United States

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

COR-HTS

Cultural Operations Research–Human
Terrain System
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DISCC

Defense Intelligence Sociocultural
Capabilities Council

DoD

U.S. Department of Defense

DOTMLPF

Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,
Facilities

DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,
Facilities-Policy
FM 3-24

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24,
Counterinsurgency

FMSO

Foreign Military Studies Office

G-2

Military Intelligence staff element
commanded by a general officer

GAO

Government Accountability Office

HTAT

Human Terrain Analysis Team

HTS

Human Terrain System

HTT

Human Terrain Team

HRAF

Human Relations Area Files

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IRB

Institutional Review Board

IQATF

Iraqi Advisor Task Force

JIEDDTF

Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Task Force
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JIEDDO

Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization

JUONS

Joint Urgent Operational Needs
Statement

MAP-HT

Mapping the Human Terrain

NIPRNet

Non-Classified Internet Protocol
Router Network

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

OCO

Overseas Contingency Operations

ONS

Operational Needs Statement

OPT

Operational Planning Team

OUSDI

Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence

PDT

Program Development Team

PMESII

Political, Military, Economic, Social,
Infrastructure and Information

PSYOP

Psychological Operations

RRC

Research Reachback Center

S-2

Military Intelligence Staff

SfAA

Society for American Anthropologists

SIPRNet

Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network
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SME-Nets

Subject Matter Expert-Networks

SOCOM

Special Operations Command

SSRA

Social Science Research and Analysis

SSWG

Social Science Working Group

TIGR

Tactical Ground Reporting System

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

TRISA

Training and Doctrine Command
Intelligence Support Activity

TCE

Theater Coordination Element

TDA

Table of Distribution and Allowances

TOE

Table of Organization and Equipment

TSO

Theater Support Office
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